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ABSTRACT
Agency theory suggests that problems will arise when there is a separation of
ownership and control in firms. According to the literature, the main agency
problem under a diffused ownership structure is likely to be the conflict of
interests between managers and shareholders, whereas the central agency problem
under a concentrated ownership structure is probably the exploitation of minority
shareholders' interests by controlling shareholders. In the case of Chinese
enterprises, such problems are even more complicated, as the government acts as
both the regulator and player in the markets.
This thesis utilises data from Chinese stock markets to address some important
issues in the corporate governance literature. Firstly, it empirically examines the
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance in Chinese
publicly listed companies (Pl.Cs), with the heterogeneity amongst state
ownership types being carefully explored. In contrast with previous research, I
found that state ownership does not necessarily lead to inferior corporate
performance, and some state owners can perform equally as well as their private
competitors.
Secondly, this thesis thoroughly investigates the issue of corporate cash holdings
of Chinese PLCs, which enhances our understanding of firms' cash holding
behaviour in the context of the largest transition economy. The empirical analysis
not only reveals the determinants of corporate cash holdings of PLCs, but also
I
confirms the existence of the target cash holding level in China. Moreover, the
exploitation of firms' dynamic adjustment mechanisms towards target levels is
also included in the analysis.
Finally, it seeks to redress the gap in the literature on top executive turnover in the
Chinese context. The executive turnover-performance relationship is explicitly
modelled in the analysis, and a variety of reasons why CEOs exit their posts are
also dearly identified. Empirical findings confirm a negative relationship
between corporate performance and CEO turnover. Also, empirical analysis
suggests that regardless of the ownership types, there is no systematic difference
in the CEO performance-turnover sensitivity among PLCs. Meanwhile, there is
evidence showing that PLCs tend to report some 'face-saving' reasons instead of
disclosing true reasons for turnovers, in order to protect their departing CEOs.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Context and background
"Corporate governance deals with the ways in which owners of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment" (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997, p.737). When an owner (principal) does not or cannot perform
management functions directly, any arrangement between the principal and his or
her nominated and appointed management (agent) can contribute to the problem
of interest conflicts. This is because the agent might not always make decisions in
the principal's interests in some unforeseen scenarios. Theoretically, such a
problem could become more severe in the presence of an informational
asymmetry where owners know less about the firm's day to day operations than
their delegated managers. In the presence of such informational asymmetry,
managers may find it very easy to run the business in their own interests rather
than those of the owners, and sometimes even at the cost of the owners. To
safeguard their assets, owners need to come up with a functioning corporate
governance system of control and monitoring over management. Moreover, the
system should consist of a number of corporate governance mechanisms in order
to ensure that managers operate the firm in the owners' interests at all times.
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The definition of corporate governance may vary depending on one's view of the
world. As mentioned before, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) simply define corporate
governance as a way in which suppliers of finance ensure their return on the
investment they have made to corporations. Gillan and Starks (1998) define
corporate governance as the system of laws, rules and factors that control a firm's
day-to-day operations. Denis (2001) suggests that corporate governance is
comprised of the set of institutional and market mechanisms that would make
self-interested managers maximise the value of residual cash flows of the firm on
behalf of its shareholders.
Regardless of the various definitions above, it is clear that the fundamental issue
on which the field of corporate governance is based is that there are potential
problems associated with the separation of ownership and control which are
inherent in the modem corporate form of organisation (Denis, 2001). The
fundamental issue of corporate governance can be traced back to Smith's
masterpiece in 1776 - 'The Wealth of Nations' - in which he raised concerns
regarding the problems caused by the separation of ownership and control in
joint-stock companies. Recent research interest in corporate governance
originates from the seminal work by Berle and Means (1932), in which they
describe a situation where potential conflicts of interest may occur between
corporate managers and dispersed shareholders, particularly when managers do
not have an ownership interest at a company. Since then, research on corporate
governance has evolved over many generations. However, its ultimate aim
remains unchanged, which is to improve the corporate governance system in
modem corporations, to mitigate conflicts of interest, and to provide better
2
protection for the interests of suppliers of finance.
According to the existing literature, the main agency problem under a dispersed
ownership structure is likely to be the conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders, whereas the central agency problem under a concentrated
ownership structure is probably the exploitation of minority shareholders'
interests by controlling shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980)
and Fama and Jensen (1983a, b) primarily focused on the agency problem that
arises from the conflict of interest between management and shareholders,
typically in firms characterised by a diffused ownership structure. They were all
concerned with the agency problems that arise when a firm's decision-making
rights are in the hands of managers who are not the firm's shareholders. They
doubt whether a manager who controls but does not own a firm will always
operate it whole-heartedly to maximise shareholders' wealth. Rather, managers
who hold substantial residual control rights may have an incentive to expropriate
shareholders' interests. Arguably, their arguments about agency conflicts between
managers and shareholders are based on Berle and Means's image of the
ownership of modem companies. However, La Porta et 01 (1999) conducted a
study using data on ownership structures of large firms in 27 wealthy economies
and found that concentrated ownership is common across the world, except in
countries with very good protection for shareholders. According to their findings,
firms with concentrated ownership are typically controlled by large shareholders
(either the state or families). A controlling shareholder is tempted to use the firm's
resources to increase hislher own profits, even at the cost of minority interests.
Hence, La Porta et al (1999) claim that the expropriation of minority interests by
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controlling shareholders is 'the most pervasive agency problem' around the globe.
Indeed, this study has greatly challenged the empirical validity of the long-fixed
image of the modern corporation portrayed by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means.
Further, La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 2000b) argue that concentrated ownership is
the consequence of weak protection for investors in many economies, and relative
laws and quality of their enforcement by regulators and courts are essential
elements of corporate governance and finance. Their work and insights have led
to the emergence of the 'Law and Finance' literature, which emphasises that
countries' legal environments can have an important impact on the quality of
corporate governance, and laws, regulations and the effectiveness of their
enforcement are of great importance not only to the growth prospects of firms,
but also the development of countries' capital markets and real economies (see,
for example, La Porta et al., 2000b).
The issue of corporate governance has already been well documented by the
extant literature, the majority of which is based on empirical evidence from
developed economies, particularly from North America and Europe. However, it
has been largely underexplored in the context of emerging and transition
economies. It is worth noting that emerging and transition economies differ
considerably from their developed counterparts in many respects, such as level of
fmancial market development, laws and regulations and quality of law
enforcement. For example, compared with Western economies, emerging and
transition economies are always criticised for their weak investor protection. Thus,
there is widespread concern among academics and practitioners over whether
4
evidence from developed economies can be generalised and applied to emerging
and transition economies.
China, as the largest developing and transition economy ID the world, has
experienced an unprecedented economic expansion with two-digit annual GDP
growth since the beginning of the post-1978 economic reform. Considering the
truly dramatic changes (both economic and social) that have happened in the past
three decades, China now presents a fascinating laboratory for corporate
governance research I. Most of the early research on corporate governance in
China discusses the merits of the enterprise reform and its social impact. More
recently, researchers have started using Chinese stock market data to investigate
corporate governance issues. This new research allows for a more direct and
quantitative evaluation of the quality of corporate governance in Chinese
enterprises (see, for example, Sun and Tong, 2003; Tian and Estrin, 2007; Hou,
2011). Indeed, previous studies have truly improved our knowledge of corporate
governance in the Chinese context. However, compared with the large battery of
literature on corporate governance in developed economies, the empirical
evidence using Chinese data is still very limited. This thesis seeks to redress the
inadequacy in the literature in this respect.
I For example, since the inception of two stock exchanges in the early 1990s, the Chinese
government has introduced a number of relevant laws, guidelines and regulations in order to build
up a sound legal environment for both domestic and international investors. These laws,
guidelines and regulations include the Provisional Regulations on Administration of Issuing and
Trading of Shares (pRAITS, 1993), the Company Law (1994), the Securities Law (1999) and the
Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed Companies (CGGLC, 2001).
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1.2. Motivations and research questions
Using relevant theoretical and empirical methodologies with data from Chinese
publicly listed companies (PLCs), this thesis is comprised of three empirical
chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), and each focuses on corporate governance in the
Chinese context from three unique respects.
The objective of the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) is to remedy the
shortcomings in previous studies by providing an in-depth analysis of the
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance in the
Chinese context. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) aims to investigate the
issue of corporate cash holdings of PLCs, and, motivated by the findings of the
first empirical chapter, the heterogeneity of state entities is taken into account in
the investigation. Finally, the third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) studies the top
executive turnover of Chinese PLCs, with particular attention paid to the exit
types of CEOs.
The first empirical chapter focuses on the relationship between ownership
structure and corporate performance in Chinese PLCs. The major issue this
chapter addresses is whether the identity of the largest shareholder - the ultimate
controller - has an effect on PLCs' corporate performance and how such effects
might vary. To do so, it builds up a new research framework for the Chinese
corporate governance research by tracing and identifying the ultimate controller
of various PLCs. As a result, the ultimate owners of PLCs are divided into five
groups: the state asset management bureau at the central level (SAMBCG), state
6
asset management bureaus at the local level (SAMBLGs), SOEs affiliated to the
central government (SOECGs), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs)
and private investors. Particular attention has been paid to issues of relative
efficiency between state and non-state shareholdings. Moreover, an analysis of
relations between ownership concentration and corporate performance is also
extensively conducted in this chapter, providing a complete picture for the
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. Both ex
ante theoretical hypotheses and ex post empirical evidence relative to this study
are presented in detail.
The extant literature on corporate cash holdings suggests that firms could have
various reasons to hold cash as long as financial markets are not perfect in the
sense of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Jensen (1986) emphasises the role of
corporate cash holdings in firms' corporate governance by arguing that the agency
conflicts will become more severe when firms have large free cash flows. It could
be argued that examining the corporate cash holdings of Chinese PLCs can enable
us to have a better knowledge of the current corporate governance practices in
China. Hence, the second empirical chapter aims to provide an in-depth analysis
of the issue of corporate cash holdings in China. Motivated by the findings in the
first empirical chapter, the heterogeneity of state entities is taken into
consideration in this respect. Meanwhile, this chapter also employs the dynamic
partial adjustment model to investigate whether there is a target cash holding
level for PLCs. Finally, it attempts to provide empirical evidence for the dynamic
adjustment behaviour of cash holdings of Chinese PLCs.
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The third empirical chapter is primarily concerned with examining the issue of
top executive (CEO) turnover in China. The research on this issue has recently
attracted a great deal of attention from both academics and practitioners inside
and outside China, as research in this area could provide a crucial measure of the
effectiveness of different corporate governance mechanisms with which a firm
solves agency problems. Therefore, investigating the top executive performance-
turnover sensitivity is arguably an important and informative method of
measuring the quality of corporate governance. The rationale behind this is that a
firm with good corporate governance should always hold its top executives
accountable for the firm's performance, and remove them if their performance is
deemed unsatisfactory. Utilising an unbalanced panel dataset, Chapter 6
specifically focuses on the CEO performance-turnover sensitivity of Chinese
PLCs. Also, it aims to identify the determinants of turnovers.
1.3. Contributions
This section presents the contributions of this thesis to the corporate governance
literature. The main contribution can be largely attributed to the two prominent
characteristics of the Chinese stock markets. The first characteristic is that in
China the majority of firms' shares are concentrated in the sense that most PLCs
have a dominant shareholder whose ownership far exceeds that of the second
largest shareholders. The second characteristic is that the state is often the
ultimate controller. Chen et al (2009) suggest that the state still retains substantial
ownership in PLCs, and this ownership is scattered among various state
agencies/entities, each of which may have different motivations and incentive
8
structures.
It is worth noting that most early research on the role of state shareholders suffers
from two types of misclassification. The first type of misclassification used share
type as a proxy for ultimate controller type, and the other one just lumped all
types of state ownership into one group. The first empirical chapter contributes to
the literature by remedying such shortcomings in the existing literature. Unlike
previous studies, this chapter brings a new insight to the Chinese corporate
governance literature by taking into consideration the heterogeneity of state
agents. Given that state shareholders participate in the stock markets in different
ways, the impact of state shareholders on firms' value is still unclear. It is
important to recognise that state ownership in Chinese PLCs can have four major
forms: direct control through government agencies - state asset management
bureaus (SAMBs); indirect control through state-owned enterprises (SOEs);
holding minority ownership through SOEs; and holding minority ownership
through SAMBs. Therefore, in the case of state-controlled PLCs, there are two
major types of state agents, i.e. SAMBs and SOEs. SAMBs can be further divided
into sub-categories: the SAMBCG and SAMBLGs, and SOEs can also be divided
into sub-categories: SOECGs and SOELGs. Therefore, PLCs can finally be
classified into five major groups according to the type of the ultimate controller.
This chapter also provides empirical evidence of how the misclassification can
lead to misleading conclusions. To this end, I first empirically show that PLCs
controlled by private investors outperform those controlled by the state, if all state
agencies are seen as one group. However, by further testing relations between
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ownership structure and corporate performance in accordance with the correct
classification of the ultimate controller, I clearly demonstrate that state ownership
does not necessarily lead to inferior performance. In stark contrast to previous
studies, my study shows that PLCs controlled by SAMBCG or SOECGs perform
almost as equally well as privately controlled ones.
Finally, from the perspective of policy-making, this chapter can potentially
provide a guide for the direction of future economic reform in China. Though the
economic reform has been successful to date, it has come to the point where
many easy and less controversial reform projects have already been carried out,
and what remain are much more difficult and ideologically controversial issues.
One of those issues lies in whether the state should maintain a full or controlling
ownership interest in firms in several sectors (Clarke, 2003). Since in the 16th
National People's Congress (NPC) in 2002 the Chinese government announced
its ambition to deepen the economic reform by continuing the further divestment
of state ownership in the whole economy in order to accelerate its economic
growth, this issue can be put in another way: what kind of state ownership will be
relinquished in the next step, and to what extent should the government retreat
from the whole economy? Through thoroughly investigating the relationship
between ownership structure and corporate performance, this chapter contributes
to the literature by at least partially answering these questions.
The second empirical chapter examines the issue of corporate cash holdings of
Chinese PLCs. This study enhances our understanding of firms' cash holding
behaviour in the context of the largest transition economy. In light of the findings
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of the first empirical chapter, the heterogeneity of state agents is well documented
in every aspects of the analysis. The empirical analysis reveals the determinants
of corporate cash holdings of PLCs, and it confirms the existence of the target
cash holding level for PLCs as well as the dynamic adjustment mechanisms
towards the target level. Meanwhile, empirical results suggest that the two
competing theories of corporate cash holdings, i.e. the trade-off theory and
financing hierarchy theory/pecking order theory, are both found to help explain
the cash holding behaviour in China. Furthermore, the empirical analysis supports
that agency problems are at least part of the reason for PLCs in China to hold
cash.
The main contribution that the second empirical chapter attempts to make is two-
fold. Firstly, this chapter explicitly investigates the determinants of PLCs'
corporate cash holdings, with special regard being paid to the ultimate controllers
of PLCs as well as the unique characteristics of the Chinese stock markets.
Utilising an unbalanced panel dataset and employing System Generalised Method
of Moments (System GMM), the empirical analysis indicates that PLCs
controlled by private owners hold significantly more cash holdings than state
owners both in the short-run and in the long-run, while there is no statistically
significant difference among state owners in this aspect. Given the unique
characteristics of the Chinese stock markets, two possible explanations are
provided: relatively easier access to external funds of state owners due to the
'soft-budget' constraint, and private owners' incentive to expropriate minority
interests due to China's weak legal system.
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The second contribution of this chapter lies in the exploitation of the dynamic
adjustment behaviour of the corporate cash holdings of Chinese PLCs. The
findings of this chapter are consistent with the view that due to the existence of
adjustment costs, Chinese PLCs cannot instantaneously adjust towards the target
cash holding level. It is also interesting to note that PLCs with private controllers
have the fastest adjustment speed. Two likely reasons are given to help explain
these findings: firstly, compared with their state-controlled rivals, PLCs with
private owners may be more financially constrained, and secondly, they are
simply more operationally efficient.
There is a perception in the corporate governance literature that firms with good
corporate governance practices should be effective at disciplining under-
performing top executives, and ousting them if necessary in extreme cases. Prior
research has suggested that it is necessary to distinguish between forced and
normal turnovers (see, for example, Parrino, 1997; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003).
Based on the rationale that only forced turnovers can reflect the disciplinary
efforts of shareholders, Chang and Wong (2009) suggest that distinguishing
between forced and normal turnovers can enable researchers to more effectively
assess the quality of firms' corporate governance. However, there are flaws in the
prior research in this respect. A turnover with certain reasons can either be forced
or normal, which largely depend on the destination of the leaving CEO. This
chapter is intended to contribute to the extant literature by remedying such flaws.
The third and final empirical chapter seeks to address these two issues in two
ways, so as to provide a richer analysis and understanding of executive turnover
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In China. First, the executive turnover-performance relationship is explicitly
modelled. Moreover, heterogeneity amongst state ownership types is exploited in
order to examine whether the relationship is different for different types of state
ownership. Second, the data identifies a variety of reasons why CEOs exit their
posts (e.g. 'Dismissal', 'Personal reasons', 'Resignation' and 'Retirement'). Some
reasons might be regarded as 'face-saving' types of exit. Utilising an unbalanced
panel dataset and employing multinomial logistic regression techniques, the
empirical analysis reveals several interesting findings regarding the CEO turnover
of Chinese PLCs. First, just as expected, a negative relationship between
corporate performance and CEO turnover is found, which clearly indicates that an
improvement in firm performance will decrease the probability of a CEO being
removed.
Second, state-controlled PLCs may have adopted similar performance-evaluation
standards for their CEOs as their private rivals, as no systematic difference in the
CEO performance-turnover sensitivity is found among PLCs. Compared with
PLCs with private owners, the state-controlled ones are more likely to retain their
incumbent CEOs only if turnovers are not performance-related. Since the top
executive performance-turnover sensitivity is an important indicator of the quality
of corporate governance, this finding can be considered as evidence for the great
improvement of corporate governance by the state ownership of Chinese PLCs.
Third, by splitting the sample according to the stated reasons for CEO turnovers,
results suggest that PLCs may use some 'face-saving' reasons when their
incumbent CEOs are dismissed. Last but not least, regardless of China's
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rudimentary capital markets and weak legal environment, my findings show that
the majority of governance mechanisms are found to have the same effects as in
developed economies.
1.4. Organisation of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review
of the corporate governance literature in general. A description of the Chinese
economic reform, the development of Chinese corporate governance and the issue
of regional differences in China is included in Chapter 3. Chapters 4, 5, and 6
empirically investigate corporate governance of Chinese PLCs from three
important angles, which are the relationship between ownership structure and
corporate performance, the issues of corporate cash holdings and top executive
turnover, respectively. Chapter 7 concludes and summarises.
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CHAPTER TWO
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL
2.1. Introduction
The concept of corporate governance stretches back to Smith's milestone work,
'The Wealth of Nations' in 1776, which raised a concern regarding the problems
caused by the separation of ownership and control in joint-stock companies. Since
then, corporate governance research has been evolving for generations (Berle and
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 1998). However, its
ultimate aim remains unchanged, and concerns the setting up of an appropriate
corporate governance system to best match ownership with control, and to
mitigate any conflicts between the two. This will lead to order and corporate
efficiency. Denis and McConnell (2002) suggest that corporate governance is a
set of institutional and market-based mechanisms that would make self-interested
insiders of a company make decisions that maximise the value of the company to
the suppliers of capital. Or, stated simply, corporate governance research
investigates how suppliers of finance ensure a return on their investment (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). Over the past half century, there has been an extensive array
of literature that has focused on these issues (see, for example, Jensen and
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Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a,
b; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, b).
Modem corporations are always subject to various conflicts of interest due to the
fact that not all fund providers of a firm (owners, including investors and
creditors) can or want to participate in corporate daily operations, and these
owners cannot take for granted that their authorised management will always run
the firm in their interests without effective monitoring. In this sense, when
ownership and control in a modem company do not fully coincide with each other,
potential conflicts of interest between owners and controllers may arise. Such
conflicts can ultimately reduce the value of a company. Early research on
corporate governance was primarily focused on conflicts of interest between
shareholders and management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduce the 'classic'
agency theory, which is mainly aimed at resolving agency conflicts between
shareholders and their appointed managers. Jensen and Meckling's 'classic'
agency theory has spawned a large body of corporate governance research as well
as strongly influencing the direction of the research for the following two decades.
In the late 20th century, the corporate governance literature was largely focused on
corporations in one economy. Through the 1970s and 1980s most empirical
research was based on the US-based corporations, and in the early 1990s the
literature began to extend to other major world economies, such as the UK,
Germany and Japan. It was not until the mid-1990s that a large body of
international corporate governance literature started to appear.
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More recently, another set of agency conflicts - conflicts of interest between large
shareholders and minority shareholders - has arisen and has successfully attracted
much attention from both academics and practitioners. Starting in the mid-1990s,
studies on corporate governance began to expand to include countries other than
the US, the UK, Japan and Germany. They provide a clearer image of ownership
concentration around the world, and reveal that around the world concentrated
ownership structures are more typical than diffused ownership structures. La
Porta et al (1998) examine legal rules, the origin of these rules and the quality of
their enforcement in 49 countries. They suggest that the concentration of
ownership of shares in large publicly companies is negatively related to legal
protections for investors. That is, high ownership concentration might be an
adaptive response to poor investor protection in some economies, and it may also
be a symptom of poorly functioning financial markets. La Porta et al (1999)
conduct a study using data on ownership structures of large firms in 27 wealthy
.economies and found that concentrated ownership is common across the world,
except in countries with good investor protection. Based upon their findings, they
suggest that instead of the agency conflicts between shareholders and
management, the most pervasive agency conflict stems from the expropriation of
minority interests by large shareholders. Indeed, studies by La Porta et al (1997,
1998, 1999, 2000a, b) have injected new impetus into corporate governance
research and pointed out a new direction for future research. Moreover, their
studies have led to the emergence of the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (LLSV) 'Law and Finance' literature. The 'Law and Finance' literature
suggests that a country's legal system is a fundamentally important external
corporate governance mechanism. Also, this growing body of research points out
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that corporate governance can directly affect not only the value and growth
prospects of individual firms, but also the development of countries' financial
markets and real economies.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the
'classic' theory of agency conflicts introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976),
and possible solutions to these conflicts. The 'new' theory of agency theory
proposed by La Porta et 01 (1998) is thoroughly described in Section 2.3. Section
2.4 concludes this chapter.
2.2. Agency problems between management and shareholders
This section briefly discusses the 'classic' theory of agency conflicts introduced
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), reviews the empirical evidence and gives an
overview of the main internal and external mechanisms to reduce agency
conflicts between management and shareholders.
2.2.1. 'Classic:' agenc:y conflicts
The 'classic' agency problem, in its simplest form, illustrates a relationship
between two parties - principals (owners) and an agent (manager) who makes
decisions on behalf of the principals. As the ownership of a modem corporation
becomes dispersed, as depicted in Berle and Means's (1932) work, the owners
might have few interests and incentives to get involved in the finn's day-to-day
operation, and hence have to render their capital and control rights to professional
managers with the hope that their authorised management may be able to run the
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finn more efficiently to generate higher returns than if the finn was managed by
themselves. In an ideal world, owners and the manager would sign a complete
contract in which they specify exactly what the manager needs to do with the
funds, and how the profits are allocated. However, it is difficult to foresee all
future contingencies, and such a complete contract is not technologically realistic.
Owners, therefore, have to allocate at least part of their residual control rights to
the management in firms' daily operations. It is worth noting that if left to their
own devices, managers may act in their own interests, which might not always be
in line with those of the owners. It is difficult for shareholders to be assured that
their funds are used efficiently and not wasted on, for example, negative net
present value (NPV) projects. The shareholders, correspondingly, can discourage
managers from diverging from shareholders' interests by devising appropriate
incentives for managers and then monitoring their behaviours and extra costs;
agency costs might be generated consequently in order to implement this.
These extra agency costs mainly result from three types of expenses, defined by
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss.
It is believed that the agent may not always act in the best interests of the
principal, if they both seek to maximize their own individual utility. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) suggest that "the principal can limit divergences from his
interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring
monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition
in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to
guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or
to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions"
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(p.308). Moreover, they argue that in addition to positive monitoring and bonding
costs incurred in most agency relationships, there will be some reduction in the
principal's welfare caused by the divergence between the decisions of the agent
and those of the principal. The reduction in welfare experienced by the principal
is referred to as the 'residual loss'.
The literature provides clear evidence that agency conflicts between management
and shareholders frequently occur and can result in a substantial reduction of
corporate value. Some of the clearest evidence on agency problems comes from
firms' corporate payout policy. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers in the US
oil industry chose to spend large free cash flows heavily on Exploration and
Development (E&D) activity and diversification programs outside the industry,
rather than returning excess resources back to shareholders. He suggested that
conflicts of interest between management and shareholders over the payout policy
are extremely severe in firms with substantial free cash flow. Managers have
strong incentives to make their firms go beyond the optimal size, rather than
returning profits to shareholders in the form of dividends. Moreover, managers
also have great incentives to retain a large portion of excess cash, since payouts to
shareholders reduce the resources under managers' control, thereby reducing
managers' power, and financing projects externally are likely to attract the
monitoring of the capital markets. Therefore, Jensen (1986) claims that there
would be intensified agency problems for firms with poor investment
opportunities and excess cash. Consistent with this view, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) suggest that since managers' remuneration is highly related to firm size,
managers are likely to use firms' excess cash to pursue a diversification strategy
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and expand firms beyond the rational level through acquiring other firms. There
has been a large body of empirical literature in support of the argument that such
agency conflicts could severely reduce shareholders' value (see, for example,
Morek et al., 1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Comment and Jarrell, 1995). More
evidence that clearly demonstrates the agency conflicts between management and
shareholders has been provided by the research on the job security of
management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the best interests of
shareholders do not necessarily coincide with the best interests of managers.
Walking and Long (1984) provide supportive evidence for Jensen and Meckling's
argument. Their research provides direct empirical evidence on the relationship
among agency theory, managerial welfare and takeover bid resistance. The
agency theory suggests that the best interest of managers may differ from the best
interest of shareholders, while the takeover process itself has been seen as a
corporate governance mechanism to deal with management-shareholder agency
conflicts. Target managers in certain situations (such as merger and tender offer
situations) may however place their own welfare over the fiduciary duty to
shareholders. That is, target managers will make decisions on a tender offer in
accordance with their own bid-induced welfare changes. This is called the
managerial welfare hypothesis. By conducting tests on a sample of 105 cash
tender offers during the 1972-1977 period, Walking and Long (1984) provide
direct empirical support for the managerial welfare hypothesis. They find that
whether managers of the target firms resist takeovers or not is directly
conditioned on their personal welfare changes. Moreover, a target firm's
managers are less likely to resist takeovers if they are more likely to obtain large
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individual gains after a successful takeover.
Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) examine the effects of anti-takeover amendments on
shareholders' wealth between 1979 and 1985. Based on their findings, they argue
that shareholders' wealth tends to be harmed when managers propose anti-
takeover amendments. Consistent evidence is provided by Ryngaert (1988) and
Malatesta and Walking (1988), whose work focuses on the wealth effects of
poison pill defenses. A poison pill is a takeover defense initiated by a company's
board of directors, and it can dramatically drive up the potential cost that a hostile
acquirer needs to pay to acquire the company. Typically, the poison pill entitles its
holders to buy the shares of a company at a discounted price if a takeover attempt
occurs without approval from the board. The most popular type of poison' pill
usually has a 'flip-over' feature that allows current shareholders of a targeted
company to have the option to purchase discounted shares after the potential
takeover is successful. Davis (1991) argues that the direct effect of the poison pill
is to 'poison' the target firm with obligations implied by the pill, thus making the
potential takeover prohibitively costly. Devised and widely adopted by boards of
directors in the 1980s, the poison pill is a way for directors to prevent hostile
buyers from directly negotiating with companies' owners and to instead
encourage negotiation with the board.
2.2.2. Solutions to the 'classic' agency problem
Researchers and practitioners have already proposed and empirically examined
several internal and external mechanisms to reduce the agency conflict between
shareholders and managers. Each of these has received substantial attention in the
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literature in its own right. In this section I will briefly discuss five mechanisms:
executive compensation contracts, issuance of debt, board of directors,
monitoring presence of large shareholders and market for corporate control.
2.2.2.1. Executive incentive contracts
Incentive contracts are designed to align managers' and shareholders' interests,
since the 'classic' agency problems .stem from the conflict of interests between
them. Incentive contracts usually come in four forms: salary, performance-based
bonuses, stock option and management ownership, and they are all aimed at
better aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. The incentive contracts
could bring in a financial incentive for management to run firms more efficiently
and increase corporate value, and such incentives should ultimately lead to better
corporate performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Murphy (1990)
empirically examine whether incentive contracts can provide managers with
value-increasing incentives, and argue that the effectiveness of incentive
contracting can be judged by the sensitivity of the pay-performance relation. They
find that the sensitivity of such a relation in US corporations is weak and
interpreted their findings as evidence of inefficient compensation arrangements in
the US. Moreover, their evidence seems to suggest that although performance-
based compensation contracts may be an effective way to reduce or eliminate the
agency conflicts between management and shareholders, the actual effectiveness
of performance-based compensation should always be questioned.
In a publicly owned company the CEO and other top executives are often paid
salary plus performance-based bonuses. The salary of top executives is a given
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amount of cash income and can be revised after a period based on their
performance. The performance-based bonuses are usually formula-driven and
have some performance criteria attached. The performance-based bonuses are
often adopted by companies as short-term incentives. In addition to the salary and
the performance-based bonuses, top executives are also compensated with some
long-term incentives. The long-term incentives (more than one year) are often
referred to as management ownership and stock options. Management ownership
is a certain amount of shares granted to top executives as part of the
compensation package. Generally, the management ownership can serve as a
bond by which top executives are induced to operate firms in the best interests of
shareholders. The stock options give top executives the legal right to buy a certain
number of shares at a fixed price in the future assuming that conditions of
continued employment and other requirements are satisfied, and such a fixed
price is usually below the market price. For those executives whose incentive
packages include management ownership and stock options, it is likely that they
would be more incentivized to run firms more efficiently in order to increase
firms' market values. Among the four main forms of incentive contracts (salary,
performance-based bonuses, stock options and management ownership), stock
options are a particularly popular form. Despite the benefits created by the stock
option schemes, there are potential downsides associated with this form of
incentive contract. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.745) argue that, "the more
serious problem with high powered incentive contracts is that they create
enormous opportunities for self-dealing for the managers, especially if these
contracts are negotiated with poorly motivated boards of directors rather than
with large investors." For example, Yermack (1997) analyses the dates of stock
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option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994 and
finds that the timing of awards coincides with favourable movements in
companies' stock prices. CEOs are often found to receive stock option awards
shortly in advance of good news announcements. Rather than interpreting such
findings as a cause-and-effect relationship between long-term incentive
compensation for managers and superior managerial decisions, Yermack provides
an opposite view that managers who are aware of future improvements in
corporate performance are likely to increase their individual benefits by
capitalising on expected outside investors' reactions to such corporate news.
Arguably, stock option awards, under this interpretation, appear more like low-
risk devices for increasing managers' own benefits than a managerial incentive
mechanism.
The extant literature also suggests that managerial ownership as a form of
incentive contract is indeed common in practice, and it is supposed to serve as a
mechanism to better align managers' and shareholders' interests. However, the
true effects of managerial ownership on firms' values are inconclusive. That is,
the managerial ownership could be a 'double-edged' sword. On the one hand, it
may have the 'alignment' effect - managerial ownership can help align interests
of managers with those of shareholders, thus managers are better incentivised to
maximise shareholders' wealth. On the other hand, it may also have the
'entrenchment' effect - higher managerial ownership may provide managers with
a shelter against monitoring, making it much easier for managers to pursue their
private benefits, often at the costs of shareholders. In line with the above
reasoning, the ultimate effects of the managerial ownership on a firm may be
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conditioned on the trade-off between the 'alignment' and 'entrenchment' effects.
Such mixed effects of managerial ownership on corporate value have been clearly
reflected in the existing empirical research. For example, Morek et al (1988)
investigate the relationship between management ownership and firms' market
valuation measured by the Tobin's Q of371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980. They find
a significant non-monotonic relationship - Tobin's Q first rises, then declines and
finally slowly increases as the board ownership increases. Based on their findings,
they suggest that the increases of the Tobin's Q reflect the 'alignment' effect of
managerial ownership, which seems to be the result of the convergence of
interests between managers and shareholders, while the firms' value starts to
decrease as the 'entrenchment' effect starts to dominate the 'alignment' effect
over some ranges of managerial ownership. Similar evidence is found by
McConnell and Servaes (1990).
2.2.2.2. Crediton
The use of debt financing provides extra outside monitoring from creditors, and
the threat of bankruptcy can force management to run firms more efficiently.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that large creditors, such as banks, are
potential active investors, and, like large shareholders, they have considerable
stakes in firms and want to assure themselves of positive returns on their
investments. In order to guarantee that their enormous investments in firms
generate positive returns, large creditors have both the substantial power and
expertise to get actively involved in firms' major decision-making processes. It is
worth noting that at least part of large creditors' power comes from a variety of
control rights to which they are entitled when firms default or violate debt
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covenants (Smith and Warner, 1979). Furthermore, Jensen (1986) argues that debt
can reduce the agency costs of free cash flows by reducing the cash flows
available for spending at the discretion of managers, thus effectively preventing
managers from wasting the firm's resources in uneconomical projects. This is
because debt holders may impose great pressure on management, thus giving
managers greater incentives to run firms much more efficiently and to strive to
meet the requirements set out in the debt covenants. Notwithstanding, Jensen
(1986) acknowledges that the positive effect that debt issuance could have on the
management may not be as important for rapidly growing corporations with large
and highly profitable projects but no free cash flow.
However, it is worth noting that while monitored debt can help reduce some
agency costs, it can also bring other costs to a firm. Fama (1985) argues that
incurred monitoring and regulatory costs of bank loans can be passed on to
borrowers via financing terms. Myers (1977) suggests that strict debt covenants
may limit a firm's refinancing ability to a large extent, and may even cause
companies to forego profitable investment projects because debt holders bear part
of the cost. Consistent with Myers's view, Jensen (1986) suggests that the optimal
debt level is the point where the marginal costs of debt just offset the marginal
benefits and hence the corporate value is maximised. In this sense, increased
leverage may also incur costs, for example the costs of interest and the
bankruptcy costs. Therefore, debt issuance should be viewed as a 'double-edged'
sword that involves a trade-off between costs and benefits to a firm.
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2.2.2.3. Board of directors
In theory, the board of directors is elected by all shareholders at a finn's annual
general meeting (AGM) and is supposed to look after the interests of all
shareholders. Directors should closely monitor managers and take effective
actions (for example, oust incumbent management if necessary) to safeguard
shareholders' wealth. The extant literature on the board of directors is intensively
focused on the relation between board characteristics, finn performance and the
quality of firms' decisions, whereas the role that the board of directors can play in
effectively reducing agency conflicts still remains as an empirical question.
Board characteristics mainly concern two aspects: board composition and board
size. Fama and Jensen (1983a) argue that effective boards should separate the
functions of decision management and decision control. They suggest that
effective boards would be composed largely of outside directors (independent
directors). Arguably, a more independent board would lead to lower agency costs
and better corporate performance. However, empirical studies provide weak
support for such a positive relation between board composition and corporate
performance, Hennalin and Weisbach (2003) summarise the US evidence and
claim that higher proportions of outside directors are not necessarily associated
with better corporate performance. As to the relationship between board size and
finn performance, Hennalin and Weisbach (2003) suggest that board size is
negatively related to both corporate performance and the quality of decision
making. Jensen (1993) finds that when a board becomes oversized, agency costs
increase and the board becomes more symbolic rather than being an effective
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internal governance mechanism. He therefore makes the claim that small boards
are likely to be more effective than large boards.
Arguably, the major role of the board is to design efficient corporate monitoring
and ratification mechanisms. There are mounting empirical studies that have been
conducted in order to investigate whether and how the board of directors affects
the quality of firms' operational decisions, such as decisions regarding CEO
turnover, responses to hostile takeovers and adoption of anti-takeover
amendments. A number of studies have examined how directors sitting on boards
fulfill these responsibilities that are commonly assigned to them. Weisbach (1988)
investigates the relation between the monitoring by inside and outside directors
and CEO turnover. He finds a stronger link between CEO turnover and firm
performance in firms whose boards are more likely to be dominated by outside
directors. His results may imply that outsider-dominated boards can hold their
management more accountable for firm performance than insider-dominated
boards, and directors can increase firms' corporate value by removing under-
performing managers. Dahya et a/ (2002) also provide consistent evidence that
outsider directors are more likely to fire incumbent CEOs. Their evidence may
indicate that outside directors on the board can play a more effective role in
monitoring the management than inside board members. Moreover, the positive
and active role that outsider directors play in enhancing firms' corporate
governance systems has also been demonstrated in the literature on the market for
corporate control. For example, Cotter et a/ (1997) investigate 169 tender offers
during the period 1989 to 1992 in order to examine the role of target firms'
outsider directors in the takeover attempts. They report that when a target's board
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contains a majority of outside directors, the shareholders of the target firm receive
gains that are about 20 percentage points higher than a similar firm without a
majority of outside directors on their board. Moreover, they also find that the
target shareholder returns are greater in resisted offers when the board is outside-
dominated.
Overall, the literature suggests that board composition might not be closely
related to firm performance, while board size and corporate valuation are often
found to be negatively correlated (see, for example, Hermalin and Weisbach,
2003). It can also be concluded that board composition in reality seems to have
some effects on the quality of firms' operational decisions (See Kaplan and
Minton, 1994 and Renneboog, 2000 for further examples).
2.2.2.4. Large shareholders
There has been a large body of literature indicating that large shareholders
(blockholders) can playa positive role in corporate governance by monitoring
and disciplining the management. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the
existence of large blockholders can be a partial solution to free-rider problems,
hence reducing agency costs. The rationale behind this is that when a shareholder
builds up a significant block of equity in a firm and becomes a large blockholder,
he is supposed to have both the ability and the incentive to monitor and influence
the management so as to ensure positive returns on their large investments in the
firm.
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Concentrated ownership structures have been found to be a common phenomenon
around the world (La Porta et al., 1999). Even in countries where diffused
ownership structures are believed to be the norm, such as the US, a number of
cases of majority shareholders can still be found in public corporations (see, for
example, Holderness and Sheehan, 1988a, b). When taking a look outside the US,
concentrated equity ownership structures are more often observed (see, for
example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2002). La Porta et of (2000b)
suggest that there are large differences among countries in ownership
concentration in publicly traded firms and these differences should be closely
related to the quality of legal protection of investors, including both shareholders
and creditors.
The presence of large shareholders can act as a shelter to protect shareholders
from expropriation by managers, but it does not come without costs. Empirical
evidence on the role of large shareholders in exercising corporate governance is
substantial and mixed. On one hand, there is some evidence clearly suggesting the
positive effects of large shareholders on corporate performance. Barclay and
Holderness (1991) document numerous cases of trades of large-percentage blocks
of shares being associated with abnormal stock price increases afterward. Becker
et 01 (2008) develop and test an empirical framework that allows them to analyse
the effects of large non-managerial shareholders on corporate policies and
performance in the large US public companies. Consistent with the view that
large shareholders can playa positive role in corporate governance, they find that
the presence of these non-managerial large shareholders enhance firm profitability,
increase dividend payout, decrease corporate cash holdings and reduce executive
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compensation. Frank and Mayer (2001) find that large shareholders are associated
with higher turnover of directors in German firms, suggesting large shareholders'
monitoring efforts. With respect to Japanese firms, Kang and Shivdasani (1995)
show that the unconditional likelihood of non-routine top executive turnover is
higher in firms with concentrated ownership, and the likelihood of outside
succession relative to an internal appointment is found to be closely related to
large shareholders.
On the other hand, despite mounting evidence demonstrating a positive role that
blockholders may play in corporate governance, there are potential costs of the
concentrated shareholdings that are worth noting. One major cost of concentrated
ownership arises from low stock liquidity and potential loss of risk-sharing
benefits. On one hand, Bolton and Thadden (1998) suggest that ''when a firm
decides to set up a controlling block, it reduces the number of shareholders who
can participate in the trading of the firm's stock and, therefore, it effectively
reduces the market capitalisation, and hence the liquidity of its stock" (p.3). In the
spirit of Bolton and Thadden (1998), a concentrated ownership structure would
limit market participation by potential shareholders and thus lower a firm's
market liquidity. On the other hand, it is worth noting that one function of firms
going public is related to the potential risk-sharing gains. However, Admati et al
(1994) argue that although some degree of ownership concentration might
encourage monitoring activities by large shareholders, it could lead to a potential
loss in risk-diversification gains that could be achieved with a diffused ownership
structure. Another significant cost of block shareholdings appears to be associated
with the fact that large shareholders have both the power and the interest to
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expropriate minority interests using their uncontained controlling power (La Porta
et al., 1999). The latter type of cost gives rise to the LLSV 'Law and Finance'
literature and will be more extensively discussed in Section 2.3.
2.2.2.5. Market for corporate control
The market for corporate control is always referred to as the takeover market. The
vast literature indicates that takeovers are an important mechanism in corporate
governance. Takeovers usually go through merger, tender offer or proxy contest,
and sometimes elements of all three are involved (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The
rationale behind takeover markets as a corporate governance mechanism is that
poorly performing firms would be punished by the market as they are more likely
to be targets of takeover attempts and the managers of poorly performing firms
are more likely to be fired (Denis and McConnell, 2003). In relation to its
function of disciplining the managers of firms in this sense, Jensen and Ruback
(1983) suggest that the takeover market could be seen as an important component
of the managerial labour market. Based on a study of UK hostile bids in 1985 and
1986, Franks and Mayer (1996) report that takeovers are followed by high
turnover of directors sitting on boards.
Despite the positive role of takeovers, it can be argued that they can sometimes
cause extra agency costs to acquiring firms when bidding managements overpay
for acquisitions in order to further their own benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that takeovers are not always in place to be
adopted as a corporate governance mechanism as they could be subject to
political opposition in many countries. Denis and McConnell (2003) review a
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number of empirical studies on takeover activities around the world and find that
takeover attempts have been rare outside the US and the UK. In some countries,
there has been no activity or very thin takeover markets. Therefore, they assert
that takeover market does not appear to be an important mechanism in corporate
governance around the world.
2.3. Agency conflict between controlling and minority
shareholders
2.3.1. 'New' agency conflicts
I use 'new' agency conflicts here to distinguish the agency conflicts arising out of
the interest conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders from Jensen
and Meckling's (1976) 'classic' agency conflicts. The phrase 'new' agency
conflicts does not mean they are really new, but rather that they represent a subtle
but substantial shift of research interests from 'classic' agency conflicts towards
agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. The 'new'
agency conflicts are considered to be the most pervasive agency conflicts (La
Porta et al., 1999) and have been extensively examined in the large and growing
body of the LLSV 'Law and Finance' literature.
Most research in the corporate governance area in the late 20th century was
focused on the US and the UK markets, where investor protection is relatively
strong and dispersed corporate ownership structures are seen as the norm.
However, La Porta et al (1999) investigate the ownership structure of large
corporations in 27 wealthy economies and fmd that except in countries with very
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good investor protection, such as the US, most large firms are narrowly held, and
many of them have controlling shareholders. Typically, through pyramid
structures and participation in the management, these controlling shareholders
make their control rights over firms well in excess of their cash flow rights.
Moreover, they find that these large firms, as a consequence, have a problem of
separation of ownership and control. Unlike the image of modem corporations
described by Berle and Means (1932) that firms are run by professional managers
without equity ownership, La Porta et al (1999) find that these large firms are
usually managed by controlling shareholders themselves who have both the
ability and interest to expropriate minority shareholders. Therefore, they claim
that the divergence between control and cash flow rights can potentially lead to
agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Recent research
has clearly demonstrated that concentrated ownership is common around the
world, particularly in countries with relatively poor shareholder protection. For
example, Faccio and Lang (2002) report that in their sample of 5,232 corporations
in 13 Western European countries, 44.29% of firms are family controlled.
Claessens et al (2000) report that in their sample of 2980 corporations in nine
East Asian countries, the majority of these corporations have controlling
shareholders and their managers are usually found to be relatives of the
controlling shareholder's family.
La Porta et al (1998) investigate the legal rules that provide protection to both
shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their
enforcement in 49 countries. Their findings show that countries whose laws
originate from common law tradition generally have the strongest legal protection
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for investors, while countries whose legal rules originate from French civil law
tradition have the weakest. German and Scandinavian civil law countries are in
the middle group in terms of legal protections. In addition, they find that German
and Scandinavian civil law countries have the best quality of legal enforcement.
Legal enforcement is also strong in the common law countries, whereas it is the
weakest in the French civil law countries. Finally, they report that ownership
concentration is surprisingly high around the world, and then argue that the high
ownership concentration might be an adaptive response to the weak legal
protection for investors as narrowly held ownership can shield large shareholders
from expropriation by the management, whereas this benefit comes at a cost to
minority shareholders, i.e. conflicts of interest between principals. Johnson et al
(2000) use the word 'tunneling' to describe the expropriation by controlling
shareholders, which they found to be a worldwide phenomenon. 'Tunneling'
means the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of controlling
shareholders (through underground tunnels).
La Porta et al (1998), together with their other works (for example, La Porta et al
(1997, 1999, 2000a, b, 2002b), have significantly changed the direction for
corporate governance research and started the LLSV 'Law and Finance' literature.
The 'Law and Finance' literature emphasises the essential role of laws, as well as
the quality of their enforcement in corporate governance in most countries. A
major theme of this literature is that a country's legal environment, as an
important corporate governance element, can have a direct impact on both the
corporate governance at the firm level, and on the country's capital market and
real economy. Weak investor protection can not only potentially decrease the
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value of firms, but also hinder the development of capital markets and growth of
real economies.
Existing empirical studies have presented plenty of evidence of the 'new' agency
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders from both developed and
developing economies. Based upon a survey of East Asian firms, Claessens et al
(2002) find that Tobin's Q decreases with the separation of cash flow rights from
the control rights of the largest shareholder. They interpret their findings as
evidence that controlling shareholders may have a greater incentive to expropriate
minority shareholders as the wedge between their control rights and cash flow
rights increases. Bertrand et al (2000), using a large sample of 18,600 Indian
firms during the period from 1989 to 1999, find that resource diversion in Indian
business groups follows the lines of ownership, flowing from the bottom to the
top of the pyramid. Unlike Indian business groups which are often held via the
pyramid structure, cross-shareholdings are a more common mechanism of
controlling firms in Korean business groups (chaebols). Bae et al (2002) provide
evidence that controlling shareholders of Korean chaebols can probably gain from
acquisitions, while their minority shareholders are likely to lose out on these
acquisitions. Their findings can lend supportive evidence to the tunneling
hypothesis of controlling shareholders. More direct evidence is provided by
research on related lending. For example, La Porta et al (2003) examine the
benefits of related lending using a dataset for Mexico. They found that related
lending is prevalent in Mexico, which means that banks are more likely to lend to
firms controlled by the banks' owners. Although related loans have similar terms
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to unrelated loans, they are 33 percent more likely to default, and have 30 percent
lower recovery rates if they default than unrelated ones.
The empirical evidence on the 'new' agency conflicts shows that for many
countries, expropriation of minority interests by controlling shareholders is an
important and costly problem, especially in countries with poor investor
protection. This may suggest that the investor protection in many countries is far
from optimal, and it might be imperative to address problems arising out of the
'new' agency conflicts as they probably have negative effects on individual firms,
capital markets and real economies.
2.3.2. Solutions to the 'new' agency conflicts
To reduce the 'new' agency costs, researchers have been active in participating in
discussions with regards to how investor protection can be improved. Arguably, a
successful corporate governance system should combine some type of large
investors with sound legal protection for all shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). Hence, in the following section I want to focus on a brief discussion of
two proposed approaches - legal reform and ownership structure - to resolve the
'new' agency conflicts.
2.3.2.1. Legal protection
The extent of legal protection for investors varies considerably around the world.
In countries such as the US and the UK the laws are protective of at least some
investors and the quality of their enforcement is also good. However, in the rest
of the world, the legal system is far from sufficient and the courts are less willing
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to enforce their laws. Legal reform aimed at enhancing the legal system is
arguably an effective way of improving corporate governance in countries with
weak investor protection. Legal reform is, however, often slow and halting in
many countries. Glaeser et al (2001) argue that in many countries government
regulation of financial markets and the introduction of a powerful regulator could
be more feasible. Their argument, put another way, is that the regulators, rather
than judges, should take charge of the enforcement of legal rules. Xu and Pistor
(2003) suggest that there is a substantial difference between how courts and
regulators enforce laws. They argue that courts tend to enforce laws in a reactive
manner, while regulators are proactive in law enforcement. Therefore, in many
countries where court enforcement of laws and private contracts is not reliable,
the introduction of a strongly motivated regulator might be an efficient and
effective way of preventing harm in financial markets. Glaeser et al (200 I) also
provide supportive evidence on the positive role of the introduction of a powerful
regulator by conducting a comparison study of two transition economies: Poland,
with strict law enforcement by a highly motivated regulator, and the Czech
Republic, with hands-off regulation. Despite starting with a weak legal system,
financial markets in Poland experienced spectacular growth after the introduction
of securities laws that were enforced by the powerful regulator. In 1996, a survey
on corporate governance in four transition economies conducted by the Central
European Economic Review revealed that the Polish market came out as the best
and outscored the Czech market in all dimensions. Yet Glaeser et al (2001)
acknowledge that there might be potential costs associated with the excessively
aggressive legal enforcement when regulators are overmotivated to hunt for
violations and penalise innocent suspects. Hence, the government regulation of
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financial markets has certain limitations and cannot be considered as a substitute
for legal reform in the long run.
2.3.2.2. Ownership structure
La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000b) argue that the highly concentrated
ownership structures around the world are a consequence of weak investor
protection. When an investor accumulates a large block of shares of a firm, he
would then have the ability as well as the incentive to monitor, discipline and
influence management. In this sense, the presence of large shareholders can
protect shareholders from being otherwise expropriated by managers in a weak
legal environment. Furthermore, it is worth noting that highly concentrated
ownership could also partially resolve the classic free rider problem of having too
many minority shareholders. The positive role of concentrated ownership has
been documented by many prior studies (see, for example, La Porta et al., 2002b;
Claessens et al., 2002). However, ownership concentration should be seen as a
'double-edged' sword and is often associated with a discrepancy between cash
flow rights and control rights, arising from, for example, pyramid ownership
structures, the use of high voting shares and cross-holdings. This discrepancy
would probably encourage controlling shareholders to expropriate interests of
minority shareholders, as discussed in Section 2.3.1. The increase of cash flow
rights can only reduce the probability of controlling shareholders expropriating
minority interests, but never eliminate it.
Unlike the US and UK markets, the presence of several large shareholders has
been commonly found in the rest of the world (see, for example, Faccio and Lang,
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2002; Claessens et al., 2002). Hence, as suggested by Maury and Pajuste (2005),
it might be imperative to investigate certain issues, such as the allocation of
control between these large shareholders and their impact on firm performance.
However, extant literature in this area remains sparse and the role that multiple
large shareholders can play in a corporate governance system is not clear-cut.
Some recent theoretical papers have presented some models for the interaction
between multiple large shareholders, and many of them suggest a positive role of
multiple blockholders in enhancing corporate performance. The rationale behind
the positive role of multiple blockholders may be that mutual monitoring and
competition for the acceptance of proposals among the multiple blockholders
would effectively limit the incentive to abuse firms' resources. For example,
Bloch and Hege (2001) introduce a model in which two large shareholders
compete for corporate control by attracting the votes of small shareholders. They
suggest that the competition for control between two blockholders can effectively
reduce the appropriation of private benefits of control. Dhillon and Rossetto
(2009) present a setting where multiple large shareholders have endogenous
conflicts of interest that are associated with the relative size of their stake in a
company. They argue that a single blockholder tends to choose an investment
policy that is far away from those preferred by small shareholders, which would
significantly reduce the share price. The presence of further blockholders can
shift the policy more towards the small shareholders' preferred investment policy,
thus increasing the share price.
Empirical evidence on the positive role of multiple large shareholders is available
based on samples of different countries. Volpin (2002) claims that in Italy, the
41
firm market valuation is higher when a voting syndicate is formed to control the
firm compared to when there is a single blockholder. Lehmann and Weigand
(2000) provide evidence that the presence of a second largest shareholder
improves the profitability of listed companies in Germany. However, it should be
noted that in countries with poor investor protection, it could be beneficial for
non-management blockholders to conspire with the controlling shareholder in the
expropriation of minority shareholders. Faccio et al (2001) argue that
blockholders in weak legal environments are more likely to collude to expropriate
minority shareholders, based on their findings that the presence of multiple
blockholders decreases the dividend rate in Asia rather than increasing it as it
does in Europe. In the spirit of Faccio et al (2001), the positive role of multiple
blockholders as an effective mechanism in enhancing firms' corporate governance
is probably conditioned on a country's legal environment. In addition, it seems
that firm value may also depend on the interaction between the blockholders.
Exploiting a sample consisting of 174 Finnish firms during the period 1993 to
2000, Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that firm value is positively related to the
presence of a third largest shareholder (a monitoring incentive), especially when
the other two largest shareholders have blocks of roughly the same size. In
contrast, the firm value is negatively related to the presence of a second largest
shareholder (a collusion incentive), particularly when the first and second largest
shareholders together own the majority of voting rights.
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2.4. Conclusion
This chapter first discussed the 'classic' theory of agency problems introduced by
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and then provided empirical evidence of these
problems, which arise due to interest conflicts between the management and
investors. Several internal and external mechanisms have been suggested to
reduce costs caused by such conflicts, including executive compensation
contracts, debt issuance, monitoring by boards of directors, presence of large
shareholders and markets for corporate control. Among all five above-mentioned
mechanisms, the presence of large shareholders (concentrated ownership) appears
to be a 'cost-effective' way to address the 'classic' agency problems. However, as
fully documented by La Porta et a/ (1998), this does come at a cost to minority
shareholders. This cost ('new' agency conflicts) arising from the agency conflicts
between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders has led to the
creation of the ever growing body of LLSV 'Law and Finance' literature. In
addressing the 'new' agency conflicts, researchers have suggested that the
increase of cash flow rights and the presence of multiple blockholders are
effective ways to restrict expropriation of minority shareholders. It is important to
note, however, that the effectiveness of these ownership characteristics ultimately
depends on the quality of the legal infrastructure in an economy.
43
CHAPTER THREE
ECONOMIC REFORMS, PRIVATISATION,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
3.1. Introduction
China is the first socialist country that has undergone economic reform without
the radical social reforms adopted by Eastern European and Former Soviet Union
countries. Unlike these countries, which took a 'big-bang' privatisation approach,
China has been determined to make its privatisation program take the form of a
gradualist approach: a gradual but stable privatisation process as opposed to the
mass privatisation in other former socialist countries. Since China's initial reform
efforts began as experimental changes aimed at improving corporate performance
rather than, as in Eastern Europe, establishing a complete Western-style market
system, it is not surprising that institutional change has been gradual and uneven
(Jefferson and Rawski, 1994). The main strategy involved in this privatisation
program is a so-called '2-R strategy': 'Retain' government control of large state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) that operate in the strategic sectors and 'Retreat' from
small and medium-sized SOEs that operate in highly competitive markets (Liu et
al., 2006). Hence, the privatisation program in China actually started with only
partial privatisation in the initial stages.
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This unprecedented economic reform involves a radical change in emphasis on
resource allocation and the redistribution of decision-making power between all
five levels of Chinese government (center, province, prefecture, county and
township) and enterprises. It is worth noting that the reform has two important
features - decentralisation and privatisation. The decentralisation reform
embraces the process of rearranging financial and controlling relationships
between the government and SOEs, as well as those between the central and local
governments. Arguably, the privatisation reform is the direct consequence of the
decentralisation reform, since the decentralisation reform has resulted in a
hardened budget constraint on both local governments and SOEs under their
jurisdictions. The hardened budget constraint and increased competition have
been argued to be the root causes for the initiatives of local government in China
to launch the privatisation program of their SOEs (see, for example, Li et al.,
1999; Cao et al., 1999). Although authorities have been determined to gradually
decrease state holdings from the industry sector, it could still be anticipated that
the state will continue to dominate the national economy in the forthcoming
decades. It is worth noting that while the state's direct control at the micro level is
being phased out, it still wields powerful leverage over state firms using state
ownership (Ji, 1998). To summarise, the Chinese privatisation reform - transfer
of property control and dilution of state ownership - is considered to be beneficial
to national economic growth. Cao (2000) argues that China has created an
economy with one of the highest growth rates in the world through a development
strategy of gradual, market-oriented measures.
As the core issue to the national economic reform, the SOE reform in China has
4S
spanned three main interrelated periods. During the first period from 1978 to
1992, the SOE reform was mainly focused on the separation of government from
SOEs, the adoption of Management Responsibility Contract System (MRCS) and
the encouragement of growth in the non-state sector. However, the reform during
this period didn't reach its target of improving the efficiency of SOEs, even
though the non-state sector stimulated the Chinese economy and showed
promising prospects. In the second SOE reform period from 1992 to 1997, the
Chinese government promoted economic growth through a build-up of a so-called
Modem Enterprises System (MES). During this period, two important
improvements were introduced into the Chinese corporate governance landscape:
the establishment of the Chinese stock markets and the stock market laws and
regulations (e.g. The Provisional Regulations on Administration of Issuing and
Trading of Shares (PRAITS, 1993) and Company Law (1994». However, the
fundamental problem in the Chinese corporate governance system - the lack of
clarity regarding property rights - still remained. The third period of SOE reform
began in 1997 when President Zemin Jiang announced a policy of significant
ownership diversification of the state sector through complete or partial
divestiture of SOEs. As a result, corporate governance, for the first time, has been
recognised as a top priority issue for Chinese economic reform.
Notwithstanding the progress in economic reform that China has made, it is
always subject to a great deal of critical questioning about its determination in
continuing with such a reform and the ways in which reform will be carried out.
Clarke (2003) points out that a fundamental dilemma of Chinese reform arises
from whether the state should maintain a controlling ownership in enterprises in
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several sectors for the purpose of satisfying multiple social and political
objectives, rather than solely for the purpose of profit maximisation. Hovey and
Naughton (2007) suggest that in economic reform the state has to weigh various
issues and maintain the complicated balance of them at all times. These issues are,
to name but a few, the traditional power and influence of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), the social issues (e.g. social well-being, unemployment and pension
schemes), the equitable distribution of state held assets, the investment
opportunities for domestic investors and the benefits of capital inflows by
international investors. Typically, the phrase 'Crossing the river by feeling for the
stones' has been the widely accepted way to describe the gradual, pragmatic,
piecemeal and somewhat experimental nature of economic reform in China.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: I will first discuss some
issues in relation to state ownership and privatisation in Section 3.2. In Section
3.3, a brief discussion of economic reform and the main causes of SOE
privatisation are provided. Since SOE reform is core to the Chinese economic
reform, Section 3.4 will provide a review of three important periods of SOE
reform, Given the importance of the establishment of stock markets in the
development of the Chinese corporate governance framework, I intend to
extensively discuss the characteristics of the Chinese stock markets and the
current corporate governance practices of PLCs in Section 3.S and Section 3.6,
respectively. In Section 3.7, I will briefly discuss the influence of regional
differences on the industrial sector in China. Finally, the conclusion of this
chapter is given in Section 3.8.
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3.2. State ownership and privatisation
Megginson and Netter (2001, p.322) suggest that "throughout history, there has
been a mixture of public (often including religious institutions) and private
ownership of the means of production and commerce". Over the past half century,
a large battery of literature has emerged to theoretically and empirically test the
relative efficiency between public and private ownership, and this has suggested
that public ownership is inherently less efficient as compared with private
ownership (see, for example, Boubakri and Cosset., 1998; La Porta and Lopez-
de-Silanes, 1999; Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Fan et al., 2007). It could be
argued that public ownership theoretically belongs to all citizens of a nation,
which in turn means that in fact no one can individually claim any residual rights
to such ownership. The state is the defacto representative of public ownership. A
case in point is the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and, nowadays, China has the
world's largest system of SOEs. Bolton (1995) suggests that the inefficiency of
SOEs may arise out of a series of problems rooted in state ownership, such as the
failure of the state in appointing and monitoring management, a lack of
competition, soft budget constraints and excessive centralisation of the state
sector. Additionally, Shirley and Walsh (2000) suggest that the state may impose
some distorted (non-business-related) goals on SOEs, which could cause
significant losses to SOEs.
Privatisation is believed to be an effective tool in improving firms' operating and
financial performance. According to the literature, privatisation is thought to
significantly benefit firms in several ways. Firstly, privatisation is capable of
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mitigating agency conflicts between management and shareholders through the
increased pressure imposed on managers by financial markets after
privatisation(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Secondly,
privatisation transfers ownership to private investors who are profit-oriented and
incentivised to closely monitor management (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Last but
not least, privatisation enables firms to focus more on profit-maximising targets
instead of those related to social and political considerations, which could better
align shareholders' interests and firms' objectives (Boycko et al., 1996).
Consequently, many governments around the world view privatisation as a
feasible method of stimulating the industrial sector, reducing government
interference and promoting economic efficiency. Over the past three decades,
waves of privatisation around the world have been carried out by many countries
in order to promote economic efficiency.
In China, the most predominant feature of the industrial sector is that state
ownership is the dominant form in a large proportion ofPLCs. Similarly, as found
in many other countries, Chinese SOEs always perform poorly as compared to the
privately-controlled enterprises in China. The intrinsic and fundamental problems
of corporate governance in state-owned economic entities are deeply rooted in the
ambiguity of property rights associated with state ownership (Lin, 2001).
Furthermore, unlike private firms that are usually affected by classic agency
problems, due to interest conflicts between management and shareholders, SOEs
in China are often subject to a plethora of agency conflicts arising from the
problem of multiple pseudo-principals. The logic behind the problem of multiple
pseudo-principals is that in reality there are neither real owners nor any real
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agents in SOEs. Since state ownership, owned by the whole population, does not
belong to anyone in particular, the state takes the role as representative of the
public. The state also acts as the owner (principal) of the people to delegate
operational rights over SOEs to the managers and to monitor their day-to-day
operations. However, the state is essentially the second-order agent itself of the
true owners - all citizens, who yet have no actual voice in corporate governance
of SOEs (Lin, 2001). In other words, there is no direct connection between the
first-order agents (managers of SOEs) and the true owners (the public). The
problem that the control rights of SOEs are vested in second-order agents - the
state, who nominates and monitors the first-order agents - could be the root cause
for corporate inefficiency in the Chinese economy. Su (2005) argues that in
addition to the classic agency problem that arises out of the separation of
ownership and control in traditional corporate finance literature, SOEs are
believed to have suffered from further agency problems. Those further agency
problems lie in the conflict of interests between politicians and enterprises
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Su (2005) suggests that there could be political costs
of government control for SOEs in China and the government administrative
interference in SOEs' day-to-day operations may eventually result in a reduction
in a firm's value. Due to the reasons mentioned above, before enterprise reform
SOEs in China were seriously burdened with a bundle of social and political
considerations for both central and local governments. In the 1990s, privatisation
in China started to accelerate after a decade of nationwide policy debates and
privatisation, as a means of improving firms' performance, had gradually gained
in popularity among officials in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Gao, 2010).
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3.3. China's economic reform and SOE privatisation
Since 19782, when China adopted its 'open-door' policy and began its economic
reform, it has commenced waves of privatisation within its public sector: the
largest ever in its history. Adhering to what Deng Xiaoping called 'socialism with
Chinese characteristics', the Chinese privatisation departs remarkably from the
approach to privatisation most commonly adopted by other socialist countries and
sets a strategy of gradualism to the centre. Cao (2000) argues that Chinese
privatisation can be characterised as 'privatisation with Chinese characteristics',
which merely adopts market-oriented measures to create a market economy,
while retaining an enormous ownership base in the hands of the state. In essence,
Chinese privatisation emphasises not the transfer of the state sector into private
hands, but rather the creation of a parallel private sector designed to supplement
the state sector, as well as the retention of the public ownership base that is
symbolic of a socialist economy (Cao et al., 1999). In stark contrast, Eastern
European countries have adopted a much more rapid privatisation ('big-bang')
strategy, characterised by the immediate privatisation of the state sector and the
swift transfer of state-owned assets to private investors. The 'big-bang' strategy,
widely used in the Eastern European countries, was a shock therapy that involved
smashing the entire system, correcting or eliminating as many rent-seeking
opportunities arising from distortions and privileges, and finally commencing a
bottom-up reconstruction of the whole edifice (Naughton, 2007).
2 China's economic reform was officially launched at the third Plenum of the eleventh Central
Committee of the CCP inDecember 1978.
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China started the reform of its planned economy with an unclear official objective:
'establishing a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics' (Hou,
2011). Such an unclear objective provided neither a blueprint nor a clear ultimate
objective for the reform. As a result, the reform has been characterised as
piecemeal, partial and even somewhat experimental, as opposed to the 'big-bang'
approach adopted in most Eastern European countries, where the predominant
objective of economic reform was to move as rapidly as possible to a market
economy. Su (2005) also suggests that China's gradual and pragmatic economic
reform has obviously manifested the Chinese government's concern about the
possibility of political and economic turmoil that is accompanied by mass
privatisation, as happened in the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European
countries. Hence, the general guideline for economic liberalisation in Post-Mao
China has been described as 'Crossing the river by feeling for the stones'. Cao et
at (1999) suggest that there are two prominent aspects that capture an important
feature of privatisation. On the one hand, privatisation in China means directly
transferring part of the existing ownership to private investors. On the other hand,
it means expanding the existing ownership base with new private investment.
Morris et at (2002) argue that privatisation has occurred in two main areas:
private and foreign-invested enterprises are encouraged at the macro-economic
level and the remaining SOEs are forced to face market forces, to a greater degree.
Gibbons and Kulkarni (2011) suggest that the reform was a 'dual-track' approach
that involved both the retention of part of a planned economy system and the
creation of a new market economy system.
Chinese economic reform has been considered to have taken a gradualist
S2
approach, with an experimental start for all new reform projects. Every new
reform will at first only be carried out as a trial run on a regional scale and will be
applied later at the national level if, and only if, it is considered successful by
central government. For instance, the reform of the state industrial sector started
in 1980 with the 'Sichuan experiment', and by granting more autonomous power
on both production and material to the managers of SOEs, the experiment was set
to increase business efficiency and vitality. The 'Sichuan experiment' proved
successful after a four-year trial period and then central government stipulated the
expansion of autonomy to all SOEs. The gradualist approach of economic reform
has also been manifested in a way that over the years both the content and the
pace of reform have been adjusted and continuously reformulated according to
new circumstances and challenges (Naughton, 2007). By the mid-1990s, China
had successfully moved away from the planned economy and a socialist market
economy began to function. However, even today, China's market economy is by
no means close to complete, and further economic reform and institutionalisation
are needed in order to complete its currently rudimentary market institutions.
Morris et al (2002) suggest that there are two major features of the reform process,
decentralisation and privatisation, and it is the former that sets up the political and
economic basis for the latter. China's decentralisation policy has two salient
features: the first - 'fiscal deregulation' - is focused on setting up a fiscal revenue
contracting system" (1980-1993), which is a revenue-sharing system between the
central and local governments, and the second - 'SOE deregulation' - is focused
3 The fiscal revenue contracting system was later replaced by the tax-revenue-sharing system in
China's tax and fiscal reform.
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on delegating the majority of SOEs to local governments (Li et al., 1999).
Arguably, the economic reform in China initially began as a bottom-up, local
. government driven process of privatisation, which was then accepted and even
encouraged by central government. Cao et al (1999) suggest that such a bottom-
up reform stems from the 'federalism of Chinese style" which is a result of the
decentralisation of government in China's earlier reform. What are the incentives
to local governments in China to promote privatisation? The hardened budget
constraints and increased competition from the non-state sector are the main
incentives for local governments in China to privatise SOEs. The soft budget
constraints are widely considered as one of the root causes for corporate
inefficiency in the transition economies. Cao et al (1999) point out that
enterprises or governments may show a lack of incentives to improve operational
efficiency if they can be endlessly bailed out. Set as one of the major objectives
of the economic reform, hardening the budget constraints ofSOEs in China began
with tightening the budget constraint of local governments and SOEs under their
supervision, which in tum induced waves of privatisation ofSOEs around Chinas.
The SOE privatisation process in China initially started at the local level and was
later accepted, and even promoted, by central government and then spread all
over the country. In addition. Li et al (1999) point out that national market
integration has greatly intensified the cross-regional competition in China, and
the competitive pressures on local governments to attract foreign investment and
fiscal support from central government have had a great impact on privatisation.
4 See Cao et al (1999) for details.
5 Cao et al (1999) argue that the Chinese path for SOE reform stands in contrast to SOE
privatisation in Eastern European countries where the aim of privatisation was to harden the
budget constraints of firms.
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By analysing the cadre evaluation system in China, Liu et al (2006) suggest that
local leaders may have an incentive to privatise SOEs in order to enhance local
economic prosperity. The point is that local leaders are evaluated by a
complicated system of 'soft targets', which central government may use to make
promotion decisions and, all else being equal, local economic growth records
would be a key 'hard target' in the evolution system. In the following sub-
sections a brief discussion of the main causes for China's gradual and quiet
privatisation - i.e. hardened budget constrained by fiscal reform as well as
banking reform and intensified competition from the non-state sector - will be
presented.
3.3.1. China's fiscal and tax system reform
Once the mechanisms" of the Chinese planned economy began to collapse, the
immediate impact was a rapid and dramatic erosion of the formal revenue system.
China witnessed the sharpest decline in budgetary revenue since the launch of its
market economy reform in 1978, with the budgetary revenue as a share of its total
nominal GDP down by nearly 20 per cent during the period 1978-1993. In order
to stop the decline of the budget, the Chinese central government carried out the
1994 fiscal and tax system reform7 that was aimed at broadening the tax base and
enhancing the fiscal capacity of the Chinese government, and soon after the
reform the Chinese government's fiscal extractive ability, indicated by the
budgetary revenue share of the country's annual GDP, started to increase
6 The mechanisms of the planned economy could consist of administrative prices, compulsory
procurement and planned delivery, and a monopoly state ownership of industry (Wong and Bird,
2008).
7 This reform was based on the 'Decision on Implementation of Management System of Taxes'
put forth by the State Council on December 1S, 1993 (Hou, 2011).
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continuously in the following years, as shown in Figure 3.1. It is worth noting
that although the major fiscal reform of 1994 expanded the fiscal revenue base for
the Chinese government, it had exactly the opposite effects on central and local
governments. That is, it enhanced the fiscal extractive power of the central
government while reducing that of the local governments by imposing tougher
budget constraints on them.
Figure 3.1 Budgetary revenue share of GDP
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2005.
Before the economic reform central government was responsible for determining
all expenditures for important future developments, while responsibilities for
delivering public administration and social public services (e.g. education,
housing and health services) at the local level were all delegated to local
governments. In principle, those social services were all financed by central
government. Starting from 1980, China adopted its fiscal decentralisation policy,
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i.e. the fiscal revenue contracting system, to let local governments have
increasingly more power in financing their own needs. The basic logic behind the
fiscal revenue contracting system is pre-estimating and apportioning revenues and
expenditures between central and local governments, while holding the latter
accountable for their own profits and losses. However, the revenue contracting
system at that time did not establish a clear set of rules for the revenue-sharing
ratio between central and local governments. In reality, the sharing ratios set
annually by central government were actually negotiable in nature and could even
vary across different regions. More generally, the Chinese tax system rested on
the local collection of vested revenues that were then conveyed to central
government, leaving local governments with sufficient space to retain collected
revenues that they should have remitted to the centre. The administrative structure
of such a tax system had proven vulnerable to erosion, especially when the
economic control of central government lessened, and it is not a surprise to see
local governments in China often shielding local enterprises from taxation and
avoiding sharing profit remittances with central government (Wong and Bird,
2008). The fiscal reform of 1994, in essence, therefore aimed to 'recentralise' the
fiscal system and its main content included three important components: (1)
simplifying the tax structure by replacing the Soviet-Union-style complex multi-
tiered system of turnover taxes with a single-rate value added tax (VAT); (2)
shifting from the former negotiated revenue-sharing system to a new tax-revenue-
sharing system by clearly determining national taxes, local taxes and shared
taxes" (for example, VATwould be shared by central and local government at a
8 See Table 4.1 in World Bank (2002) for a summary of the tax assignments between central and
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fixed ratio of 60:40); (3) reconstructing the formal tax administration by splitting
the local tax bureaus into two distinct segments: a national tax administration and
a local tax administration, which were responsible for the tax collection for
central and local governments, respectively. Arguably, this fiscal reform
effectively hardened the budget constraints of local governments and, by
assigning the collection of central taxes and VAT to the national tax
administration, the reform largely eliminated opportunities for local governments
to reduce, exempt or retain taxes that they were supposed to deliver to central
government. In addition, in 1995, the new 'Budget Law' was implemented to
impose stringent guidelines on the government's deficit financing in the financial
markets. It required local governments at all levels to balance their budgets and
strictly controlled their borrowings in the financial markets.
The 1994 fiscal reform was by no means the end of fiscal reform, but merely
marked the beginning of the whole process. China's current fiscal-tax system
could be seen as a product of a series of changes over the past two decades and it
is now functioning much better than ever before according to Western standards.
Yet the system is still far from flawless, with many critical fiscal problems
remaining after the 1994 fiscal reform, In recent years, for example, two of the
most prominent fiscal issues in China have been the growing fiscal disparities
across regions and the mismatch of expenditures and revenues between various
levels of the government. Clearly, China's current fiscal-tax system is still a
system in transition and heavy workloads could be expected in the future. 'China
local governments.
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will further deepen its fiscal-tax system reform in a bid to enhance transparency
of fiscal budgets and improve tax policies', said Finance Minister Xie Xuren at
the 2012 China Development Forum.
3.3.2. China's monetary and banking reform
China's central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBC), was founded in
December, 1948 and its headquarters were originally established in the capital
city of Hebei Province, Shijiazhuang, but were soon moved to Beijing in February,
1949. The PBC, as China's central bank, is responsible for formulating and
implementing the national monetary policy. It is also responsible for drafting and
enforcing relevant laws, rules and regulations, regulating the financial markets",
managing the state foreign exchange and gold reserves, maintaining the country's
financial stability and establishing a steady CNY exchange rate system. However,
the PBC used to have a dual role and was in charge of both the central banking
and all commercial banking operations in China (i.e. the monobank system)
before the economic reform. It was not until 1983 that the State Council stripped
the PBC of its commercial operations, which were then handed over to four
independent state-owned specialised banks, and made it function solely as the
central bank. The status of the PBC as the central bank was legally confirmed on
March 18, 1995, when the 'Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's
Bank of China' was passed at the 3rd Plenum of the 8th National People's
Congress (NPC).
9 The inter-bank lending market, the inter-bank bond market, foreign exchange market and gold
market.
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The four state-owned specialised banks are the so-called 'Big Four' banks!" in
China. They are the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the China Construction Bank (CCB) and the
Bank of China (BOC), each of which was purposely built for providing banking
services in given areas. For example, the ABC specialises in providing financing
to China's agricultural sector and offering wholesale and retail banking services to
peasants, township and village enterprises (TVEs) and other rural institutions. In
accordance with the 'Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial
Banks' enacted in 1995, the Chinese government commercialised the operations
of the 'Big Four' banks, bringing them up to international standards (i.e. the Basel
Accord) for bank assets and risk management and, as a result, these four former
specialised banks were transformed into state-owned commercial banks. In
addition, in 1994, the 'Big Four' banks started to hand over their government-
directed (policy) spending functions to three new policy banks: the Agricultural
Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (COB) and the
Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC). Arguably, the establishment of these three
new policy banks has substantially reduced the burden of the 'Big Four' banks
with respect to financing government-directed trade and development projects
and made them become more profitability-oriented and more conscious of the
quality of issued loans (Lin and Zhang, 2009).
10 Besides the 'Big Four' banks there are a number of smaller commercial banks in China. The
most famous among them are the Bank of Communications, China CITlC Bank, China Everbright
Bank. HuaXia Bank, China Minsheng Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen
Development Bank, China Merchants Bank and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. After the
accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO), as part of its commitments to the WTO,
China released the 'Rules for Implementing the Regulations Governing Foreign Financial
Institutions in the People's Republic of China' in January 2002. By the end of2006, foreign banks
(financial institutions) have been permitted to provide local currency business to all Chinese
enterprises and individuals, allowing them to fully compete with their Chinese counterparts on a
fair basis.
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The Chinese banking system, though large in absolute terms, was characterised
by massive. government intervention, poor asset quality and low capitalisation
before the monetary and banking reform (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2006). Garcia-
Herrero et al (2006) also point out that since the banking sector is the main fund
provider of China's large SOE system, its reform is believed to have an important
and direct impact on SOEs. In 1993, after Vice-premier Zhu Rongji took over his
concurrent post as the governor of the central bank, the State Council formally
declared the launch of China's monetary and banking reform of which the first
and foremost target was to centralise the PBC's operations. According to the 1995
'Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China', under the
supervision of the State Council the PBC should have full autonomy in drawing
up and fulfilling its monetary policies. However, before the monetary and
banking reform, the PBC's local branches were under dual-supervision and they
were actually required to report to both central and local governments (Cao et al.,
1999). It was the dual-supervision that empowered local governments to exert
substantial influence on the PBC's monetary policy and credit allocation
decisions. Before 1994, the PBC's local branches issued around 70 per cent of the
total central bank's loans to state-owned banks. The majority of these loans would
then be delivered to SOEs by the local branches of state-owned banks, resulting
in a high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the banking system. However,
the risk of a build-up of new NPLs could never be eliminated with the presence of
substantial government intervention in the Chinese banking system.
When China was under the planned economy the whole country could be
considered as a single large company, whose business decisions were centrally
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determined, with all the SOEs being merely its production units. In such a
planned economic system, SOEs were almost completely 'financed by the state
budget with little debt. Since the post-1978 economic reform, managers have
been given more autonomous power to run SOEs. Managers were given more
control rights in firms' production, investment, sales and personnel management.
Also, they were allowed to retain some of the firms' profits. Importantly, it should
be noted that after the economic reform SOEs in China were required to be
responsible for their own losses. Since the economic reform the government has
gradually replaced the budget finance with debt finance for SOEs by redefining
the financial arrangement or relation between SOEs and state-owned banks. Su
(2005, p.120) suggests that "the Chinese government remained responsible for
fmallosses ofSOEs, mainly through state-owned banks".
In countries like Japan and Germany, where banks are major financiers to firms,
the governance role of banks is widely found to have positive effects on firms'
corporate governance systems. When they hold a substantial claim on a firm, a
bank is greatly driven to monitor the firm's day-to-day operations as well as
disciplining its management. A bank will do this in order to make sure that the
firm produces a satisfactory corporate performance and fulfils its financial
obligations (Jensen, 1986). However, such a positive role may not be expected
from any of the Chinese state-owned banks. Since the 1995 monetary and
banking reform the commercial bank lending, mainly from the 'Big Four' banks,
has been a substitute for the budget-grant-allocations to a large extent. Most bank
loans issued to SOEs are actually directed by governments at different levels, in
which banks never conduct serious screening process on borrowers. Continuous
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bank loans issued by state-owned banks, on non-commercial terms, have kept
alive a number of inefficient firms during the reform period. Moreover, these
inefficient firms actually stood little chance of paying back their loans in due
course, which inevitably led to a large build-up of NPLs in the state banking
sector, particularly in the second half of the 1990s. Arguably, the failure of the
Chinese banking system and the accruement of NPLs arose from several factors.
Firstly, the Chinese government is both creditor and debtor of SOEs. Such a dual
role of the Chinese government is often associated with the soft budget constraint
- defined as the expected re-negotiability of old debts and issuance of new debts
to SOEs, even when they are making losses (Tian and Estrin, 2007). In this sense,
the managers of SOEs are inclined to treat bank loans as a viable way of getting
government financial support and they feel little pressure to repay them. It is
worth noting that constant government bailouts could substantially undermine the
efforts to harden the budget constraints of SOEs. Secondly, state-owned banks are
often instructed by governments at various levels to support many unproductive
projects and save inefficient SOEs. Due to the constant government control over
the lending process, and the continuing ruling of the CCP, politicians have found
it fairly easy to use resources in the banking system to fund projects for non-
commercial purposes (e.g. patronage or showcase purposes) and to compensate
losers in the economic reform (Naughton, 2007). Thirdly, the steady accruement
of NPLs undermined the base of the banking system's own ability to pay off their
bad loans. When the 'Big Four' banks were separated from the monobank system
in the mid-1980s, their capital adequacy ratios (CARs) were well above the
demanded standard, which is 8 per cent of total assets set by the Basle Accord.
However, as instructed by the government, the state-owned banks used to
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continuously write off various kinds of loans, which dragged down the average
CAR of the 'Big Four' banks to around 6 per cent of total assets by the end of
2002. Together with the increase in the share ofNPLs in total loans, the decrease
of CARs in the state banking system has led to a steady erosion of its own
financial resources, particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Naughton
(2007) suggests that state-owned banks were technically unable to resolve their
problems on their own. In a bid to weaken the influence of local governments,
fundamental restructuring was carried out in the banking system during the
second half of the 1990s. In late 1998, the PBC abolished all of its local branches
and set up nine regional branches 11, and the operating boundaries of these
regional branches did not necessarily overlap with local administrative
boundaries. Such fundamental administrative restructuring in the banking system,
together with the adoption of macro-economic austerity that was targeted for the
fight against rising inflation at that time, imposed a much tighter budget
constraint on the state-owned banks (Naughton, 2007). Shortly after this
restructuring the state-owned banks, particularly the 'Big Four' banks as main
financiers to SOEs, were also required to centralise their operations, and their
local branches soon found themselves facing tougher standards on commercial
bank loan issuance, which in tum placed a harder budget constraint on SOEs.
Given that the 1994 fiscal reform did not curtail the seemingly endless
government lending to SOEs through state-owned banks, it can be argued that the
budget constraint of SOEs could not have been effectively hardened without the
1995monetary and banking reform.
II These nine regional branches are Shanghai branch, Tianjin branch, Shenyang branch, Nanjing
branch, Jinan branch, Wuhan branch, Guangzhou branch, Xi'an branch and Chengdu branch.
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Even though much progress has been made in China with regard to improving its
banking system since the monetary and banking reform, there is still a long way
to go to achieve a stable banking system. In 1998, the Chinese government
injected 270 billion CNY or 32.6 billion USD of capital into the 'Big Four' banks
and, in 1999, four state-owned asset managing companies (AMCs) were
established to take over some of these banks' NPLs (1.4 trillion CNY, roughly 20
per cent of their total loans). The AMCs are responsible for liquidating NPLs for
as much residual value as possible by repackaging and selling them to investors
(Naughton,2007). Notably, the government capital injections and the
establishment of four AMCs (one for each of the 'Big Four' banks) were aimed at
constructing a healthier capital structure for the 'Big Four' banks and
encouraging them to make presumably more prudent commercial bank loans. As
of 2005, the ratio ofNPLs to total loans has been dramatically reduced to 10.5 per
cent for the 'Big Four' banks, when it was above 30 per cent in 1997. In 2003 the
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was officially launched to take
over the supervisory role of the PBC to regulate the banking sector, which is
aimed at improving the efficiency of bank supervision as well as strengthening
the role of the PBC in the making and implementation of China's national
monetary policy.
3.3.3. Competition from tbe non-state Sector
3.3.3.1. Non-state-owned enterprises: townsbip and village enterprises
When the former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues started the
economic reform in 1978, it was the first time ever that various types of non-state
ownership were legally permitted to co-exist with state ownership in the Chinese
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economy. In the 1980s, despite enormous resistance to the rise of non-state
ownership, the non-state sector experienced an unprecedented development. After
Deng Xiaoping's 'Southern Tour' in 1992, it gained a new momentum to
accelerate its expansion. Non-state-owned firms were allowed to be more
involved in sectors that used to be monopolised by SOEs, except for strategic
sectors such as electricity, telecommunications, oil and the defence industry. By
the mid-1990s, the industrial output produced by the non-state sector was already
equivalent to that of the state sector. Cao et al (1999) argue that the rapid
expansion of the non-state sector in the 1980s and 1990s had made it a major
competitive force for SOEs, and SOEs supervised by local governments were
faced with more competition pressure than those supervised by central
government. This is because most SOEs supervised by local governments are
small and medium-sized firms whose business areas are more likely to overlap
with those of non-state-owned companies in competitive industries. Arguably, the
boom of the non-state sector played a vital role in introducing extra competition
into previously state-dominated sectors, and this is particularly true during the
first twenty years of the reform. The extra competition from the non-state sector
significantly increased the losses of inefficient SOEs, which in tum increased the
government's cost of keeping alive those SOEs. Thus, the government,
particularly local governments, were forced to start considering deepening the
economic reform by privatising inefficient SOEs under their supervision. Among
all the different types of non-state ownership, the collective enterprises were more
ideologically favoured, and thus encouraged by government officials, because
they are not completely privately-owned enterprises but 'public' enterprises. As a
result of rural industrialisation, the township and village enterprises (TVEs), a
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typical form of collective enterprise, have been considered as one of the major
driving forces behind the rapid expansion of China's non-state sector and fast
economic growth in the early stages of the economic reform (Li et al., 1999). In
1995, TVEs, as a whole, produced nearly 30 per cent of China's annual GDP and
contributed around 17 per cent of total government revenue. Moreover, during the
golden period of TVEs (1978-1996) they acted as the catalyst that China needed
to transform its whole economy from a centrally-planned economy to a market
economy (Naughton, 2007). TVEs outperformed SOEs in many industries and
thus exerted great pressure on them. It can be argued that TVEs have great
advantages in terms of corporate ownership structure, corporate governance
system, personnel system, labour relations and conditions of institutional
arrangement, as compared to their state-owned competitors (Perotti et al., 1998).
Although TVEs have undoubtedly been an important engine for China's rapid
economic growth, their success has greatly challenged the standard property
rights theory. As some economists have pointed out, collective enterprises,
including TVEs, do not have clearly defined property rights (see, for example,
Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Li, 1996). Typically, they are collectively owned by
citizens living in rural communities, such as towns and villages, and so all the
community members are nominal owners. However, none of the nominal owners
have the exclusive rights of ownership associated with traditional property rights
theory and there is no residual claimant in the conventional sense (Weitzman and
Xu, 1994). In practice, the property rights of TVEs can only be executed
collectively through the representatives of the community. In most cases, the
community governments are the de facto executive owners/representatives of
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TVEs. TVEs are, in fact, considered to be merely a transitional type of ownership
at the early stages of the economic reform and the problem of their vaguely-
defined property rights should be resolved as the economic reform moves on.
Hence, after 1996, the government began to privatise collective enterprises in
various forms, such as 'shareholding companies' or 'shareholding cooperatives'
or simply 'selling-out' (Li et al., 1999). Figure 3.2 shows that collective
enterprises enjoyed a rapid expansion in the whole economy during their golden
period, from 1978 through 1996, but suddenly shrank in 1997 when the Chinese
government shifted the policy and decided to launch a massive privatisation of
collective enterprises throughout the whole country.
Figure 3.2 Number of enterprises in China 12
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2003.
12 In 1984 the first shareholding company was established in China and collective firms are
encouraged by the governments at different levels to transform into shareholding companies.
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3.3.3.2. Foreign direct investment (FDI)13
Since the launch of the economic reform, China's inward FDI has risen
dramatically under the open-door policy and the pivotal role it has played in
boosting the non-state sector of the whole economy has attracted more and more
attention from within and outside China. The nationwide impact of FDI in China
was moderate during the 1980s and FDI inflows were largely restricted to four
special economic zones (SEZs). The speed of China's annual FDI growth has
been greatly accelerated since 1992, when the Chinese government reaffirmed its
policies of openness and market-oriented reforms. As shown in figure 3.3, the
annual FDI inflows were only 4.4 billion USD in 1991, but they rocketed up to 11
billion USD in 1992 and 60.6 billion USD in 2004. In 2008, China overtook the
USA and became the world's largest recipient of FDI. Figure 3.4 clearly shows a
steady upward trend in China's FDI inward stock from 1980 to 2004.
Naughton (2007) summarises three distinctive characteristics of China's inward
FDI. Firstly, FDI has been the predominant form of global capital resources for
China. Secondly, the majority of Chinese inward FDI inflows have been confined
to the manufacturing industry. Thirdly, an outstandingly large proportion of
Chinese FDI has come from other East Asian economies, especially Hong Kong
and Taiwan. At the national level, prior empirical research has demonstrated the
importance of FDI for China's economic growth over the past three decades (see,
for example, Chen et al., 1995; Buckley et al., 2002). Large FDI inflows have led
to a large and ever-growing number of foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) that
13 The Chinese inward FDI flows include capital flows from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
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often (but do not exclusively) take the form of joint ventures between foreign
firms and Chinese enterprises. Typically, in the FIEs, foreign firms are major
suppliers of capital, techniques, product design and a sales network abroad, while
Chinese enterprises are often the providers of land and labour (Whalley and Xin,
2006). The share of total national industrial output from FlEs has increased
dramatically since 1992, and in some regions FlEs have even become one of the
major power engines behind regional economic growth. For example, Cao et al
(1999) found that in 1994 the share of industrial output from FlEs was 12 per cent
nationwide (5.6 per cent in 1992), 20 per cent in Jiangsu, 24 per cent in Beijing,
51 per cent in Shenzhen and 70 per cent in Xiamen.
Figure 3.3 FDI inflows
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Figure 3.4 FDI inward stock
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Although FDI inflows have substantially contributed to China's two-digit
economic growth over the past three decades, their impact on most of China's
domestic enterprises, especially SOEs, has been multifaceted. On one hand, FDI
has brought in a bundle of resources such as management experience, market
channels, technology, capital inflows and other non-capital inflows of resources
(Naughton, 2007). China's domestic enterprises, mainly through their cooperative
partnership with foreign investors in FIEs, could have greatly benefited from
those resources. Indeed, in the past three decades FDI has played a vital role in
China's industrial technology development, industrial growth and industrial
structure upgrade. On the other hand, the incoming FDI has eroded SOEs' profit
margins to a large extent by dramatically increasing the market competition,
especially in the manufacturing industry. Compared with SOBs, FIEs may have
advantages in areas such as product design, product quality, technology,
ownership and corporate governance structures, and business experience.
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Furthermore, Whalley and Xin (2006) suggest that the labour productivity of FIEs
could also be one of their major advantages, and that this figure was around nine
times that of China's domestic enterprises in 2004.
3.4. Enterprise (SOE) reform in China
It could be argued that enterprise reform is the central issue of the entire
economic reform process. Over the past three decades, China has made every
endeavour to develop the institutional foundations of a modem and functioning
corporate governance system. The enterprise reform, or SOE reform, in China
could be divided into three interconnected phases. In the first phase (1978-1992),
the SOE reform began with the Management Responsibility Contract System
(MRCS) in 1987, which was aimed at transferring the management authority
from the government to SOEs' managers and shielding SOEs from political
intervention. Under the framework of MRCS, managers of SOEs were allowed to
have some specific control rights in production, investment, sales, profits and
personnel management (Su, 2005). They also gained the rights to retain part of
their profits, all of which used to be vested and conveyed to the state under the
planned system. The main theme of the MRCS was to effectively separate the
ownership and control of all SOEs and to make them more focused on profit-
maximising activities. However, there existed a critical defect in the MRCS,
mainly due to the asymmetric information between the government and managers
of SOEs. In the presence of such asymmetric infonnation it could be fairly easy
for mangers to hide the true situation of SOEs from the government. Su (2005)
suggests that under MRCS the profit retention by managers had no downside,
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while the state was always held responsible for SOEs' final losses through state-
owned banks, resulting in an ever-bloating triangle of debts between the
government, SOEs and state-owned banks. To summarise, the first phase of SOE
reform in China did not successfully introduce functioning incentive contracts
between the management and the state, nor did it effectively prevent considerable
administrative intervention from the government in SOEs' operations.
The second phase (1992-1997) of SOE reform could be largely characterised as
the reform that was to set up a Modern Enterprise System (MES) for all Chinese
SOEs. The second phase of the SOE reform began in 1992 after Deng Xiaoping's
'Southern Tour', during which the government declared its ambition to realise its
official goals of SOE reform, and one of the key goals was the establishment of
an MES. Given the failure of the MRCS, the state council decided to terminate
the MRCS nationwide in 1994 and introduced the MES instead. Under the MES,
firms' outstanding shares are classified into five types. These are state, legal-
person (LP), employee, tradable A-shares and offshore shares. Regardless of the
share type, all shares have the same voting rights. Tradable shares are those
shares not retained by the government and state enterprises, and these can be
transferred to outside investors in the form of initial public offerings (lPOs) and
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) (Su, 2005).
The MES was described as being characterised by clearly quantitatively
delineated property rights, well defined rights and responsibilities, financial
independence and accountability, immunity from government intervention and
scientific management (Morris et al.,2002). The Chinese government adopted
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various methods, mainly through corporatisation and integration, to build up the
MES in SOEs. Arguably, corporatised SOEs were restructured along the same
lines as Western-style corporations and had well-defined shareholder rights. In
contrast with traditional or former SOEs, they usually took the form of limited
liability companies and joint-stock companies. In the meantime, the government
carried out a nationwide integration project that encouraged some SOEs to
acquire or merge with some other SOEs, both vertically and horizontally, in order
to form large enterprise groups (conglomerates), which were modelled after
Korean chaebols. The formation of large enterprise groups was mainly aimed at
enhancing the SOEs' capabilities to compete internationally. In 1994, the Chinese
government brought the SOE reform a big step forward by introducing the
Company Law which statutorily requires all companies to have two important
corporate governing bodies - the general meeting of shareholders and the board
of directors - and two corporate positions - the chairman of the board of directors
and the chief executive officer (CEO). Moreover, the Company Law also
provides a general statutory guideline for all other important corporate issues,
such as corporate structure, ownership transfer, issuance of corporate bonds and
IPOs.
Although the theme of the MES reform programme was to make SOEs subject to
a greater degree of market discipline and avoid government interference in the
running of these SOEs, the outcome of the reform were found to be disappointing.
During this period, China sought to improve the corporate governance of SOEs
through corporatisation instead of privatisation. The principle of the reform was
the 'separation of government from management', which aimed at preventing
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political interference in SOEs by allowing managers of SOEs to enjoy greater
managerial autonomy and incentives to run SOEs on a profit-maximisation and
market-orientation basis. However, the corporate performance of SOEs, after
corporatisation, was again found to be unsatisfactory. Indeed, the performance of
SOEs has greatly deteriorated in the 1990s, causing adverse impacts on China's
macroeconomic stability. Official data (China Statistical Yearbook, 1998) shows
that profits of industrial SOEs decreased from 81.7 billion CNY in 1993 to 42.8
billion CNY in 1997, while losses increased and almost doubled from 45.3 billion
CNY to 83.1 billion CNY. Lin (2001) points out that the actual corporate
governance of corporatised SOEs can be characterised by excessive power of
CEOs, insider control and collusion, expropriation of minority shareholders and a
lack of transparency. Moreover, one of the main targets of the MES reform was a
further separation of the government from the management, which actually
equated to increasing the separation of the principle from the agent. Arguably,
such an increasing separation of government from management was in fact
logically imperfect from the perspective of agency theory and could lead to
increasing informational asymmetries between the management and the
government. The corporate governance problem of SOEs has become even more
serious because of increased managerial autonomy. The increase in managerial
autonomy could lead to greater informational asymmetries between the
management and the government, making it much easier for managers of SOEs to
operate firms in their own interests. Lin (2001) claims that the problems of the
corporate governance of SOEs are eventually attributable to continued state
dominance in ownership and control of the industrial sector, and the process of
corporatisation and integration has not come with any substantive change in the
7S
very nature of ownership and control of SOEs.
The third phase of the SOE reform (1997-present) can be characterised by
significant diversification of state ownership through the partial or complete
privatisation of SOEs. In 1997, at the 15th congress of the CCP, President Jiang
Zemin formally announced the decision on state ownership diversification
through privatisation, which was intensively focused on small and medium-sized
SOEs. In the meantime, he also stressed that state ownership would continue to
remain dominant in the economy. The decision was reiterated at the 4th Plenum
of the 15th Party Congress in September 1999 and by the State Planning and
Development Commission's (SPDC) statement in January 2000, which
reaffirmed that although the state would start to retreat from the Chinese economy,
state ownership would continue to play a dominant role in the whole economy,
particularly with regard to strategic industries, such as infrastructure and key
producers goods (Lin, 200 I).
There are two separate worlds of SOEs in China: small and medium-sized SOEs
under the supervision of local governments and large-sized SOEs under central
government. The government strategy largely involved in the process of
privatisation, particularly in the 1990s, is a so-called '2-R strategy' - 'Retain'
government control of large SOEs that operate in the strategic sectors and
'Retreat' from small and medium-sized SOEs that operate in highly competitive
markets (Liu et 01.,2006). Stated simply, the '2-R strategy' can be viewed as an
official policy for China's nationwide privatisation process whereby the state
should retain government control of large SOEs, while retreating from small and
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medium-sized SOEs. In line with this strategy the Chinese government usually
chooses to corporatise its large SOEs through share issue privatisation (SIP). In
essence, the SIP in China is only partial privatisation, selling only part of the
existing shares on the stock market to investors (mainly domestic investors at the
initial stages of the reform). Perotti (1995) argues that SIP, a commonly used
method of privatisation in economies with less developed capital markets, could
be more likely to be motivated by political revenue and some other non-efficiency
considerations. In China, large-sized SOEs, especially those in strategic sectors,
are considered by the government to be closely associated with the safety,
security and stability of the national economy. The government, therefore, should
never relinquish its control rights over large SOEs. Constrained by political
ideology, cadres of the CCP might prefer only partially privatising large-sized
SOEs to completely selling them to private parties. The partial privatisation of
large-sized SOEs, which was in line with President Jiang's speech at the 15th
congress of the CCP, was therefore a reflection of political considerations. The
first part of the '2-R strategy' - 'Retain' government control of large SOEs that
operate in the strategic sectors - has clearly demonstrated the government's
ambition to remain as the controller of large SOEs. In contrast, both central and
local governments have chosen to entirely or largely privatise their small and
medium-sized SOEs, often through management buyouts or management-
employee buyouts or as joint ventures with foreign investors. Since the
implementation of the 'SOE deregulation' policy the majority of small and
medium-sized SOEs have been gradually transferred to local governments at
different levels. Local governments at various levels have, since then, become the
real residual claimants and controllers of these SOEs. By 1985, SOEs controlled
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by provincial, municipal and county governments accounted for 53 per cent of the
total industrial output from all enterprises at, or above, the township level. It
cannot be simply concluded that the large divestment of small and medium-sized
SOEs was merely an action initiated by the central government. Rather, it was a
reflection of initiatives of local governments to get rid of the burden imposed on
them by the increased losses ofSOEs under their jurisdiction (Cao et al., 1999; Li
et al., 1999; Lin, 2001). As stated before, the hardened budget constraint and
increased competition from the non-state sector have made SOEs less and less
profitable, which has greatly changed the cost of benefits to local governments at
each level for keeping SOEs. The deteriorating SOE performance was magnified
under the hard budget constraint and the losses of SOEs became increasingly
heavy burdens for local governments, which provided local governments with an
incentive to privatise their SOEs. Hence, the Chinese pattern of SOE privatisation,
which stands in contrast to those of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
is a gradual and bottom-up one (i.e. initiated by local governments and then
promoted by central government). As a result of the significant diversification of
state ownership, starting in the late 1990s and accelerating in the early 2000s,
great numbers of SOEs have been restructured, privatised and some of them or
their spin-offs have been converted into PLCs. By 2007, only 20680 industrial
enterprises were state-owned or majority-controlled, among which only 10074
enterprises remained entirely state-owned (Chan and Unger, 2009).
3.5. Chinese stock market
The establishment of the stock market was to facilitate the reform of the SOEs
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because the government found it difficult to continue with policy lending,
subsidies and preferential treatment through the ailing banking sector. The soft
budget constraint had the state sector trailing far behind in productivity and
profitability. The huge amount of NPLs in the banking sector could be seen as the
legacy of these policies. Therefore, the Chinese stock market was expected to
alleviate government fiscal burdens as well as boosting the national economy
growth.
This section first discusses the remarkable emergence of the Chinese stock
market. Next, I intend to describe some important laws and regulations pertaining
to the stock markets, such as The Provisional Regulations on Administration of
Issuing and Trading of Shares (PRAITS, 1993), the Company Law (1994),
Securities Law (1999) and the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies (CCGLC,2002).
3.5.1. The emergence of Chinese stock market
There are two stock exchanges in China: the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE),
which was established in December 1990, and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE),
which opened in April 1991. The reason for establishing two stock exchanges
rather than one was to stimulate competition (Xu and Wang, 1999). Given that the
function of stock markets in China was mainly to support the restructuring of
SOEs, the decision as to whether a company can go public or not is determined
largely by an administrative process rather than a market-based process. When a
firm wants to go public, it must seek permission from the local government and
the relevant central government ministries. The China's Securities Regulatory
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Commission (CSRC) also requires the firm to provide three years of audited
accounting data prior to listing, and requires that typically at least 25 percent of
all shares must be available for trading on the stock exchanges after listing.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the Chinese stock market from 1998
to 2007. Given that the stock market provides an attractive way to raise funds, the
Chinese stock market (SHSE and SZSE) has grown rapidly during the past two
decades. There were 1530 publicly listed companies (PLCs) across both stock
exchanges at the end of 2007, with total market capitalisation of 32714.1 billion
CNY.
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3.5.2. Sbare classifications
The Chinese stock market classifies owners of shares into five groups": state,
legal-person (LP), employee, tradable A-shares and offshore shares (e.g. H-shares,
N-shares and B-shares), all providing equal voting rights (Tian and Estrin, 2008).
This official classification is, however, somewhat misleading, since it neither
clarifies the nature of owners nor traces the ultimate owners. For instance, by
pyramid or cross-shareholdings, foreign investors have already obtained a big
portion of A-shares which are designed exclusively for domestic investors, while
an increasing number of domestic investors are now offshore shareholders.
State Ownership: The state ownership can be divided into two portions: the
immediate ownership, namely the state shares that are directly obtained by the
government institutions or departments, and indirect ownership, which is the
legal-person shares held by state-owned legal-persons (Wei, 2007). A number of
empirical studies have found immediate state ownership to be negatively
correlated with performance. Qi et 01 (2000) studied PLCs listed on the Shanghai
Stock Market for the period 1991-1996 and also found that the direct state
shareholdings had a negative impact on listed firm performance. Similar results
were reported by Chen (2001), Wei (2007) and Xu and Wang (1999). The
findings of the empirical studies reviewed above suggest that state shareholdings
have a negative effect on SOEs. Hence, a quick response to the findings would be
for the state to further divest its shareholdings.
14 In general, state and legal-person shares are non-tradable and only under some specific
circumstances can they be exchanged. Starting from 2005, China's split-share reform/share
segmentation reform is currently underway to make all shares tradable.
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Legal-person shares: In China, Legal Persons (LPs) are 'technically'
autonomously managed legal entities, most of which are also primarily state-
owned government agencies (Hovey and Naughton, 2007). Thus, LP holdings can
be classified as shares held indirectly by the state through various holding entities
and the others obtained by non-state legal entities. LP holdings have been
analysed in a number of empirical studies and are generally found to have a
positive influence on firm performance. For example, Sun and Tong (2003) found
that LP ownership would positively affect listed firm performance. Xu and Wang
(1999) also found a similar positive relationship. Gul (1999) found a stronger
correlation for firms with LP dominance than for state dominance. Therefore, it
appears that under the present circumstances, LP ownership has both the ability
and the incentive to provide necessary and efficient monitoring which results in
improved performance of listed firms in China (Hovey and Naughton 2007).
Tradable A-shares: These shares are principally issued to Chinese domestic
investors traded in CNY on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange. Shareholders of tradable A-shares are indeed the supermajority
power in the market. The majority of empirical studies with regard to tradable A-
shares reveal that the greater the proportion of tradable A-shares, the higher the
performance of the firm. For example, Hovey (2005) found a positive relationship
between tradable A-shares and firm performance, though the relationship is not as
strong as would be expected. However, according to conventional theory. tradable
A-shares would have little explanatory power on corporate performance, largely
due to the pursuit of short-term interests and lack of incentives to actively
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monitor management. Xu and Wang (1999) did not find a positive relationship
between tradable A-shares and corporate performance and thus suggested that the
free-rider problem might exist.
Employee shares: These shares are offered to employees of a listed company,
usually at a substantially discounted price. These share offerings are designed as
an incentive scheme to employees and are thus expected to have a positive effect
on corporate performance, Employee shares are normally subject to a lock-up
period before they become tradable on the market, and usually the period is of 6
to 12 months, according to the relevant policy stipulated by the CSRC. For
example, Bank of Ningbo (Stock Code: 002142) launched its Initial Public
offering (IPO) in July 2007, but its employees had to wait for 12 months before
the CSRC lifted the ban on their shares.
Offshore shares (foreign ownership): These shares are B-shares, plus cross-
listings in Hong Kong (H-shares), New York (N-shares) and other foreign
exchanges. According to findings by (Coffee, 2002; Lang et 01.,2003; Moffett et
al., 2003), it is expected that firms that are cross-listed on foreign stock
exchanges would have superior performance due to improved disclosure and
monitoring, and ultimately enhanced value. The B-share market was opened up
for trading by domestic individual investors in February 2001, as long as funds
used for trading are from offshore accounts (Hovey and Naughton 2007), which
might be seen as the first step towards amalgamation of the B-shares market with
the A-shares market. As one of the objectives of the Chinese stock market is to
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attract international capital, the integration of them may be able to create a more
efficient and better performing market that produces good returns, reduces
variability and risk and attracts more international players.
In December 2002, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) were formally
granted a permit by the Chinese government to invest in the A-shares market. The
permit is aimed at substantial, established institutions, as foreign institutions are
required to have at least 10 billion USD under management or be a top 100
financial institution. They are required to be fully committed to the market, thus
entry and funds repatriation conditions are restricted. Before December 2002, in
A-shares market, foreign ownership mainly took the form of a major co-operator
in joint-stock companies, like General Motor (Shanghai) Ltd., Honda (Guangzhou)
Ltd. and Shenzhen Development Bank Ltd., etc. Foreign ownership has been an
important player in China's A-shares market up to the present time and is on
average said to have a positive influence on the performance of PLCs in China
(Hovey and Naughton 2007). Indeed, conventional theory would hold that foreign
institutional holders would tend to monitor firms they invest in more closely and
thus performance should improve. In addition, they select only these firms that
have excellent records and potential (Chung et al., 2002; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000).
To summarise, many empirical findings support the notion that foreign ownership
on average leads to prominent performance of PLCs in China and has the
potential to strengthen the market. Hence, it should be encouraged in China.
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3.6. Corporate governance of Chinese PLCs
As the world's second largest economy and the largest transition economy, China
has recently become the focus of corporate governance. Over the past three
decades, the Chinese government has done much to improve the corporate
governance of Chinese industrial enterprises, such as the injection of two stock
exchanges in the early 1990s, the enactment of a series of relative laws and
regulations and the establishment of the CSRC. As a result, substantial progress
in the quality of corporate governance practices has been observed for a number
of PLCs. However, China's current corporate governance has been found to still
be unpleasant and far from perfect by many recent empirical studies. For,
example, Cheung et 01 (2008) develop a corporate governance index (COl) to
measure the overall quality of corporate governance practices of the largest 100
PLCs in China and their test results show that the COl of Chinese PLCs tends to
be loosely connected with market valuation. Arguably, their empirical results
suggest that it seems impossible for Chinese PLCs to enhance their market
valuation through the improvement of their corporate governance practices. It
might be imperative for PLCs to further improve the effectiveness of their
corporate governance mechanisms.
Despite the variety of definitions of corporate governance, extant literature
generally divides corporate governance into two categories: internal and external
corporate governance. The remainder of this section will present a brief
discussion of both internal and external corporate governance arrangements in
China, especially for Chinese PLCs.
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Internal corporate governance is primarily comprised of the ownership structure,
board of directors and executive compensation. In the current Chinese legal
environment the existence of highly concentrated ownership, especially one
ultimate controller, is pervasive among Chinese PLCs. Recent empirical works
have found that the median of the largest shareholder's shareholding is around 40
per cent, while the median of the second largest shareholder's shareholding is
only around 5 per cent (see, Bai et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2009). Moreover, more
than 80 per cent of PLCs are directly or indirectly controlled by the state (Liu and
Sun, 2005; Li, 2008). There is no doubt that the state is currently both the
regulatory authority (judge) and the controlling shareholder (player) in most listed
firms. Arguably, such a dual role could give the state a strong incentive to
regulate the market in its own favour so as to further its interests as the
controlling shareholder. The major responsibility of the board of directors is to
minimise agency costs induced by the separation of ownership and control in
modem companies (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). However, as in other East Asian
countries, controlling shareholders of Chinese PLCs are tempted to control the
board of directors and management in order to make sure that the firm is operated
in their best interests (Chen et al., 2002). Moreover, controlling shareholders
often see a board they can control as a tool to extract extra private profits,
sometimes even at the cost of the minority shareholders.
There is a consensus in the literature that independent directors can be an
effective mechanism in enhancing firms' corporate governance (Weisbach, 1988;
Kato and Long, 2006; Fan et al., 2007). Unlike insider directors, independent
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directors are less influenced by controlling shareholders and are responsible for
maximising all shareholders' wealth rather than the wealth of the controlling.
shareholders only. To improve the level ofPLCs' corporate governance and better
protect the interests of minority shareholders, the CSRC issued 'Guidelines for
Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies'
in 2001. The guidelines required that all PLCs should have at least one third
independent directors on their boards by 30th June, 2003.
Another major issue of internal corporate governance is managerial compensation.
Normally, the compensation of senior management teams come in four forms in
developed economies: salary, bonus, perquisites and stock-based incentives (Li et
al., 2008). In China, before the economic reform began in 1978, all SOE
managers were civil cadres who acted as state representatives and were paid in
accordance with their rank in a highly structured payment scale system. Arguably,
managers' incomes were not associated with corporate financial performance. In
other words, there was a lack of an incentive system at that time to motivate
managers to improve firms' financial performance. Since the early 1990s, many
managerial incentive schemes have been introduced to SOEs. Firth et al (2006b)
suggest that the most popular managerial incentive scheme is comprised of two
components: salary and performance-based bonus. However, Li et al (2008) point
out that the performance-based bonus is not very flexible in practice because the
method of bonus payment has not been clearly defined. Moreover, in spite of
many recently introduced managerial incentive motivated reward schemes, it
should be noted that very few PLCs, especially those controlled by the state, have
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executive stock option schemes.
Besides the internal corporate governance mechanisms, external corporate
governance is the other important aspect of corporate governance system and it
mainly consists of the market for corporate control, bank monitoring and the legal
system. In Western countries, companies with unsatisfactory corporate
performance are often punished or disciplined by the market. Bai et al (2004)
suggest that an active market of corporate control is efficient in allocating
resources for firms. Although an active market of corporate control has been
considered as an effective external corporate governance mechanism in developed
economies, such a market in China, up to the present times, has not been in place.
One major reason might be that block shareholdings are often state or legal-
person shares. All state and legal-person shares were non-tradable before the
split-share reform'f began in 2005 and could only be transferred under the permit
of the CSRC. Perhaps a more active market for corporate control might be
expected to emerge and start to have a positive impact on corporate governance in
China as a result of the split-share reform of2005.
According to the existing literature, debt issuance is an important external
corporate governance mechanism in helping to reduce conflicts of interest
between management and shareholders (Smith and Warner, 1979; Jensen, 1986).
15 There are five types of shares in China: state, legal-person (LP), employee, tradable A-shares
and offshore shares. Under the split-share system, in general, state and LP shares are non-tradable
shares while the other three types are tradable shares. The aim of the split-share reform of 200S
was to make all non-tradable shares tradable in the market.
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Gilson (1990) suggests that creditors can take over the role of shareholders in
disciplining the management when firms are under financial stress. Arguably,
borrowings from banks could be more effective than any other forms of public
debt in reducing problems associated with agency conflicts and informational
asymmetries (Diamond, 1984; Berlin and Loeys, 1988). This is primarily due to
the comparative advantage of banks in monitoring firms' activities and in
collecting and processing information, in order to ensure the safety of their issued
loans. In China, due to the lack of a functioning corporate bond market, banks,
especially the state-owned banks, are still the main loan providers. Bank loans are
an important financing source which constitutes more than 20 per cent of total
assets in most PLCs. It is worth noting that more than 80 per cent of total bank
loans are provided by the 'Big Four' banks. There is no doubt that the banking
sector has played an important role in the corporate governance of Chinese PLCs.
Li et al (2008) point out that, far from being a model similar to the role the
banking sector plays in Japan or Germany, where banks are actively involved in
monitoring firms' operations, the Chinese banking sector is reluctant to directly
get involved in firm's corporate governance. It is worth noting that the soft budget
constraint in China is the key obstacle preventing banks from conducting regular
monitoring of PLCs, since the government is both creditor and debtor in state-
controlled PLCs (Tian and Estrin, 2007).
The role played by the legal framework and the legal foundation in disciplining
management and preventing controlling shareholders from expropriating minority
shareholders has been extensively documented in the literature (La Porta et al.,
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1997, 1998, 1999, 2000b). It could be argued that the government can improve
corporate governance by strengthening a legal system that protects shareholders'
interests and enhancing the enforcement of laws and regulations. Since the early
1990s, in order to improve the legal environment of the Chinese stock market a
number of relevant laws and regulations have been enacted and introduced, such
as the Provisional Regulations on Administration of Issuing and Trading of
Shares (PRAITS, 1993), the Company Law (1994), the Securities Law (1999) and
the Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed Companies (CGGLC, 2001).
Indeed, these laws and regulations have greatly improved the legal infrastructure
of China. However, despite the recent progress China has made, the Chinese
stock market is still being criticised for its unsatisfactory legal framework and a
lack of effective law enforcement. Yang et al (2011) argue that a sound legal
system would never materialise without a truly independent judicial system, and
in the current market condition the government is both the market regulator and a
participant.
To summarise, In spite of the great progress China has made in corporate
governance in the past two decades, there is still plenty of room for further
improvement. It is worth noting that many traditional corporate governance
mechanisms that are widely used in developed economies to reduce agency
problems might not be applicable in the Chinese markets under the current
circumstances, such as the market of corporate control, banking monitoring and
managerial stock-based incentives. Yang et al (2011) impute such a situation to
three key problems of Chinese markets: (1) the dominance of state ownership in
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PLCs; (2) strong political interference on PLCs; (3) nonexistence of a truly
independent judicial system. Li et al (2008) suggest that the dysfunction of the
board of directors and other relevant committees could also be a key reason.
3.7. Regional differences in China
Substantial disparity across regions is a reality in almost every geographically
large country. China covers 9.6 million square kilometres, and its vast land area is
inevitably associated with enormous contrasts in conditions, both natural and
artificial, across 32 provincial regions. It is argued that economic as well as
political factors are the main driving force of such significant regional differences
in China. Moreover, the regional disparity may transfer (often indirectly) the
influence of these factors to listed companies, affecting and shaping their
corporate governance in many ways (e.g. access to external finance, investment
opportunities and tax advantages). Hence, this section discusses the influence that
regional disparity may have on the corporate governance of listed companies in
China from both economic and legal perspectives.
To elaborate the role economic factors play in regionalism, it might be useful to
review an important claim of the development literature. It has long been argued
that countries pursuing externally oriented development strategies are more likely
to achieve higher rates of economic growth than those that are internally focused
(Lee, 1994). If China's 32 provincial regions are seen as independent economies
to each other, this argument can, to a large extent, explain the substantial
economic disparity across regions in China. The degree of economic development
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(in terms of per capita national income) differs substantially among regions, with
trade and investment being highly biased towards the rich Eastern regions. It is
worth noting that such uneven development is politically encouraged in China, as
authorities believe it could be wise to allow some regions to develop much faster
to raise sufficient funds to help other comparatively backwards regions,
ultimately improving the whole national income. Obviously, Eastern regions were
the best candidates in this sense, and government policy and domestic resources
has been largely altered towards the East, particularly in the early stages of the
economic reform.
The political effect is a series of 'preferential policies' that heavily favour the
Eastern provinces or metropolises, as concluded by Fan (1997). He argued that at
least six 'preferential policies' could be identified. The 'preferential policies'
extended to the coastal regions are in essence policies to marketize and
international these Eastern areas. Arguably. firms in these open economic zones
could import intermediate inputs duty-free to produce exports; collaborate with
foreign companies in investment, manufacturing and distribution; hire and fire
workers in accordance with their performance and demand conditions; and escape
the confiscatory taxation that is needed in a centrally planned economy to finance
its vast, complicated system of social subsidies (Demurger et al., 2002).
It can be often observed that the political and economic effects work together to
build up the regional inequality in China. It could be argued that the uneven
development caused mainly by economic and political factors, plus geographical
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advantage of the Eastern regions (being close to the sea) makes them stand out as
the most advanced areas in China, which could be manifested in a number of
ways: to name but three, higher GDP per capita, relatively mature industry market
and more domestic and foreign investments. For example, the statistics of
geographical distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) from 1989 to 1998
could be a good manifestation of the results of the uneven development. Eastern
regions in total received 88% of total FDI over that 10 years period, while central
regions and Western regions were in receipt of merely 9% and 3% respectively.
These economic differences could be expected to significantly affect corporate
governance. First, rich regions could enable firms to have access to less costly
external finance. Second, a mature industry market may provide market
competition to firms, effectively reducing agency conflicts by disciplining the
management. Third, domestic and foreign investments are concentrated in
Eastern regions, bringing in both financing opportunities and market competition.
The three above-mentioned effects on firms point to two important issues in
corporate governance: the firm's cash holding policy and product market
competition, with both having vast literature in their own right.
Overall, extra caution should be taken in the interpretation of regional differences
on corporate governance of listed firms in China, and this is due to the fact that
listed firms are always large firms and have nationwide operations. Although their
headquarters are located in one region, their local branches may spread across the
whole country.
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3.S. Conclusion
The recognition of the enormous inefficiencies of SOEs in China has led to the
post-1978 economic reform. Gains could be expected, as the Chinese government
has adopted various privatisation projects to gradually replace state control with
private control by outside investors (Megginson et al., 1994). The economic
reform has been considered beneficial to the national economy and is seen as a
landmark in the development of corporate governance in China. Despite recent
improvements China has achieved in the area of corporate governance, there is
still huge scope for further improvements. The current corporate governance
system of PLCs is severely hampered by a number of problems, such as the huge
block holdings by the state, excessive government intervention and a lack of an
independent judicial system (Li et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2011). It is worth noting
that in the Chinese corporate governance system, problems, especially those
associated with the relatively lower inefficiency of state ownership, should be
carefully resolved in the future as a matter of top priority. MacNeil (2002)
examines the emergence of the legal system of PLCs in China and finds that
China falls into the investor-unfriendly category. However, it should be
emphasised that corporate governance in China is still in the process of
development.
The government is continuing its efforts to search for a sound corporate
governance system, as evidenced by many of its recent actions, such as the
introduction of a system of independent directors in 2001, the launch of the split-
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share reform in 2005 and the revision of the Company Law in 200616• In order to
enhance the monitoring and disciplining function of the board of directors for all
listed companies in China, in 2001 the CSRC introduced the 'Guideline for
introducing Independent Directors to The Board of Directors of Listed
Companies'. The Guideline requires that independent directors should make up at
least one third of directors sitting on the board in any listed company by 30th June,
2003. Moreover, the appointed independent directors are required to comment on
managerial performance in the company's annual reports. The core theme of the
Guideline is to ensure an increase in the proportion of independent directors
sitting on the board who can serve as a check on both management and the board
in the interests of all shareholders.
On the 27th October 2005, the 18th Secession of the Standing Committee of the
10th National people's congress (NPC) passed the revised Company Law of the
People's Republic of China, which was promulgated in order to replace the old
Company Law enacted in 1994. The revised Company Law has made a number
of important changes to China's corporate governance system. Particularly, it
introduces several measures to enhance managerial accountability, and those
measures include board composition, the role and responsibilities of directors, the
role of major shareholders and shareholder remedies. First, the revised Company
Law reforms rules with respect to board composition by enhancing the power and
functions of outsider directors. Second, it introduces a whole new chapter to
16 The government has not announced any major new laws in this area since then.
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reinforce the general framework of directors' duties, as well as establishing a
special regime regarding related party transactions. Third, as an effort to protect
the interests of minority shareholders, it requires that shareholders should not
abuse their voting powers, and permits the company to apply a cumulative voting
system which is intended to secure some power or influence for minority
shareholders in board elections,. Finally, it enhances corporate governance in
China by substantially strengthening the shareholder remedy regime. As
discussed above, the revision of the old Company Law in 2005 has greatly
improved the previous system which has been proved out-of-date and inadequate.
Indeed, this revision has made many important changes (breakthroughs and
innovations) to the corporate governance system, which has thus been considered
to be a revolutionary reform in this area.
The Chinese stock market classifies owners of shares into five groups: state
shares, legal-person shares, tradable A-shares, employee shares and offshore
shares, all having equal voting rights (one-vote-one-share). Among all types of
shares, state shares, legal-person shares and tradable A-shares each comprises
around one third of the total outstanding shares, with the other types as a whole
representing less than 10 percent of total outstanding shares. Under the split-share
system, in general, state and legal-person shares are non-tradable shares while the
other three types are tradable shares. Non-tradable shares entitle holders to have
as exactly same voting and cash-flow rights as holders of tradable shares, but they
cannot be publicly traded in the market. The non-Tradable shares represent a
major obstacle to the development of China's domestic financial market due to
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their negative effects on market liquidity and financial transparency. In January
2004, the Chinese government officially admitted problems caused by the non-
tradable shares and stated that necessary reforms in this area would be launched
in the immediate future. In 2005, the CSRC officially launched a structural
reform program, called the split-share reform, whose ultimate aim was to make
all non-tradable shares tradable in the market.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ULTIMATE CONTROLLER AND
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
4.1. Introduction
China's economy has experienced rapid growth over the past thirty years and has
witnessed a significant transformation of all sectors. A large number of former
state owned enterprises (SOEs) have been reorganised and some of them or their
profitable operating arms have been privatised and then listed on the two stock
exchanges in China in order to further China's economic reform (Chen et al.,
2006). The two stock exchanges are the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE),
established in December 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE),
launched in April 1991. Up to the present day there have been around 1700
publicly listed companies (PLCs) in China and as far as my study is concerned,
there were 1530 PLCs (including around 1300A-shares PLCs) by the end of2007.
The Chinese stock market has been developing fairly rapidly since its
establishment. It grew to become the third largest in the world by the end of 2007
and is expected to surpass the US stock market and become the largest stock
market in the world by 2020. Despite a multitude of successes in many ways, the
profitability of PLCs has been disappointing on the whole (Chen et al., 2009),
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leading to mounting concerns with regards to PLCs' competiveness, sustainability
and financial performance, etc.
The ownership structure of PLCs in China has two distinct features. The first one
is that PLCs always have a dominant shareholder whose shareholding far exceeds
other shareholders (Hovey and Naughton, 2007). The second feature is that the
state retains a significant ownership stake and acts as the ultimate controlling
shareholder in most PLCs (Clarke, 2003). Due to the large involvement of the
Chinese government in the economy and the gradual privatisation strategy
adopted in China's economic reform process, more than 80% of PLCs remain
directly or indirectly controlled by the state. Two such distinct features, along
with an increasingly important role of the Chinese securities market in China, the
second largest world economy, have made China the best lab for research on
corporate governance among all emerging markets and have stimulated
increasing interest in Chinese PLCs from both academics and practitioners within
and outside China. Accordingly, these interests are nested in two major areas. The
first one (see, for example, Chen et al., 2009) is focused on investigating the
corporate governance and its development in China, and particular regards have
been paid to issues of relative efficiency between state and non-state
shareholdings. The other one (e.g. Clarke, 2003; Hovey and Naughton, 2007) is
intent on discovering an optimal level of state ownership in those PLCs as well as
finding some feasible routines to further divest state ownership, since in the 16th
National People's Congress in 2002 the Chinese government announced its
intention to deepen the economic reform by continuing reduction in state
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ownership in the whole economy so as to attract more investors to accelerate its
economic growth, as long as the state could still retain control of the economy.
This announcement symbolised the economic policy shift of the Chinese
government from 'dominating' the economy to 'controlling' the economy.
It is worth noting that the present ownership structure in Chinese PLCs gives
birth to two types of agency problems. The first one is the 'classic' agency
conflicts between shareholders and management. The second is the 'new' agency
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Given China's weak
legal environment and the weakness of the government as the ultimate controller
in realising the maximum value for all shareholders, the latter type of agency
problem may be more prevalent and complicated in China. The excessive
involvement of government in the economy probably makes these two agency
problems co-exist in most Chinese PLCs. However, current corporate governance
practices mainly target the first one, while practices related to the second one are
rare. Even among those few works aimed at addressing the second problem, their
misclassification of the ultimate controller automatically renders their results
invalid, with Chen et al (2009) being the only exception.
Chen et al (2009) argue that there are two types of misclassification in the
existing literature. The first one mistakes the legal share-types for the types of the
ultimate controller, which is rather misleading because the share-types" neither
17 The Chinese stock market classifies owners of shares into five groups: state shares.Jegal-person
shares, tradable A-shares, employee shares and offshore shares (such as H-shares, N-shares and B-
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clarify the nature of the owners nor trace the ultimate owners. From the
theoretical perspective of agency theory, it is necessary to first identify the owner
(principal) and the manager (agent) in order to clearly define their rights and
responsibilities. However, the first type of misclassification fails to live up to this
requirement. The second type of misclassification is in treating all state
shareholdings as only one group, which completely ignores the fact that these
dominant state shareholdings are scattered amongst a variety of state agencies
that are supposed to have different motivations and incentives. Thus, treating all
these state agencies as only one type (i.e. the state) may obscure the real relations
between a PLC's performance and ownership structure and could lead to
erroneous conclusions. Hence, Chen et al (2009) trace the ultimate controller for
each firm-year observation and argue that it is imperative to classify the ultimate
controllers into four major types based on their political and economic interests:
state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state-owned enterprises affiliated to
the central government (SOECGs), state-owned enterprises affiliated to the local
government (SOELGs) and private investors.
Chen et al's (2009) work was really a milestone in Chinese corporate governance
research but there is still a flaw in their classification, which treats the state asset
management bureaus at the central level (SAMBCG) and state asset management
shares), all having equal voting rights (one-vote-one-share). Among all types of shares, state
shares, legal-person shares and tradable A-shares each comprises around one third of the total
outstanding shares, with the other types as a whole representing less than 10 percent of total
outstanding shares. China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC) launched the split-share
reform in 2005, with its ultimate goal of allowing all PLCs' shares to be tradable on the market.
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bureaus at the local level (SAMBLG) as one group. Although they are all SAMBs
under the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the
State Council (SASAC), their incentives and motivations are not necessarily the
same. It is worth noting that the SAMBs operating at the central level and their
local counterparts differ as the ultimate controller in PLCs in three aspects largely
determined by their operation levels: level of monitoring, staff quality and
relation with the government, and it might be more appropriate to further divide
the SAMBs based upon their operation levels.
I find that PLCs whose ultimate controller is private investors outperform those
controlled by the state, if all state agencies are seen as one group, whereas it is
worth noting that of all four types of state agencies, SAMBCG or SOECG
controlled PLCs perform almost equally as well as their privately controlled
rivals. It is the underperformance of PLCs controlled by SAMBLGs or SOELGs
that has dragged down the overall state performance. As to the ownership
concentration, I find an 'M' shaped relation between the ultimate controller's
shareholding and corporate performance, suggesting two possible optimal
ownership concentration levels. Authorities in China have had the objective of
gradually decreasing state holdings in the economy (Hovey and Naughton, 2007).
and in this sense, this chapter could be seen as a suggestive guide to China's
further economic reforms.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides information
with respect to theoretical issues. discusses motivations behind different ultimate
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controllers of Chinese PLCs and proposes testable predictions. Section 4.3
explains the research design, section 4.4 gives examples to demonstrate how two
types of misc1assification adopted in previous works could lead to misleading
results and then reports empirical results based upon the precise classification,
and Section 4.5 concludes the study.
4.2. Background and hypotheses
4.2.1. Ownership concentration and corporate performance
Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduce the 'classic' agency theory based on their
findings that in a widely held company the potential agency conflict could arise
from the separation of control and ownership, as the manager who holds
substantial residual control rights may not always behave in the owners' interests.
Subsequent research aimed at reducing this agency conflict between manager and
shareholders has come up with a bundle of possible solutions, such as incentive
contracts (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), debt issuance (Smith and Warner, 1979),
market for corporate control (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), board of directors (Fama
and Jensen (1983a) and large shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
The 'classic' agency theory strongly influenced corporate governance research for
two decades. However, La Porta et al (1999) argue that the most pervasive
agency conflict stems from the expropriation of the minority shareholders by
large shareholders. Their argument is based upon their findings that concentrated
ownership is a common global phenomenon, particularly in countries with weak
shareholder protection. Holderness and Sheehan's (1988a, b) findings are
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supportive of La Porta et aI's (1999) claim, as even in the US, which is
considered a country with an excellent legal system to ensure shareholders' rights,
hundreds of public companies are found to have a controlling shareholder.
Among the aforementioned five possible mechanisms to reduce the classic
agency problem, the presence of large shareholders is thought of as the most
direct way. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the presence of large
shareholders could provide a partial solution to the free-rider problem, hence
reducing the agency costs caused by the classic agency problem. In a stark
contrast to the minority shareholders, large shareholders are believed to have both
the ability and incentive to closely monitor management and oust the managers
through a proxy fight or an internal management shakeup if necessary (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986; Frank and Mayer, 2001).
Concentrated ownership acts as a shield to protect shareholders from
expropriation by managers, but it does not come without a price. In spite of the
positive role of large shareholders, a large body of literature has also documented
a series of agency problems rooted in the existence of large shareholders. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) claim that large shareholders are more likely to use their
control rights to generate private benefits through expropriation of minority
shareholders. La Porta et al (2002b) echo Shleifer and Vishny's (1997) claim by
analysing then testing a model of the effects of legal protection of minority
shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the
valuation of firms. The expropriation of minority shareholders would probably
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reduce a finn's valuation, and such value discounts could be evidence of the
manifestation of the scale of expropriation that the minority shareholders are
subject to. Large shareholders could make private benefits in a variety of ways,
such as paying extra perks to managers, granting related loans and guarantees,
undertaking related transactions and investing in unprofitable projects. Johson et
at (2000) use the word 'tunneling' to describe this agency conflict. 'Tunneling'
means the transfer of assets and profits out of a finn (through an underground
tunnel) for the controllers' private benefits at a cost to minority shareholders.
Claessens et at (2002) suggest that, given that concentrated ownership is
predominant in most countries, the agency conflicts between the large
shareholders and minority shareholders are much severer than those between
managers and shareholders.
In essence, the key incentive of large shareholders to expropriate minority
shareholders lies at the divergence of the cash-flow rights and control rights. In a
modem finn there is always a separation between control and ownership of a
controlling shareholder to some extent, particularly through the pyramidal
holding structure or cross-shareholdings. The control (i.e. voting rights) is
referred to as a shareholder's ability to elect the board of directors and intervene
in the finn's affairs, while the ownership (Le. cash flow rights) provides the
shareholder with the rights to make claims on cash payouts and dividends. If a
controlling shareholder owns a finn through the pyramidal structure or cross-
shareholdings, it is likely that the controlling shareholder's voting rights are
greater than his cash flow rights. The large shareholders would probably extract
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private benefits out of firms, once their control rights stay well in excess of cash-
flow rights and the consequent benefits exceed the loss that expropriation might
induce. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.759) conclude that, "as ownership gets
beyond a certain point, the large owners gain nearly full control and are wealthy
enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not
shared by minority shareholders". Though the China Securities Regulation
Commission (CSRC) stipulates the one-share-one-vote policy for all PLCs in
China, deviations from this policy could still be achieved through cross-holdings
and/or pyramidal structures. Claessens et al (2000) examined the separation of
ownership and control for 2,980 firms in nine East Asian countries and conclude
that on one hand, controlling shareholders make the control rights exceed cash
flow rights via cross-holdings and pyramidal structures, and, on the other hand,
they assign insider members to sit on the board to enhance their control.
In summary, the relationship between a firm's value and the largest shareholders
is complex and Bai et al (2004) suggest that increasing ownership concentration
from a low level may help address the free-rider problem. However, further
increase in ownership concentration could lead to the 'tunneling' problem,
namely the 'entrenchment' effects. Finally, as the ownership concentration
approaches 100 percent, the 'alignment' effects start to work again to remove the
'tunneling' problem. Chen et al (2007) suggest that the relationship between firm
performance and ownership concentration is largely determined by the tradeoff of
the 'entrenchment' effects and the 'alignment' effects. To examine this
relationship, researchers have conducted a vast number of studies on China's
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PLCs, but the results are inconclusive, indicating a positive relation (Xu and
Wang, 1999), an inverse V-shaped relation (Sun and Huang, 1999), and a U-
shaped relation between firm performance and ownership concentration (Bai et
al., 2004). Based upon the above discussion, I therefore make the first prediction
in order to find an exact relationship between PLCs' performance and the largest
shareholder:
Hypothesis 1: The largest shareholder's ownership has a U-shaped relation with a
PLC's valuation, that is, the ownership appears to show 'entrenchment' effects at
a low level of concentration, but the 'alignment' effects will take over when
ownership concentration approaches 100 per cent.
4.2.2. Ownership identity and corporate performance
In addition to the relationship between the largest shareholder's ownership
concentration and firms' performance, it pays to examine the relationship
between another vital aspect of the largest shareholder (i.e. its identity) and a
PLC's performance. I especially intend to theoretically discuss and then
empirically examine whether and how different motivations and incentive
structures are related to the control rights they hold. Chen et al (2007, p.129)
claim that, "in Chinese capital market, not only the ownership of the largest
shareholder determines principal-agent problems, but also the characters of the
largest shareholders have important effects on principal-agent problems and the
effectiveness of corporate governance". The heterogeneous characters not only
provide the largest shareholders with different incentives and abilities to
maximise a firm's value, but also provide them with different incentives and
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abilities to abuse a firm's resources to expropriate minority shareholders.
Following Chen et als milestone work in 2009, I divide Chinese PLCs into five
groups according to the type of the ultimate controller. They are the state asset
management bureau at the central level (SAMBCG), state asset management
bureaus at the local level (SAMBLG), SOEs affiliated to the central government
(SOECG), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELG) and private
investors.
4.2.2.1. SAMBCG vs. SAMBLGs
SAMBs are one major group of state controlling agents in China and are under
the supervision of the SASAC. The SAMBs operate at the central and local levels,
i.e. SAMBCGs and SAMBLGs. The SAMBCGs report to the SASAC at the
central level (SASAC's headquarters, SASACCG), while SAMBLGs report to the
SASAC at the local level (SASACLGs). The SASAC, whose headquarters is
located in China's capital, Beijing, has local branches in all provinces and
municipalities. The SASAC headquarters is responsible for overseeing the state-
owned asset directly controlled by the central government, while its local
branches are responsible for managing state-owned assets of local governments.
SAMBs usually take different names in different regions, such as 'State-owned
Assets Administrative Office', 'Municipal State-owned Assets Administrative
Bureau', 'Administrative Bureau of the State Property' and 'Municipal State-
owned Assets Management Bureau', etc. Unlike SOEs, SAMBs are more like
government institutions/offices and usually oversee and manage state shares or
109
sometimes legal-person shares in PLCs and many unlisted SOEs. Theoretically,
SAMBCGs and SAMBLGs can invest in any companies or projects in China.
However, it is often the case that an SAMBLG's operating boundary is the same
as the administrative boundary of the local government whose assets it looks after.
In contrast, SAMBCGs do not have such restrictions.
In the rest of this thesis, I will use the SAMBCG to represent all SAMBs under
the direct supervision of the SASACCG, and SAMBLGs to represent the rest of
the SAMBs under the supervision of different local SASACs. I use the SAMBCG
instead of SAMBCGs to stress that all SAMBCGs can theoretically be seen as a
number of administrative offices of the SASACCG, and use SAMBLGs to stress
that they are under the supervision of different SASACLGs.
It is worth noting that every state agent has a twofold face or identity. They are
the ultimate controllers (principals) for the controlled PLCs, but they can also be
viewed as the managers (agents) of the citizens who are literally the true owners
of all state-owned enterprises in China. As for SAMBs, the performance of their
controlled PLCs is closely related to their twofold identities. Although the
SAMBCG and SAMBLGs follow exactly the same operation guidelines, three
possible reasons may cause them to differ according to agency theory. Firstly, if
SAMBs are seen as the state agents, the extent of the monitoring level to which
SAMBCG and SAMBLGs are exposed is closely tied to the economic and
strategic importance of the firms they oversee. In this sense, SAMBCG definitely
receives a comparatively higher monitoring level than SAMBLGs. Agency theory
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suggests that effective monitoring could constrain the agents and force them to
run firms in the interests of the owners. Secondly, if viewed as the owners of the
controlled PLCs, SAMBCG is much better staffed than SAMBLGs. The expertise
of the staff really does matter when SAMBs have to supervise a number of PLCs
as well as unlisted SOEs in a wide range of industries. The SAMBCG has
attracted the very best people from different industries or research institutions to
work for it, and is intellectually backed by its consultants, the majority of whom
are academics. Thirdly, SAMBLGs as the owners are more likely to abuse
corporate resources in order to achieve non-pro fit-maximisation objectives set out
by local governments. Most SAMBLGs are former local government finance
offices and used to be supervised by local governments. Although these former
local finance offices have been reconstructed and placed under the supervision of
local SASACs, their ties with local government are still closely connected.
Decisions as to remuneration or promotion of cadres of SAMBLGs are still at
least partially bound up with the local governments. It could be highly possible
for these cadres to abuse their 'cheap voting rights' to meet the local social
objectives requested by the local governments in order to help them climb up the
career ladder. Such objectives may distract the SAMBLGs from the profit-
maximisation goals, resulting in lower corporate performance of the controlled
PLCs according to agency theory. To summarise, the SAMBCG is assumed to be
theoretically more efficient than SAMBLGs.
4.2.2.2. SOECGs vs. SOELGs
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are assumed to operate purely on the premise of
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profit-maximisation and receive dividends from their investments. Moreover, an
SOE as the ultimate controller typically has expertise in the controlled PLC's
industry, especially if the PLC is a spin-off from the SOE (Chen et al.• 2006).
SOEs could be further divided into those that are affiliated to the central
government (SOECG) and those affiliated to the local governments (SOELG).
From the theoretical perspective of agency theory, SOECGs are supposed to be
superior to SOELGs due to the different monitoring levels they receive from the
government and the public. Administratively, SOECGs belong to the central
government and are closely monitored by its ministries. The Ministry of Finance
collects investment gains and makes equity change decisions; the Trade Union
Commission of Large Enterprises selects SOECGs' top management; the National
Economic and Trade Commission is in charge of SOECGs' pivotal investments,
bankruptcies, mergers, restructurings and transformations; the National Planning
and Economic Commission handles fixed capital construction; and the Ministry
of Labor determines the wages of employees. SOECGs are, in general, large
nationwide and strategically important companies, which are subject to strict
monitoring from the central government. SOECGs are always top enterprises in
their industries and have nationwide operations, such as Sinopec, Bank of China
and China Mobile, etc. In this sense, their business success or failure does have a
great impact on the whole national economy and they are thus exposed to strict
monitoring not only from the central government but also from the public. In
contrast, SOELGs are comparatively smaller and most of them only have regional
operations, therefore, they are not equally important as SOECGs and attract less
112
outside attention. Moreover, the supervision level SOELGs receive from the
regional governments and their affiliated departments varies across regions, due
to the legal environment inequality in China.
4.2.2.3. Private investors
This type of the ultimate controller includes both private firms and individuals. In
most cases a private investor becomes the largest controlling shareholder through
the acquisition of non-tradable shares from state shareholders, either at the time
of the IPO or subsequently (Chen et al., 2009). More recently, there are an
increasing number of cases where a private firm has obtained the approval from
the CSRC to go public. Unlike SAMBs and SOEs, these private investors have a
much clearer target of profit-maximisation, and pay more attention to the market
performance of their controlled PLCs.
4.2.2.4. The distinction between SAMBs and SOEs as the controller
Although SOEs and SAMBs are two main types of state entities, they differ as the
ultimate owner of PLCs in many respects. Firstly, PLCs with SOELGs or SOECG
as their ultimate controllers are similar to those controlled by private investors to
some extent, in terms of risk borne and benefits shared. The SOEs have the rights
to select their managers for the controlled PLCs and bear the corresponding risks
of the consequences of the selected management teams. The after-tax profits
drawn from their controlled PLCs are consolidated in SOEs' accounting reports
as investment profits. These vested undistributed profits can be used by SOEs to
fulfill their own development plans, hence the corporate performance of PLCs is
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closely related to the performance of SOEs to a large extent. Moreover, managers
of SOEs typically benefit from those profits as there is a close link between their
monetary rewards and SOEs' performance, and intuitively much of their attention
would be given to those PLCs they have influence on. In stark contrast, SAMBs
are more like state agencies than modem commercial enterprises. SAMBs have
rights to select the boards of directors as well as managers of PLCs, but bear no
risks of the consequences of their selections. They collect vested profits from
PLCs under their control and deliver them to the state treasury. The officials in
SAMBs have no rights to use those profits for any purposes. Moreover, SAMBs'
officials are civil cadres paid by the government and their remuneration and
rewards are not related to the performance of PLCs they oversee (Chen et al.,
2009). Therefore, SAMBs' officials show a lack of incentive to better manage the
controlled PLCs, since the performance of PLCs is not closely tied to their
personal well-being. Secondly, SAMBs may find it more difficult to monitor
PLCs. Unlike SOEs that control only one or a few PLCs, SAMBs often need to
look after a number of PLCs as well as SOEs that are not listed. To make things
even worse, these firms are always scattered across a range of industries, while
officials in SAMBs typically have little relevant experience and lack the
necessary skills to effectively monitor these firms. Moreover, officials are
prohibited from being closely involved in PLCs' daily operations and usually
have little direct contact with those PLCs, which has led to excess information
asymmetry. The more severe the information asymmetry is, the more difficult for
officials to effectively evaluate PLCs' management. Compared to SAMBs, SOEs
typically have expertise in their controlled PLCs' businesses and are rewarded for
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getting closely involved in their daily operations. Last but not least, SOEs' close
links with their controlled PLCs and better know-how about their businesses
enable them to pick up more competent management teams.
4.2.2.5. The relative efficiency of state vs. private controllers
As I have stressed, every state controller in essence has a two-fold identity. Each
citizen with an extremely dispersed ultimate shareholding in those firms has
insufficient incentives and ability to effectively monitor and discipline those state
agents. Hence, according to agency theory, managerial discretion and non-profit-
maximisation goals are expected for state firms. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stress
that the de facto control rights of the state-owned enterprises belong to
bureaucrats who typically have goals dictated by their political interests rather
than firms' profitability. In contrast, a PLC with a private investor as the ultimate
controller has clearly defined property rights and is believed to show superiority
in reducing the costs arising from the 'classic' agency problem. Indeed, a private
investor's role in a PLC is such that he or she is typically equipped with detailed
knowledge of the industry in which the PLC operates and will more effectively
monitor the hired managers. The 'classic' agency costs will therefore be
minimised when a private investor is the controlling shareholder. However, unlike
. state entities, private investors are more liable to expropriate the minority
shareholders if their control rights are well in excess of their cash-flow rights.
The debate of the relative efficiency of state vs. private owners is actually a
debate about the state's 'grabbing hand effect' and 'helping hand effect'. Most
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previous studies believe state owners are less efficient than private owners based
on the assumption that officials will abuse firms' resources to pursue political and
social objectives other than the objective of profit-maximisation (Boycko et al.,
1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Replacing state's entities with private entities
could better align the management with the corporate economic performance,
thus tremendously reducing classic agency costs. However, it comes with a cost
because the presence of a controlling private owner may trigger severe concerns
about the expropriation of minority shareholders. In contrast, as Brada (1996)
argues, state owners may improve firm performance in such a way that politicians
have an incentive to prevent controlling shareholders and managers from
engaging in behaviour that reduces the amount of corporate resources, even
though they do not necessarily have profit-maximising objectives. In summary,
the relative efficiency between two groups (state vs. private owners) remains an
empirical question, as PLCs' corporate performance really depends on, to a large
extent, which problem can be solved or mitigated more successfully.
I intend to extend the literature by for the first time arguing that the
aforementioned five ultimate controllers all have different motivations and
incentive structures that will lead to different economic performance of the PLCs
they control. In this sense, previous studies cannot provide me with a clear
direction in this respect. Therefore, I have to make my second prediction based on
the above discussion along with the belief regarding the progress in constructing a
sound legal environment that China has made over the past 30-plus years.
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Hypothesis 2: Private investors as controlling shareholders have more incentives
to closely monitor the management and play active roles to ensure profit-
maximisation, hence producing the best performance for PLCs under their control.
With respect to the relative efficiency of state owners only, SOEs should show
superiority over SAMBs on PLCs' performances, SOECGs would lead to higher
valuation of PLCs than SOELGs, and SAMBCG is assumed to be more efficient
than SAMBLGs.
4.3. Research design
4.3.1. Data
The original sample for this study consists of all A-shares PLCs listed on The
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SlSE)
from 2000 to 2007, subject to data availability. Data on both corporate accounting
performance and ownership structure is from annual reports and publications
collected by Shanghai Wind Information Co., Ltd18• Unlike most previous works
using the type of shares held by the largest shareholder as the proxy for the
controlling entity, I intend to identify the ultimate controller behind the largest
shareholder, which requires a careful investigation into the control chain. Finding
out the ultimate controller for each PLC in each year has proven to be a massive
workload, as it is necessary to look into a PLC's annual report in each year in
order to detect the identity of the controller. The workload will get even heavier
as the number of PLCs increases and the time span extends. This might be a
18 www.wind.com.cnis one of the major corporate data providers inChina.
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reason why some prior studies have no choice but to use share types as proxies
for identities of the ultimate owner. Thanks to the financial support from the
Business School PhD research account, this requirement has been accomplished
by a customised dataset provided by Sinofin Financial Information Service Co.,
Ltd19•
For each PLC in the sample, I identify the type of the controlling entity behind
the largest shareholder and categorise these ultimate controllers into five groups
(SAMBCG, SAMBLGs, SOECGs, SOELGs and private investors).
The initial sample has 10349 observations. The sample screening process is as
follows: (1) Exclude firms for which operating performance data is not available
and follow the tradition of literature to remove financial firms, due to them using
different financial reporting system(1031 observations dropped); (2) Drop firms
whose leverage ratio is greater than one(7 observations dropped); (3) Eliminate
firms with ST or PT designation during my research period2°(l731 observations
dropped); (4) Remove firms that do not have continuous operations (listing) for at
19 www.sinofin.netis one of the major corporate data providers in China.
20 It is mandated by the CSRC that if a Chinese listed company reports accounting losses in two
consecutive years, its stock will be put under 'Special Treatment' status (ST). If it fails to turn its
accounting earnings back to positive in the third year, i.e. it reports losses for three consecutive
years, it will be put under 'particular treatment' (PT) status. The market has imposed various
trading and financial restrictions on ST and PT stocks. For example, unlike other normal listed
companies, the stock price movement of an ST company is restricted to be no more than five per
cent in either direction, and the company's semi-annual report must be audited. Furthermore, an
ST company cannot raise additional capital from the stock market. A listed company with PT
designation can only be traded on Fridays with a stock price limit of five percent fluctuation per
day. Moreover, it will be delisted from the market if it continues to suffer losses in the fourth year.
The rationale behind the ST and PT designations is that ST and PT companies are bad performers
in the long run, and it is necessary to restrict or delist them in order to protect the interests of
investors (Jiang and Wang, 2008).
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least four years during the research period(256 observations dropped). As a result,
the final sample is an unbalanced panel that consists of 7324 firm-year
observations, and there are 1043 firms in the sample.
Panel A of Table 4.1 presents a detailed distribution of the sample of Chinese
PLCs used in the analysis according to firms' ultimate controllers, and the
balance of the panel is stated in panel B.
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4.3.2. Methodology
4.3.2.1. Generalised method of moments (GMM)
Most previous studies use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to test and examine the
empirical issues of corporate governance in China. However, OLS may provide
inconsistent estimation as it cannot appropriately address the endogeneity
problem which seriously violates an assumption necessary for the consistency
OLS. In order to work around such a problem, some others wield the Fixed
Effects (FE) model to attack the fixed effects by using Within Group
transformation. The Within Group transformation is able to remove the fixed
effects in static models, but does not eliminate dynamic panel bias when the
lagged dependent variables are included as the explanatory variables". Hence,
what is really needed is a different estimation technique that removes the fixed
effects while avoiding the dynamic panel bias. In this sense, Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) could be an ideal choice to provide consistent estimates for
my research. Working in the GMM framework, I have decided to use 'System
GMM' (Blundell and Bond, 1998) which is considered more efficient than the
'First-differenced GMM' as the estimation method. Two relevant post-estimation
tests should be carried out in order to ensure the validity of estimation results. I
adopt Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term
Ei,t and expect to see the absence of order 2 serial correlation in the first
differenced errors. I also use Sargan test to test the joint validity of the
instruments. Rejection of Sargan test suggests that the model is over-fitted by too
21 See Roodman (2006), p.18.
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many instruments and if this is the case we need to re-think the set of instruments
that should be included in the model.
4.3.2.2. First-differenced GMM
I first set out the first-differenced GMM estimation approach. Without loss of
generality, we now consider the following regression model with unobserved
individual specific effects
for i= 1, ...Nand t = 2, ... ,T,where fj + Ej,t = Uj,t has the standard error
components structure
E[fj]=O, E[Ej,tl = 0, E[fjEi,t]= 0 for i= 1, ..., Nand t = 2, ... ,T.
Also, I assume the idiosyncratic shocks, Ej,tare serially uncorrelated
E[tj,tti,s]=O for i= 1, ... , Nand s *' t
and that the initial conditions Yi,l are predetermined
E[Yi,l tj,t] = 0 for i= 1, ... , Nand t = 2, ... ,T.
In order to remove the fixed effects, first-differencing the model (a) gives
(b)
And for convenience, I rewrite the above model as
LlYi,t=aLlYi,t-l +LlEi,t (c)
The fixed effects have been successfully removed as expected. However, the
model (c) has a problem of its own, as the first-differenced lagged dependent
variable and the first-differenced idiosyncratic shock are correlated, that is,
Cov( LlYi.t-l ,LlEi,t) *' O. Unlike the static panel model, this first differenced
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dynamic model cannot be estimated by OLS because of such a correlation. To
make things even worse, the fixed-effect method widely adopted in estimating the
static panel models fails to address this issue. Under the Within Group
transformation, we use mean-deviations transformation to get rid of the fixed
effects. Then, the lagged dependent variables become YI~t-1=Yi t-1 - ~i 2 +
, , T-1'
...+ Yi,T) while the idiosyncratic shock becomes Eit=Ei,t - T~1(Ei,2 + ... + Ei,T)
(Roodman,2006). Obviously, within a dynamic panel model, the Yi,t-1 term in
yit-1 correlates negatively with the - T~1 Ei,t-1 in Eit, thus leading to
inconsistent estimates. Unlike the Within Group transformation, the first-
differenced models can be estimated by GMM using values of Y lagged by two or
more periods as instruments, provided assumptions set out at the beginning of this
section are satisfied. Because these deeper lags remain orthogonal to the LlEi,t
term, they are therefore available as valid instruments. Together, under the first-
differenced GMM, the assumptions imply O.5(T-1)(T -2) moment conditions as
follows:
E[yj,t-s A£j,t]=O for t=3, ... ,T and s~2.
As long as the values of Y lagged by two or more periods are valid instruments,
first-differenced GMM is able to yield consistent estimates as N-+oowith T fixed.
4.3.2.3. System GMM
It is worth noting that the first-differenced GMM has been found to have poor
finite sample properties, particularly when the number of time periods available is
small. Blundell and Bond (1998) found that the first-differenced GMM may be
124
subject to a downward finite sample bias, according to their simulation results.
This occurs as the autoregressive process becomes too persistent or as the
variance of the fixed effects increases relative to the variance of the idiosyncratic
shock (Bond et al., 2001). Building on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995),
Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the system GMM estimator which may have
superior finite sample properties by making an additional assumption that
EUi.1Yi,2]=0 for i= I, ... , N. This additional assumption only allows the means of
Y series to differ across individuals but to remain constant over time for each
individual (Bond et al., 2001). Together with the assumptions set out in the
previous section, this additional assumption yields additional T-2 linear moment
conditions as follows:
E[AYi,t-l £i,t] = 0 for i= I, ... , Nand t = 3, ... ,T.
These moment conditions suggest the use of lagged first-differences of the y
series as instruments for equations in levels.
The system GMM estimator combines the standard set of equations in first-
differences (e.g. Model (c) with values ofy lagged by two or more periods as
instruments, with an additional set of equations in levels (e.g. Model (a» with
lagged first-differences of the y series as instruments (Bond et al., 2001). In a
nutshell, the system GMM exploits a system of both the set of moment conditions
in first-differences and the additional set of moment conditions in levels, and that
is why it is called the 'system' GMM.
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4.3.2.4. Endogenous regressors and predetermined regressors
What if there are any other regressors besides the lagged dependent variable that
correlate with Ii and are endogenous? Without loss generality, I now consider a
model with an additional right-hand-side variable xi,t.
(d)
for i= 1, ... , Nand t = 2, , T, where xi,t is endogenous in the sense that
E[Xi,tEi,s]#:Ofor for i= 1, , N and s~t.
Similarly as I have done in section 4.3.2.2, taking first differences to eliminate the
fixed effects fi , model (d) can then be rewritten as
dYi,t=Clt.Yi,t-l+f3dxi,t+dEi,t
The moment conditions for first-differences equations
E[xu-s AEi,t]=Ofor t=3, ... ,T and s~2
are available here, in addition to those in section 4.3.2.2. The above conditions
(e)
mean that values of Xi,t lagged by two or more periods can be used as instruments
for equations in first-differences.
If the Xu variables are predetermined with respect to Ei,bwhich implies that
E[Xi,tEi,s]#:Ofor for i= 1, ... , N and s<t,
the values ofxi,t lagged one period up are available as instruments.
Similarly in addition to moment conditions proposed in section 4.3.2.3, it is valid
assuming that changes in endogenous Xu variables are uncorrelated with the
individual effects,
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E[dXj,tfj]= 0 for i= 1, "., Nand t = 2, .,,' T,
and then the moment conditions for equations in levels,
E[dXi,t-1Ei,t]= 0 for i= 1, ..., Nand t = 3, ...,T
are available in addition to those given in section 4.3.2.3. These moment
conditions demonstrate that the lagged first-differences of endogenous Xu
variables can be used as instruments for the levels equations. And if Xj,tvariables
are predetermined in the sense that E[xj,tEj,s]t:Ofor for i= 1, "., Nand s<t, the
contemporaneous dXi,tis also valid.
4.3.3. Model specification and definition of variables
4.3.3.1. Regression model
In order to determine and quantify how vanous corporate specific factors,
including ownership structure, financial factors and board characteristics, may
impact on PLCs' corporate performance, I employ a dynamic regression model of
the following form:
Performancei,t="r~=l aj Performancei,t_j+D8+CP+By+ 16 +Tt+/i
(1)
The Model (1) is a general regression model where Performanceiy (corporate
performance) is measured by return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and
return on sales (ROS). "r~=laj Performancei,t_j is a set of lagged dependent
variables incorporated as the explanatory variables to make the model dynamic.
The reason why I use lags of corporate performance as explanatory variables is
that past corporate performance of a PLC is believed to have laid the financial
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basis for its corporate performance in the current year, and particularly the
financial basis at the beginning of the current year. A PLC with outstanding
performance in the past tends to show superiority in the future. However, this
persistent effect may fade away over time. The deeper the lag, the weaker the
influence it would have on current corporate performance, In this sense this set
usually consists of first one or two lags of Perf ormance.j only. D is a vector of
dummy variables to identify five groups of the ultimate controller, C is a vector of
various corporate financial factors , B is a vector of a number of board
characteristics, and I is a vector of variables capturing the industrial
characteristics. Ii are unobserved panel-level effects and Ei,t are idiosyncratic
shocks. fj and £u are assumed to be independent for each i over all t . I also
include time dummies to remove universal time-related shocks from the errors. Tt
is a vector of time dummies. ai' 8, fJ ,y and 6 are unknown coefficients to be
estimated.
4.3.3.2. Measuring operating performance
In order to measure PLCs' operating performance, I follow the tradition of the
literature by using return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as the
dependent variable in regression models (Li et al., 2008; Tian and Estrin, 2008;
Wei, 2007). In contrast to ROA and ROE, return on sales (ROS) is thought to be
less subject to accounting manipulation and is also used as the dependent variable
for the check of robustness (Fan et al.• 2007; Chen et al.• 2009).
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4.3.3.3. Augmented by corporate financial characteristics
Leverage: this is an independent variable computed as the ratio of total liabilities
to total assets. This ratio is supposed to be negative to corporate performance, as
higher levels of leverage ratio means higher levels of debt which will lead to
more interest payouts at each period and thus lower corporate values (Tian and
Entrin, 2008). However, Jensen (1986) argues that the existence of liabilities
could help reduce the free cash flow problem and force managers to become more
efficient because the pressure from the debt issuers may force managers to run
firms more efficiently and avoid investing in negative NPV projects.
Lnsize: this is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets of firms and is
seen as a proxy of firm size. Chen et al (2009) argue that the size of a firm may
have mixed effects on corporate performance. Most large-sized PLCs in China
are former SOEs and are therefore more likely to be subject to some typical
agency problems that are prevalent in SOEs. Hence, in this sense, the size may
have a negative impact on corporate performance. However, larger corporate size
enables PLCs to have easier access to financial loans from banks. Moreover,
larger corporate size also ensures solid backup from the government. In this
regard, corporate size could have positive effects on corporate performance.
Growth: this is measured by the annual growth rate of sales. PLCs with high
growth rate should have better profit-maximisation opportunities and
consequently a higher corporate valuation (Chen, 2001).
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Topone: this is an independent variable to capture the level of ownership
concentration measured by the percentage of total shares held by the largest
shareholder. The largest shareholder's shareholding is a 'double-edged' sword in
corporate governance as I have discussed in Section 4.2. Moreover, I posit that
there are non-linear relations between ownership concentration and corporate
performance, and to test this on my data, the quadratic term of Topone, Topone2
is included.
Top4_1: this is a ratio measured by the percentage of total shares held by the
other top five shareholders over that held by the largest shareholder. This ratio
reflects the comparison of the controlling power in a PLC between these two
groups. Some recent studies show that the presence of multiple blockholders may
be an effective way to provide internal monitoring that increases corporate value
by reducing the possibility of the expropriation of minority shareholders by the
largest shareholder (Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bloch and Hege, 200 I). However,
the presence of multiple blockholders may not always increase corporate value
and such a positive role is likely to depend on the degree of investor protection.
Faccio et al (2001) found that group-affiliated firms in Europe provide
significantly higher dividend rates than similar firms in Asia, suggesting that the
multiple non-management blockholders in weak legal environments are more
likely to collude with the controlling shareholder to expropriate minority
shareholders.
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4.3.3.4. Augmented by board characteristics
Size of the Board (Boardsize): the number of persons serving on the board is
usually seen as the proxy for the size of the board. According to the Company
Law enacted in 1994, a PLC should have a board of directors that consists of five
to nineteen people. Theoretically, the board of directors should look after the
interests of all shareholders, instead of the interests of the controlling shareholder
only. It should play an active role in monitoring firm's daily operation and take
effective actions to avoid managers abusing corporate resources. However, taking
into account the fact that the controlling shareholder has a tendency to send its
members to sit on a board in order to enhance his control and his control rights
are always well in excess of his cash-flow rights, the question of how effective
the board is at increasing corporate performance remains an empirical issue.
Klein (1998) finds that there is little relation between the board composition and
corporate performance, while Jensen (1993) argues that small boards are more
efficient than large ones.
Shares held by the board (Boardshare): it is argued that directors' ownership can
serve as a mechanism to better align directors' interests with those of outside
shareholders. However, the directors' ownership is like the managerial ownership,
to some extent, and can also be seen as a 'double-edged' sword. Its ultimate
impact really depends on the trade-off between the 'alignment' effects and
'entrenchment' effects it brings in.
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Independent directors (Independent): this is a ratio of the number of
independent directors serving on the board over the number of directors.
Ac~ording to the CSRC's 'Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to
the Board of Directors of Listed Companies' 22 enacted in 2001, independent
directors in any PLC should make up no less than one third of directors serving
on the board by 30th June, 2003. A core theme of the independent directors on the
board is to serve as a check on both management and the board in the interests of
all shareholders. In other words, it is necessary for them to be 'independent' of
the firm to resolve the agency problem. Unlike insider directors, independent
directors are less subject to the influence of blockholders and therefore more
capable of efficiently monitoring a firm's operation. Hence, in a sense, the
presence of the independent directors should impact positively on corporate
valuation.
Independence of the board chairman (Duality): some have argued that the
duality of roles of the chairman of the board and the CEO is a very indicative
measure of the independence of the board. The central concern is that joint
service as the CEO and board chairman may erode the corporate system of checks
and balances and compromise independence between directors and firm managers.
Advocates of more efficient corporate governance are against the joint service,
and argue for independent board leadership.
22 See CSRC's zhengjianfa[2001] No.102
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4.3.3.5. Augmented by industrial characteristics
Market share (Ms): in order to account for the determinants of corporate
performance with regards to the industrial characteristics, I follow the standard to
include a variable called market share on the right-hand side of the equations.
Market share is calculated as total firm sales divided by industry sales, which is
the sum of all firms' sales within an industry. A finn with a large market share
could be expected to have high profitability due to three possible reasons. Firstly,
a large market share may enable the finn to have a share-based differentiation
advantage, since risk-averse customers may favour a large share firm. Secondly, a
large market share may allow the finn to have more bargaining power relative to
its rival oligopolies within an oligopoly environment in which the large share
firms are likely to coordinate with each other in order to raise the industry
profitability. Last but not least, a large market share could make the firm achieve
a cost advantage over other firms with smaller market shares because of
economies of scale. Hence, I expect a positive link between market share and
corporate performance.
Market Concentration (Mcon): the market concentration has also been included
so as to capture another important aspect of industry characteristics and is
calculated in the Herfindahl manner as the sum of the squared market shares of
the firms in an industry. Hence, the market concentration should range between
zero and one. The closer it is to unity, the more concentrated the industry. A
highly concentrated industry means reduced competition and has certain
industrial structures that are conducive to oligopoly conduct, enabling firms to
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make more abnormal profits than it would in unconcentrated industries. In this
sense, I expect that the market concentration should positively affect the
corporate performance.
The existing literature on the effects the industry characteristics may exert on firm
performance has provided a clear guidance on the inhalation of appropriate
variables for my research and I follow the standard practice (Geroski et al., 1993;
Haynes et al., 2002) to include variables capturing the market share (Ms) and the
market concentration (Mcon) respectively.
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Table 4.2 Summary of variables
Variable Name Variable Definition Expected Sh!n
Performance ROA, ROE and ROS
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities over total assets +/-
Topone The percentage of shares held by the +/-
largest shareholder
Topone2 Quadratic term of Top one +/-
Top4_1 Ratio measured by the percentage of +/-
total shares held by the other top four
shareholders over that held by the
largest shareholder.
Growth Annual growth ratio of Sales +
Lnsize Natural logarithm of total assets of +/-
firms
SAMBCG Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate -
controller is the SAMBCG; otherwise 0
SAMBLG Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate -
controller is an SAMBLG; otherwise 0
SOECG Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate -
controller is an SOECG; otherwise 0
SOELG Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate -
controller is an SOELG; otherwise 0
Private Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate +
controller IS a private investor;
otherwise 0
State Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate
-
controller is not a private investor;
otherwise 0
Boardsize Size of board (the number of directors) -
Boardshare Percentage of shares held by directors +/-
Independent Ratio of the number of independent
+
directors to the number of directors
Duality Dummy variable coded 1 if board
chairman is the CEO; otherwise 0 -
Ms Market share calculated as total firm +
sales divided by industry sales
Mcon Market concentration +
Notes: Real vanables are deflated usmg the China's annual CPI.
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Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables
used in the regression analysis, and the Correlation matrix for the variables is
included in TableA4.1 in the Appendix.
Some interesting facts are worth noting. To evaluate the relationship between
corporate performance and ownership structure, I use ROA, ROE and ROS as
measures of corporate performance. SAMBCG on average stands out as the best
group in terms of both ROE and ROS, with its mean of ROE being 0.0549 and
mean of ROS being 0.0606. SOECG has on average the best performance on
ROA amongst the five groups, and its mean ROA is around 0.035. Surprisingly,
private investors underperform in all three types of performance measurement,
with average ROS even being negative. Nevertheless, the descriptive statistics can
only provide unconditional means of each measurement, and in the following
Section I still need to test the real impact of each type of ultimate controller on
corporate performance by using regression techniques with relevant factors
controlled.
As for the ownership concentration, I use the percentage of shares held by the
largest shareholder as a proxy. As far as my sample is concerned, it can be
concluded that the ownership of PLCs in China is highly concentrated, with the
largest shareholder holding 42.1% of total shares on average. State entities
(SAMBCG, SAMBLGs, SOECGs and SOELGs) on average hold more than 44.7%
percent of total outstanding shares. In contrast, their private counterparts (private
investors) own around 31.86% of total outstanding shares on average. I use annual
growth rate of sales as a proxy for the growing opportunities that a PLC could
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obtain. Not surprisingly, private investors have significantly faster growing speeds
than state owners with an average growth rate of 31.06%, which is consistent with
most prior studies. Director's ownership is a common way to align director's
interests with those of all shareholders, yet it seems that PLCs in China place little
value on this internal mechanism, as the average level of director's ownership is
merely 0.35% of total outstanding shares. As I have discussed in the previous
Section, the duality of roles of the board chairman and the CEO could be harmful
to corporate performance. Of five groups of the ultimate controller, SAMBCG has
the lowest level and on average only about 3.58% of the Chairmen in PLCs
controlled by SAMBCG are CEOs at the same time.
4.4. Empirical tests and results
In this section, I test the two hypotheses by using system GMM (Blundell and
Bond, 1998) and Splines Regression. To ensure the results are not influenced by
the presence of outliers, all variables except dummy variables are winsorised at
both tails of their distribution. The winsorisation is at the both 1 and 99 percentile
points of the distribution. Before performing the regressions, it pays to discover
how the types of classification that most prior studies have adopted may lead to
erroneous conclusions.
4.4.1. Two types of misclassiflcation
Most previous studies always run into two types of misclassification of Chinese
PLCs, and their results are by no means valid in this sense. The first type of
misclassification (e.g. Xu and Wang, 1999; Chen, 2001; Firth et al.,2008), in
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essence, categorises PLCs based upon the legal classification of shares, which
lumps PLCs roughly into three groups, which are entities holding state shares,
entities holding legal-person shares and entities holding tradable shares. Such
classification is rather confusing. Most importantly, it should be noted that legal-
person shares and tradable shares can be held by a range of heterogeneous entities,
ranging from wholly state-owned enterprises to state agencies to private firms. To
see how it may lead to misleading results, I use two firm-year observations in my
sample to give a convincing example. The two observations I have selected are
Konka (Stock Code: 000016) and Great Wall (Stock Code: 000066) in 2004, and
both are controlled by SAMBCG. However, they are classified into two groups
(entities holding state shares and entities holding legal-person shares) instead of
one group in previous studies, due to the fact that SAMBCG holds state shares in
Great Wall, while legal-person shares are held in Konka. It would be rather
illogical to enter them into two groups when their de facto controller types are
actually the same, and conclusions drawn by those works are therefore misleading
and invalid.
The second type of misclassification is 'less' confusing than the first one, as it
traces the ultimate controller for each PLC in their studies and then classifies
PLCs correspondingly. However, it distorts people's understanding about Chinese
PLCs by making an invalid assumption that all state entities tend to converge in
ways they direct their controlled PLCs (see, for example, Kato and Long, 2006;
Chen et al., 2007). As I have documented in the previous section, state ownership
is scattered among heterogeneous state entities and each of them have different
motivations and incentive structures. In order to see how classification adopted in
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my research will differ from previous studies, I just take four firm-year
observations in 2005 for example. The four observations I have selected are
Wandong Medical (Stock code: 600055), Amoi (Stock code:600057), Hisense
(Stock code:600060) and Eastern airline (Stock code:600115), and they are
controlled by SOELG, SOECG, SAMBLG and SAMBCG respectively and thus
are lumped into four separate groups in my study. In prior literature, they have
been treated as only one group - the state - which might obscure the real impact of
the state as the ultimate controller. In the following sections, I intend to show
what an invalid assumption this type of misclassification has imposed on some
prior studies and how we can get over it by assuming heterogeneity amongst a
range of state entities.
4.4.2. State vs. private
Although the second type of misclassification seems quite 'close' to the correct
classification, it would never be possible for studies using it to provide any valid
policy suggestions. To demonstrate the shortcomings embedded in the second
type of misclassification, I adjust the general regression model (1) to test the
hypotheses and the adjusted regression model (2) is as follows:
+e'tt. (2)
Actually, I run following regression models for each dependent variable. I
incorporate both the first and the second lags of dependent variables as
explanatory variables in all three models.
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Table 4.4 reports regression results when PLCs are lumped into two groups, Le.
state and private. Although results generated by OLS and fixed-effects estimators
are also reported, I intend to draw conclusions mainly based on the estimates
provided by the 'System GMM' method. As I have discussed in the Section 4.3,
OLS and fixed-effects estimators are actually biased estimators for dynamic panel
data. In fact, the OLS estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
is upward biased while that obtained with a fixed effects estimator is downward
biased. In this sense, they are able to provide a range that should contain good
estimates of the true lagged dependent variable, and one would expect the 'System
GMM' estimate to lie between the tw023•
Based upon the regression results, it could be easily concluded that the private
entities perform better than their state counterparts in terms of all types of
23 Bond et of (2001) have provided a test to see whether the system GMM estimator is the
appropriate one. This test consists of comparing the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
obtained when the equation is estimated by OlS, fixed effects and first-difference GMM. As the
OlS estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is upward biased while that
obtained with a fixed effects estimator is downward biased, one would expect the first-difference
GMM coefficient to lie between the two. If however, it lies below or very close to the fixed-effects
estimate then one needs to use the system GMM estimator. Although I have found that in my study
the majority of results produced by both first-difference and system GMM estimators are similar,
the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable given by the first-difference estimator are
sometimes close to or even smaller than the corresponding fixed-effects estimates. Therefore, I
choose to rely on the system GMM estimator.
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performance measurement and this conclusion is consistent with many pnor
studies. However, in the next sub-section I will adopt the correct classification to
show how results based on such types of classification might distort our
understanding about Chinese PLCs.
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Table 4.5 Instrument sets for Model 2
Instruments for the first- Instruments for the level
differenced equations equations
Model ROA lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
2.1 independent variables lagged t- independent variables
2 to t-5
Model ROE lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
2.2 independent variables lagged t- independent variables
2 to t-5
Model ROS lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
2.3 independent variables lagged t- independent variables
2 to t-5
Notes: Appropnate instrument sets are selected and Justified using Sargan and senal correlation
tests and at the same time, and the exogenous variables use themselves as instruments.
4.4.3. Categorising PLCs by the ultimate controller
In this section, I follow Chen et al (2009) to identify the ultimate controller by
carefully tracing up the control chain. As Ihave discussed in Section 4.2, Igroup
PLCs into five groups and argue that these distinct types of owners have different
objectives and varying incentive structures, which would affect the corporate
performance of PLCs they invest in. I will show that the conclusion drawn in
section 4.2 could be confusing and misleading and then provide a valid conclusion
by using the correct classification. To this end, the regression model has been
modified as follows:
(3)
Actually, I run following regression models for each dependent variable. I
incorporate both the first and the second lags of dependent variables in models 3.1,
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3.2 and 3.3.
ROAi,t=LJ=l aj ROAi,t-j+81SAMBCGt,t+82SOELGi,t+83SOECGt,t+
84SAMBLGl,t+C(J+By+ 16 +Tt+fi.+Ei,t (3.1)
ROEi,t=LJ=l aj ROEi,t-j+81SAMBCGt,t+82SOELGt,t+83SOECGt,t+
84SAMBLGt,t+C(J+By+ 16 +Tt+fi.+Ei,t (3.2)
ROSi,t=LJ=l aj ROSi,t_j+81SAMBCGt,t+82S0ELGt,t+83S0ECGt,t+
(3.3)
Table 4.6 reports system GMM estimates for the regression model (3.1), model
(3.2) and model (3.3). Regression results reported in Table 4.6 are robust. No
matter which dependent variable is used, estimates are consistent and most
estimates for key variables are consistent with those reported in Table 4.4.
The results reported in Table 4.6 reveal several interesting points. The positive and
significant relation between PLCs' corporate performance and contemporary firm
sizefl.nsize.) suggests a positive role that the firm size can play in corporate
governance. Also, this positive connection supports my decision to treat firm size
as an endogenous variable, as better performance in contemporary years means
more income which could in tum be reinvested by a PLC in itself to increase the
asset base. Thus it could be possible to see a larger firm size at the year end. My
results also confirm that better growth opportunities help PLCs perform well.
According to Model (3.3), if a PLC has a one-standard-deviation increase in its
growth ratio, it will experience a significant increase in corporate performance;
149
this increase is around 0.042. Given that the mean of the corporate performance
(ROS) is 0.0322, it could be concluded that the relationship between PLCs'
growth perspective and firm performance is both statistically and economically
significant.
The negative and significant relationship between. the leverage ratio (Leverage.)
and corporate performance could be due to several possibilities, such as: PLCs
could use profits to repay debts, PLCs could reinvest profits in themselves to
increase net assets, and positive performance could allow them to get the permit of
additional share offering from the CSRC. All these possibilities would probably be
reflected as a lower leverage ratio at the year end. According to Model (3.2), the
leverage ratio coefficient is -0.2276 (z-statistic=-7.09) in column (6). Hence a one-
unit (0.01) increase in a PLC's leverage ratio results in a decline of 0.0022 in
corporate performance measured by ROS. The mean value for ROS is 0.0322, so a
0.01 increase in leverage ratio yields a 7% decline in corporate performance
measured by ROS. The results are consistent with Tian and Entrin's (2008)
argument that higher levels of leverage ratio means higher levels of debt, which
will lead to more interest payouts at each period and thus lower corporate values.
There is a large body of literature claiming a non-linear relationship between
ownership concentration and corporate performance. To test such a relationship, I
proposed a hypothesis in Section 4.2 and expected the coefficient of Topone to be
negative and significant, while Topone2 is positive and significant if Hypothesis 1
holds that there exists a V-shaped relationship between ownership concentration
and corporate performance. However, this U-shaped relationship is rather weak in
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Table 4.7 Instrument sets for Model 3
Instruments for tbe first- Instruments for tbe level
differenced equations equations
Model ROA lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
3.1 independent variables lagged t- independent variables
2 to t-5
Model ROE lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
3.2 independent variables lagged t- independent variables
2 to t-5
Model ROS lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
3.3 independent variables lagged t- independent variables
2 to t-5
Notes: Appropnate instrument sets are selected and Justified usmg Sargan and senal correlation
tests and at the same time, and the exogenous variables use themselves as instruments.
my sample.
As for board characteristics, the positive and significant coefficients of
independent directors could lead to the conclusion that the presence of
independent directors does have some positive effects on corporate governance in
China. For example, for Model (3.1), a 10% increase in the portion of independent
directors sitting on the board would lead to an improvement in a PLC's corporate
performance (ROA) of approximately 20%. There is little evidence to support
Rechner and Dalton (1991), even though the signs of the coefficients of Duality
are inconclusive in three models. Furthermore, there is no strong evidence to
support the idea that there is a connection between directors' ownership and
corporate performance at Chinese PLCs. As far as the results are concerned,
independent variables regarding board characteristics lack sufficient explanatory
power.
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Table 4.6 shows a more precise image of the influence that different types of
ultimate controller may have on corporate performance, There are tremendous
differences in operating performance among the five groups after controlling for
the lagged performance, internal financial factors and board characteristics. As
shown in Table 4.6, the negative and significant coefficients of SOELG and
SAMBLG suggest that state owners, if seen as a group, do not perform as well as
their private rivals. The explanation could be that private investors are more likely
to closely monitor firms' management, and in this sense the classic agency costs
will be significantly reduced.
Table 4.8 illustrates a much clearer image that PLCs controlled by SOECGs and
the SAMBCG are found to be almost as good as those privately controlled ones.
Moreover, the SAMBCG is statistically different from SAMBLGs, and the
difference in corporate performance between SOECGs and SOELGs is
statistically significant. Interestingly, bureaucratic SAMBs are not the worst, as
was expected. One possible reason could be that monitoring from central
government and its ministries as well as the public does help improve the
SAMBCG's management efficiency, which could in turn enhance the corporate
performance of PLCs under its control.
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Table 4.8 Test of equality in coefficients [Wald-starlstlcsj"]
Model3.l Model3.2 Model3.3
SAMBLG 4.32** 3.19* 4.80**
VS.SOECG
SAMBLGVS. 3.91 ** 5.65** 2.19
SAMBCG
SAMBLGVS. 2.20 1.57 0.82
SOELG
SAMBLGVS. 7.48*** 3.05* 9.60***
Private
SOECGVS. 0.14 0.06 0.51
SAMBCG
SOECG 4.52** 5.45** 3.62*
VS.SOELG
SOECGVS. 1.32 2.64 0.07
Private
SAMBCG 4.01 ** 2.89* 2.01
VS.SOELG
SAMBCGVS. 0.67 0.02 0.02
Private
SOELGVS. 3.73* 6.12** 5.98**
Private
Notes: * P-value:=;lO%,** P-value:=;5%,and .** P-value:=;l%.
4.4.4. Linear splines regression
In the previous section, the results do not strongly support a Ll-shaped non-linear
relationship between corporate performance and ownership concentration. In
order to capture the non-linear features of such a relationship in China's PLCs,
instead of including quadratic terms of ownership concentration in regression
24 To test a set of linear or nonlinear hypothesis---Ho: R (8) =q, after fitting a model, I use the Wald
test statistics: W={R (i)-q} '(GVG,)-l {R (i)-q}, which under Ho, in large samples, has a Chi-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of equations in R (')-q =0, i.e. the
number of restrictions. i is the I xk estimated coefficient vector. V is the krk estimated asymptotic
covariance matrix, and V=Est.Asy. Var[l']. G is the derivative matrix of R(i) with respect to i. R is
a function returning aj x I vector.
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models, I opt for a more precise method - the linear splines method. Linear splines
allow estimating of the relationship between y (i.e. the proxies of firm
performance, such as ROA, ROE, and ROS in this study) and x (Topone) as a
piecewise linear function, which is a function composed of linear segments -
straight lines. One linear segment represents the function for values ofx below qO,
another linear segment handles values between qO and q I, and so on. The linear
segments are arranged so that they join at the knots (qO, q1, q2 ... ).
Based upon previous works25 that provide an empirical direction for the partition
of ownership concentration, I set the knots at the zs", 50t\ and 75th percentiles of
the Topone, thus spliting the Topone into four segments (TopJ, Top2, Top3 and
Top4) which can be described as follows:
Performance.y = L~=laj Performance.jc, + P1Topll,t + P2Top2l,t +
(4)
Actually, I run following regression models for each dependent variable. I
incorporate both the first and the second lags of dependent variables as
explanatory variables in all three models.
(4.1)
25 See Bai et al (2004),Chen et al (2007) and Tian and Estrin (2008).
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(4.2)
(4.3)
Segment 1: 0 < Top 1< 25%. In this segment the alignment effects should be
expected such that corporate performance improves with the increase of the
ownership concentration. A certain level of ownership concentration can at least
partially solve the classic agency conflicts between management and shareholders.
Bai et at (2004) claim that the increase of ownership concentration from a low level
can help deal with the free-rider problem. Furthermore, it could be argued that the
presence of block shareholders can reduce agency costs caused by the classic agency
problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Hence a build-up of ownership concentration
from a low level can help address the classic agency conflicts, which would in turn
increase a firm's corporate value.
Segment 2: 25%<Top2<50%. In this segment the entrenchment effects should
be expected such that corporate performance decreases with the increase of the
ownership concentration. Through the pyramidal structure or cross-shareholding,
the voting rights of the controlling shareholder could differ dramatically from
herlhis cash flow rights. "As ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners
gain nearly full control and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate
private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders" (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997, p.759). The further increase of ownership concentration in this
segment might provide the controlling shareholder of a company with more
incentive to expropriate minority shareholders, which would result in reduced
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corporate value.
Segment 3: 50% S; Top3< 75%. In this segment I would expect a positive
relationship again, as the ownership concentration goes well beyond 50 percent and
the incentive for tunneling will be removed. Bai et al (2004) argue that the
relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration is complicated,
and there are positive as well as negative effects on firm performance that are
associated with different levels of ownership concentration. Furthermore, they
argue that the first positive effect of ownership concentration starts to appear when
ownership starts out being very diffused, and the emergence of block shareholding
may help minimise the free-rider problem. The second positive effect becomes
significant when the degree of concentration is very high, and the 'alignment' effect
starts to remove the 'tunneling' problem. In the spirit of Bai et al (2004), a positive
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance would be
expected in this segment.
Segment 4: 75%STop4<1 00%. In this segment the interests of the controlling
shareholder of a firm should be well aligned with those of minority shareholders,
with many agency problems being well addressed. However, as ownership
concentration approaches 100 percent, the benefits of public listing, such as risk
sharing and equity financing opportunities, may gradually fade away. Chen et al
(2007) argue that poor liquidity, lack of monitoring, and excluding professionals
in this segment cause the relationship to become negative. In this sense, a negative
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance might be
found in this segment.
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Table 4.9 reports the system GMM estimates for the linear splines regression, with
estimates for key variables being consistent with those reported in Table 4.4 and
Table 4.6. It is observed that the firm performance changes are associated with the
changes of ownership concentration across four segments, and have expected signs
in each segment, after controlling for other factors. The coefficients of the
percentage ownership of the largest shareholder are positive and significant in
segment I, negative and significant in segment 2, positive and significant in
segment 3 and negative again in segment 4, which suggests an 'M-shaped'
relationship between corporate performance and ownership concentration proxied
by the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. However, such an "M-
shaped" relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is
moderate according to my results reported in Table 4.9, as the relevant coefficients
of top1, top2, top3 and top4 are not significant across all the different measures of
performance.
This 'M-shaped' relationship also provides some consistent but relatively weak
support to Hypothesis 1. Bai et al (2004, p.604) argue that "at first, increased
ownership concentration from a low level addresses the free-rider problem among
shareholders so that it has a positive effect. However, a further increase in
ownership concentration has a negative effect if it reduces the constraint on
tunneling from other shareholders. Finally, as ownership concentration approaches
one-hundred percent, the effect becomes positive again In China, the second
effect dominates and the first effect is negligible. Hence, we expect to find a U-
shaped relationship between firm value and ownership concentration among
Chinese firms". The estimates of ownership concentration reported in Table 4.9
160
are consistent with their argument, although they neglect the 'efficient losses' in
segment 4. Hence, if I ignore the positive effect in segment 1 and the negative
effect in segment 4, my results could be considered to be supportive of aU-shaped
relationship between firm value and ownership concentration.
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Table 4.10 Instrument sets for Model 4
Instruments for the first- Instruments for the level
differenced equations equations
Model4.1 ROA lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
independent variables lagged independent variables
t-2 to t-6
Model4.2 ROE lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
independent variables lagged independent variables
t-2 to t-6
Model4.3 ROS lagged t-3, and all other lagged first-differences of all
independent variables lagged independent variables
t-2 to t-6
Notes: Appropriate instrument sets are selected and justified using Sargan and senal correlation
tests and at the same time, and the exogenous variables use themselves as instruments.
4.4.5. Robustness check
To check whether my results are robust to alternate measures of some key variables,
a series of robustness tests have been conducted and results are reported in the
Appendix. To test if the estimation results generated by models (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3)
are consistent for alternative measures of a firm's size and leverage ratio, I
calculate a firm's size as number of employees and leverage ratio as a firm's total
liability over total assets minus total liability. The results are reported in Table A4.2.
Similar tests are carried out for models (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) and
the corresponding results are given in Table A4.3 and columns (1), (2) and (3) of
Table A4.4. The results have clearly shown that my main findings are robust to
these alternate measures. In addition, as a comparison for the results given in Table
4.9, I also experiment with alternative cut-off points for the measure of ownership
concentration. Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table A4.4 report the results by setting
the cut-off points at 15%, 30% and 50%, while columns (7), (8) and (9) show the
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results given by setting the cut-off points at 30%, 50% and 70%. The overall
relationship between ownership concentration and firms' performance seems quite
moderate according to my results.
4.5. Conclusion
This study documents that the percentage of outstanding shares held by the largest
shareholder and the type of ultimate controller behind the largest shareholder are
strongly associated with Chinese PLCs' corporate value, after controlling other
possible determinants of finn performance, Using an unbalanced panel that
consists of 7324 Chinese PLCs' finn-year observations from 2000 through 2007
and applying the consistent system GMM estimation to it, I find that my findings
suggest an 'M-shaped' relationship between ownership concentration and finn
value. Such a non-monotonic relationship demonstrates the possibility of finding
two optimal levels of ownership concentration. One of these two optimal levels
should lie at around 25 per cent of ownership concentration, while the other one
lies at around 75 per cent.
Moreover, my findings challenge the classification of PLCs adopted by most prior
studies and demonstrate how this may lead to erroneous conclusions. In
categorising PLCs according to the types of the ultimate controller, my results
contrast with those works and show that state ownership may not always reduce
corporate value, and PLCs controlled by SOECGs and the SAMBCG could
perform almost equally well as those controlled by private investors. My results
also suggest that if the Chinese government wants to further the privatisation of
166
state ownership in the next phase of economic reform, it should seriously consider
the possibility of relinquishing its control on those underperforming PLCs whose
ultimate controllers are SOELGs and SAMBLGs.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS OF
CHINESE PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANIES
5.1. Introduction
In a world of perfect capital markets, firms' cash holdings would be an irrelevant
issue in corporate day-to-day operations. Since there is no liquidity premium in
such a world, firms can easily adjust their holdings of liquidity assets at zero cost.
Moreover, they can raise external funds at fair prices to finance investment projects
whenever their cash flows are low. However, such a perfect world, in reality, does
not exist, and it could be costly for firms to adjust their levels of cash holdings as
well as raising external funds. In this case, if facing a shortage of internal resources,
firms have to raise funds in the capital markets by, for example, selling existing
assets, cutting dividends and investment or issuing new debt andlor equity. It is
argued that there are costs to both purchasing and selling financial and real assets,
and the costs have both fixed and variable components. The fixed cost occurs at a
fixed rate in every single transaction, while the variable cost is assumed to be
proportional to the amount of funds raised (Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan,
2004).
Arguably, in imperfect capital markets, firms may have strong incentives to
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maintain internal financial flexibility by holding sufficient cash, as cash could
provide low cost financing for them. Keynes (1936) suggests that firms have a
transaction motive for holding cash due to the cost of converting cash substitutes
into cash. However, there are also potential costs associated with corporate cash
holdings. In accordance with the trade-off theory (see Opler et al., 1999 and
Dittmar et al., 2003 for theoretical analysis), firms always balance the benefits and
costs of holding cash to determine the target level of cash reserves. Once the actual
cash holdings deviate from the target level, they will start adjusting towards the
target cash reserves (see, for example, Opler et al., 1999). The most direct cost of
holding cash is the opportunity cost, which is the forgone return arising from the
low return on liquid assets (Opler et al., 1999). In addition, the adverse effects of
retaining a large amount of cash would also arise from the existence of agency
conflicts in modem firms, which is detrimental to shareholders' value. Jensen (1986)
argues that the agency conflicts between shareholders and the management could
be most devastating when firms have large free cash flows.
Meanwhile, the benefits of holding cash could arise from a number of sources.
Firstly, more cash reserves may help firms to not only reduce their reliance on
external financing, but also to reduce the costs of financing, relieving firms'
financial constraints to a large extent (Almeida et al., 2004). Secondly, firms with
high cash reserves may have a strategic advantage in competitive product markets,
as indicated by Haushalter et al (2007) and Fresard (2008). Last but not least, firms
with ample cash reserves are less likely to have to forgo profitable net present value
(NPV) projects (Almeida et al., 2004). Due to the existence of asymmetric
information between firms and investors in capital markets, it could be costly for
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firms to raise external funds to finance their projects (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms prefer internal financing to external
financing as a consequence of capital market asymmetric information in capital
markets. Hence, firms with greater growth opportunities would hold greater
amounts of cash with hopes of not passing up valuable investment opportunities.
The investigation into firms' cash holdings has recently attracted a great deal of
attention from both academics and practitioners. An important strand of this ever
growing literature is aimed at uncovering the determinants of corporate cash
holdings", For a large panel of industrial firms in the US over the period 1975 to
1994, Kim et a/ (1998) found that the optimal level of holding liquidity assets
would increase in response to higher costs of external financing, more volatile
future cash flows and greater growth opportunities. Opler et al (1999) tested a
similar sample consisting of publicly traded US firms in the period 1971 to 1994.
They argue that large firms and firms with high credit ratings, which have better
access to the capital markets, are more likely to hold lower cash reserves. More
recently, given mounting concerns regarding the existence of agency problems in
firms around the world, more regard has been paid to the investigation of the
relationship between agency conflicts and corporate cash holdings. For example,
Ozkan and Ozkan's (2004) study of a panel of UK firms provides evidence of a
significant non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and
corporate cash holdings. They also argue that firms whose ultimate controllers are
families would hold significantly higher ratios of total cash and equivalent items to
26The other important strand focuses on the relationship between cash holdings and corporate
performance (see, for example, Harford, 1999; Pinkowitz et al., 2006).
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total assets than those non-family controlled ones. Pinkowitz et al (2006) provide
evidence for the agency theories which predict that the value of corporate cash
holdings is less in countries with poor investor protection. They suggest that it is
because that laws and their enforcement in those countries could not provide
effective protection against the expropriation of minority investors by controlling
shareholders, which would lead to lower corporate values. Based on Opler et aI's
(1999) work, Dittmer and Mahrt-Smith (2007) argue that poorly governed firms
tend to dissipate cash quickly in ways that could significantly decrease
shareholders' value. However, such a negative impact of large cash holdings can be
effectively cancelled out in firms which are well governed.
Though the ever growing literature about corporate cash holdings has improved our
knowledge extensively, it is mainly derived from data from developed countries. In
contrast, research regarding corporate cash holdings in China remains inadequate.
Distinct from previous studies, this chapter is intended to contribute to the literature
on corporate cash holding mainly in two aspects. Firstly, this chapter explicitly
investigates whether the identity of the ultimate controller of Chinese publicly
listed companies (PLCs) has any impact on their cash holding levels, with special
regard being given to the unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market.
Corporate cash holdings are one main source of agency conflicts, as suggested by
prior studies (see, for example, Dittmar et al., 2003, Pinkowitz et al., 2006, and
Kalcheva and Lins, 2007), and it is argued that agency problems could be a
possible reason for firms to hold excessive amounts of cash. Jensen's (1986) free
cash flow hypothesis stresses the agency costs of free cash flow arising out of the
conflicts between shareholders and the management. Consistent with the 'classic'
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agency theory. private firms in China. with clearly-defined property rights and
better-aligned interests between shareholders and the management. should be more
effective in reducing possible agency costs than those controlled by the state. In
this sense. it would be rare that one might see a privately-controlled firm
maintaining excessive cash balances. However, with respect to corporate cash
holdings, such an argument might not hold in China. given the state's dominant role
in the economy and the presence of the 'soft-budget' constraints for the state-
controlled firms. Rather. the cash holding behaviour of Chinese PLCs could be
heavily influenced and shaped by these salient characteristics in the Chinese stock
market. Due to the long-accused 'soft-budget' constraints, PLCs that are ultimately
controlled by the state are less fmancially constrained in the way that they have
much better access to credit in most state-owned commercial banks (Wei. 2010).
Therefore, these PLCs may face less borrowing constraints and lower costs of
external financing, and it is highly likely that they would have lower ratios of
liquidity assets to total assets relative to the privately-controlled PLCs. A negative
relationship between cash holdings and state-controlled PLCs might therefore be
observed. Another explanation for this negative relationship could be that private
owners as the controlling shareholders may have incentives to over-invest in liquid
assets in order to generate private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders,
and these potential agency conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholder
and minority shareholders have already been emphasised by recent studies (see, for
example, La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000a, b).
There have been several existing studies providing empirical evidence to support
the existence of the optimal target level for corporate cash holdings of firms in
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developed economies (see, for example, Kim et al., 1998, Opler et al., 1999, Ozkan
and Ozkan, 2004, and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). However, there is little if
any evidence on the optimal cash holding level in China. Utilising the partial
target-adjustment model, I investigate the dynamic adjustment processes of cash
holdings of Chinese PLCs based on the view27 that market imperfections such as
adjustment and transaction costs can cause delays for firms in adjusting their cash
holdings. Hence, the second contribution of this chapter lies in the exploitation of
the dynamic adjustment behaviour of the corporate cash holdings of Chinese PLCs,
which especially focuses on investigating whether there is any difference in the
adjustment speed for different ultimate controllers. It is argued that a firm's ability
to access external funds could play an important role in shaping its cash holding
adjustment behaviour. In China, external borrowings are mainly referred to as bank
debts. For PLCs with private controlling shareholders, borrowings from banks are
subject to rigid monitoring from debt-issuing banks, generally via stringent debt
provisions. In contrast, backed up by the state, state-controlled PLCs, if necessary,
can adjust their cash holdings fairly easily by accessing external finance at
favourably low costs, mainly from state-owned banks. Since carrying liquid assets
and adjusting cash holding levels both involve costs, this would, in tum, enable
these state-controlled PLCs to maintain lower cash balances, and to appear more
reluctant to adjust their cash holdings, as compared with privately-controlled PLCs.
Moreover, it is important to note that maintaining target cash holding levels, which
are mainly derived from the transaction cost motive and the precautionary motive,
could have strategic meanings for firms. It is possible that PLCs with private
27 See Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004, for theoretical analysis.
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owners are more efficient in the sense that they tend to have faster cash holding
adjustment speed, so as to lower their financial risks and grab value-enhancing
investment opportunities. Therefore, with the same extent of deviation from the
target cash holding level, privately-controlled PLCs might be more active in
making adjustments towards the target level.
The endogeneity problem in the empirical analysis of corporate cash holdings will
be carefully addressed, as suggested by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). They argue that
it is important to control the endogenity problem in this context for mainly two
reasons: "Firstly, it is highly likely that observable as well as unobservable shocks
affecting cash holdings of firms can also affect some of the firm-specific
characteristics such as leverage and market-to-book ratios. Second, it is possible
that observed relations between cash and its potential determinants reflect the
effects of cash on the latter rather than vice versa" (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004,
p.2105).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview of
theoretical issues relevant to corporate cash holdings. Section 5.3 describes the
dataset and the variable constructions. Section 5.4 presents the results. Section 5.5
concludes the chapter.
5.2. Corporate cash holdings
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief overview of the theoretical issues
relevant to corporate cash holdings. The literature about target (or optimal) cash
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holdings is based on the premise that if there are market imperfections then there
are various reasons for firms to hold cash. In a world where managers always
maximise shareholders' wealth, corporate cash holdings should be at a level such
that the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits of holding cash. This is the
trade-off theory of corporate cash holdings, which elaborates both benefits and
costs of firms holding cash. The obvious costs of holding liquid assets are costs of
carry, while the two main benefits that have been discussed in the existing literature
arise from a transaction costs motive and a precautionary motive.
In this chapter I intend to first briefly discuss the trade-off theory and then move on
to provide a description of the competing theory to the trade-off theory, i.e. the
financing hierarchy theory/pecking order theory. Previous studies have suggested
that corporate governance, as an important issue in the discussion of corporate cash
holdings, should be taken into consideration at all times (see, for example, Opler et
al., 1999, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004, Dittmar et 01.,2003, Pinkowitz et 01.,2006 and
Harford et al., 2008). This section also goes over relevant corporate governance
issues that could possibly help explain corporate cash reserves in China.
5.2.1. Transaction costs motive
It is argued that the normal (or optimal) cash holdings could be seen as a result of
the trade-off between benefits and costs of retaining large cash reserves within
firms. The benefits of holding cash balances stem from mainly two motives. The
first is the transaction costs motive, which means that a firm facing a shortage of
internal resources can raise outside funds by liquidating its near cash and/or other
assets, which would involve a great amount of costs in imperfect markets as
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opposed to perfect markets". Opler et al (1999) suggest that unless the firm can
liquidate cash substitutes into cash at low cost, it may prefer to resort to outside
funds in capital markets. However, it is pointed out by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004)
that it is likely for firms to incur transaction costs in the asset liquidating process,
and the costs normally involve both fixed and variable components. Consequently,
the costs, in particular the fixed costs of assessing capital markets, could force
firms to refrain from frequently raising outside funds. Considering the effect of
transaction costs, one would expect firms to maintain cash balances so as to reduce
these costs.
5.2.2. Information asymmetries, agency costs of debt and precautionary
motive
The second motive of holding cash is the precautionary (speculative) motive, which
suggests two particular concerns of firms. The first is about the expectation of
future investment opportunities, while the second concerns the corporate cash flow
volatility in the future. In addition, the precautionary (speculative) motive points
directly to the costs arising from the information asymmetries between the
management of the firm and outside investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Given
such asymmetric information, "outsiders want to make sure that the securities they
purchase are not overpriced, and consequently discount them appropriately" (Opler
et al., 1999, p.lO). Although firms can have access to the capital markets, the
existence of the information asymmetries could make external financing extremely
costly. In reality, outside investors may require so large a discount that the
28 See Modigliani and Miller, 1958.
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management may find it too costly to finance projects by raising outside funds and
choose to reduce investment instead. When facing value increasing growth options
if taken, firms may have strong incentives to hold more cash as a buffer against
cash shortfalls. Firms with such investment opportunities could do so in an attempt
to make it less likely that they will have to pass up some positive NPV projects. It
is also important to note that the information asymmetries might vary over time, as
suggested by Opler et al (1999), such that harmless asymmetric information at one
point in time could later mutate into an obstacle to firms' external financing, and
vice versa. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that due to the high costs of external
fmancing caused by the information asymmetries, stockholders could be better off
if firms build up financial slack to undertake good investment opportunities during
the periods when the management has little or no information advantage. Hence
firms may find it valuable to be good at stacking up financial slack in their day-to-
day operations. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) claim that firms with greater growth
opportunities are encouraged to carry more cash and marketable securities to avoid
possible future cash shortfalls.
Besides the asymmetric information that could increase the cost of outside funds,
the precautionary motive also stresses the role of agency costs of debt. These
agency costs arise when the interests of the shareholders are not consistent with
those of the debtholders. Because of these costs, firms may choose not to raise
external funds and pass up some valuable projects that may only benefit
debtholders but not shareholders, which is the underinvestment problem pointed
out by Myers (1977). However, firms with greater growth opportunities want to
avoid situations where the agency costs of debt are prohibitively expensive so that
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they cannot raise external financing to invest in rewarding projects. Obviously, one
way to do so is to maintain large cash balances in firms.
5.2.3. The financing hierarchy theory
The financing hierarchy theory/pecking order theory of Myers (1984) states that in
the presence of asymmetric information between firms and outside investors, it is
likely that firms follow a hierarchy in financing their investments in the sense that
they would finance projects primarily with internal resources, then with debt and
finally with equity. Under the financing hierarchy theory, there is no optimal level
of cash holdings for a firm and cash is merely the opposite side of the debt.
Corporate cash holdings are simply the outcome of the investment and financing
decisions made by the firm (Dittmar et al., 2003). Thus, when current cash flows
are adequate enough to finance investments, firms will pay back debt and
accumulate cash. When current cash flows are insufficient to finance current
investments, firms use their accumulated cash holdings, and then issue debt if
needed.
Though the financing hierarchy theory is the popular competing theory to the trade-
off theory, the distinction between them is not as sharp as people might expect, and
many variables that are correlated with cash holdings are also used in the trade-off
theory. Previous studies suggest that both views are able to help explain the
determinants of corporate cash holdings (see, for example, Ferreira and Vilela,
2004; Saddour, 2006). The major difference between these two theories is that the
trade-off theory expects a positive relationship between investment (capital
expenditures) and cash holdings, while the financing hierarchy theory predicts a
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negative relationship, with many other predictions made by the two views being the
same. I will provide a more detailed description of predictions implied by the two
theories in the following section.
5.2.4. Agency costs of managerial discretion and board structure
A firm where the management maximises shareholders' wealth should set the firm's
cash holdings at a level such that the marginal benefit of cash holdings equals the
marginal cost of those holdings. If this is the case, then the only cost of holding
cash is the relatively low return associated with the liquid assets (i.e. costs of
carrying cash). However, prior research has pointed out that the agency costs could
be even greater than any other costs of holding cash (see, for example, Dittmar et
al., 2003; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Kalcheva and
Lins, 2007). With respect to corporate cash holding policy, managers and
shareholders always view the costs and benefits of the liquid assets differently,
which could result in the free cash flow problem emphasised by Jensen (1986),
namely that managers in control of free cash flow will invest it in negative NPV
projects rather than pay it out to shareholders.
From the perspective of agency theory, there are, in general, three reasons for
managers to have greater incentives to hold cash in excess of the optimal level that
is set to maximise shareholders' value. Firstly. managers may hold excess cash to
avoid market discipline. This is because a firm that finds itself being short of funds
to finance its new profitable investment opportunities can borrow external funds
from capital markets. However, this does not come without a cost to the
management, since borrowings from capital markets would in turn bring in extra
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outside monitoring (Jensen, 1986). Secondly, managers are likely to hold more cash
as they may want to have more financial flexibility to pursue their own interests.
Cash is not simply negative debt for management, since it could allow managers to
invest in projects that capital markets are reluctant to finance (Opler et al., 1999).
Moreover, as Opler et al (1999) argue, investing in liquid assets could enable
management to avoid the discipline of capital markets, making it easier for
managers to use cash for their private objectives at the expense of shareholders.
Last but not least, management may pursue targets of empire building rather than
maximising shareholders' wealth. In this sense, management may even waste its
accumulated cash on poor projects when good projects are not available, instead of
using the cash to make payouts to shareholders. Jensen (1986) suggests that the
power of managers largely depends on what level of resources are under their
control. Payouts to shareholders, however, reduce the resources, which in tum
implies weaker managers' power. In addition to reducing managers' power, Jensen
(1986) suggests that the payouts to shareholders may incur the monitoring of the
capital markets as firms must obtain new capital to finance projects.
It is argued that managerial ownership can serve as a mechanism to better align
managers' interests with those of the shareholders. However, it is worth noting that
managerial ownership could be a 'double-edged' sword. On the one hand,
managerial ownership gives managers incentives to maximise shareholders' wealth
(alignment effect). On the other hand, higher managerial ownership may provide
managers with a shelter against monitoring, making it much easier for managers to
hold more cash to pursue their private benefits (e.g. first-class airline travel, five-
star hotels) without risking replacement (entrenchment effect). Hence, the ultimate
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impact of managerial ownership depends on the trade-off between the alignment
and entrenchment effects.
Apart from the managerial ownership that could potentially affect corporate cash
balances, the literature also suggests that the board structure (independence and
size) may have some effects on the cash holdings, which is in relation to the role of
the board structure in influencing managerial incentives. With respect to the role of
board size in corporate governance, Jensen (1993) argues that small boards are
more effective and efficient than large boards. For a sample of 452 US industrial
firms between 1984 and 1991, Yermack (1996) reports an inverse relationship
between board size and firm value. Moreover, he suggests that large board size
would result in a decrease in the strength of CEO performance incentives, and the
function of the threat of dismissal also operates less effectively as board size
increases. However, bigger boards could increase the level of board monitoring and
provide for greater business expertise, thus enhancing corporate performance
(Anderson et al., 2004). As such, a positive relationship between board size and
corporate performance should be expected.
With respect to the board independence, the literature usually uses two measures.
The first measure is the ratio of the number of independent directors (outside/non-
executive directors) sitting on a board over the total number of directors. A
generally accepted view in the literature is that independent directors are appointed
to look after the shareholders' interests by effectively monitoring and disciplining
managers (see, for example, Weisbach, 1988; Huson et al., 2001). More specifically,
it is argued that as the independent director representation becomes increasingly
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larger, the monitoring effectiveness of the board increases, thereby containing the
managerial discretion and enhancing corporate performance. Accordingly, firms
with more independent boards are expected to perform a more effective and
efficient monitoring and disciplining function over the management, which could in
turn exert some influence on the corporate cash holdings. That is, a more
independent board would force self-interested management to distribute excess
cash to shareholders, instead of spending it on some unprofitable projects or
wasting it on organization inefficiencies. Hence, from the perspective of agency
theory, I would expect firms with more independent boards to hold lower amounts
of free cash flows.
Another measure of board independence is the duality of the roles of the chairman
of the board and CEO. It is argued that such duality of roles would enable the
chairman of the board to enjoy absolute power over other members on the board.
The duality of the chairman of the board and CEO has often been questioned in the
literature, and opponents of the duality argue that it may constrain board
independence and weaken its oversight and governance role (Fizel and Louie, 1990;
Baliga et al., 1996). Accordingly, firms with more independent boards are expected
to perform a more effective and efficient monitoring and disciplining function over
the management, which could in turn exert some influence on the corporate cash
holdings.
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5.2.5. Bank loans, 'soft-budget' constraints, ultimate controllers and
ownership concentration
Debt financing is expected to improve the quality of corporate governance'" and
can playa positive role in motivating managers and their firms to be more efficient
(Jensen, 1986). It is often argued that borrowings from banks (bank loans) could
be more effective than any other forms of public debt in reducing agency problems
and asymmetric information (see, for example, Diamond, 1984; Berlin and Loeys,
1988). This is because the utmost aim of banks after issuing loans to firms is to
make sure that those firms can fulfill the legal requirements to repay interest and
loans in due course. In doing so, banks can use their comparative advantage of
collecting and processing information and of monitoring firms to ensure the safety
of loans. Consequently, the information asymmetries between management and
outsiders can be minimised by the banks' specialised knowledge (Tian and Estrin,
2007). Furthermore, banks providing or renewing a loan to a firm can present a
positive signal to capital markets about that firm, which together with the reduction
of the information asymmetries can make it much easier for the firm to have access
to external finance. Arguably, this would imply lower corporate cash holdings in
such firms.
China is transforming into a market economy and the private sector is playing an
increasingly important role in its whole economy. However, state ownership is still
prevalent in both enterprises and banks. According to the China Securities
Regulation Commission (CSRC), the state owns on average more than one third of
29 In general, the role of debt financing in disciplining management comes from the threat of
bankruptcy, the reduction of free cash flows and close monitoring by debt issuers.
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all outstanding shares of publicly listed companies (PLCs), while remaining as the
ultimate controller in more than 80% of all PLCs. At the same time, the Chinese
government has a dominant stake in the financial system. As for PLCs, bank loans
are an important financing source which constitutes more than 20% of total assets
in most PLCs. According to the China Banking Regulation Commission (CBRC),
the 'Big Four' banks - the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the China Construction Bank (CCB) and the
Bank of China (BOC) - that are fully controlled by the state still provide a stunning
amount of bank loans (more than 80% of total bank loans) to firms in China.
Besides the 'Big Four' banks, most other banks are also controlled by the
government.
It is important to note that the Chinese government is both creditor and debtor in
state controlled PLCs. Tian and Estrin (2007) conclude that such a dual role of the
Chinese government is in relation to 'soft-budget' constraints, defined as the
expected re-negotiability of debts in state-owned enterprises, even when they are
making losses. In this sense, the state may explicitly or implicitly put pressure on
banks to provide new debts or renegotiate existing debts with those firms.
Furthermore, banks are sometimes required by the state to issue 'policy loans' to
support the loss-making state-owned enterprises. Under 'soft-budget' constraints,
the governance role of bank loans that has been widely discussed in the Western
literature (e.g. monitoring by creditors, reduction of free cash flows and the
reduced asymmetric information between management and outsiders), may not
hold in state-controlled firms in China. In contrast with state-owned firms, it might
be more difficult, if not impossible, for private firms to get financial support from
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banks, which would in turn imply more cash holdings in these firms.
According to agency theories, the ultimate controllers of firms could find it more
beneficial to further their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. It
has been argued that liquid assets can be converted into private benefits at
relatively lower cost than any other asset (Myers and Rajan, 1998). Hence, the
investigation into corporate cash holding behaviour may represent a promising
opportunity to provide direct evidence on the implications of agency problems for
corporate governance.
From the perspective of agency theories, the identity of an ultimate controller can
have a significant impact on a firm's incentives for cash holdings. The ultimate
controller of Chinese PLCs can be mainly classified into five groups. They are the
state asset management bureau at the central level (SAMBCG), state asset
management bureaus at the local level (SAMBLG), SOEs affiliated to the central
government (SOECG), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELG) and
private investors, each of which has a different motive and incentive structure as I
have thoroughly discussed in the last chapter. While the results drawn in the last
chapter are supportive of the private control", we cannot rule out the possibility
that private owners may overinvest in liquid assets, which would significantly
lower corporate value. Dittmar et a/ (2003) suggest that it is possible that firms
controlled by families may hold more cash as a store of wealth in order to avoid the
30 In the last chapter I analysed the relationship between the identity of the ultimate controller and
corporate performance of Chinese PLCs, the results of which can only provide the 'absolute' effect
of the relationship. For example, a privately controlled PLC may suffer more agency costs in some
respects than other state-owned PLCs, but its overall performance can still be superior to those state-
owned ones.
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payout of taxes. Using a sample of UK public firms from 1984 to 1999, Ozkan and
Ozkan (2004) found that firms whose owners are families maintain significantly
higher cash balances. They interpret their findings as showing that the inefficient
long presence of family owners in the management would lead to higher agency
costs. However, Dittmar et of (2003) consider the fact that in countries with weak
investor protection it may be more expensive to raise external funds, as it is always
the case that countries with weak investor protection have less developed capital
markets, and borrowings might be prohibitively costly in those markets. Dittmar et
of's (2003) explanation is a much more benign one that firms in such countries only
accumulate cash as a buffer against future cash shortfalls, and as a way of making
them less likely to have to pass up valuable investment opportunities. As a case in
point, China has the world's fastest-growing but least developed capital market
relative to those in developed economies. Arguably, in China privately controlled
firms are more subject to financial constraints than the state-owned ones, and it is
possible that PLCs controlled by private owners realise the difficulties in accessing
external finance and thereby retain more cash as a store of wealth in order to avoid
possible cash flow shortfalls in the future. If this argument holds for Chinese PLCs,
a positive and significant relationship between private owners and cash holdings
can be observed, whilst the question of whether there are any differences in the
behaviour of corporate cash holdings among different groups of the state owners is
not clear.
Hypothesis 1: There is a target cash holding level for Chinese PLCs, and this target
level could vary across PLCs with different ultimate controllers. Since privately-
owned PLCs are more financially constrained, with other things being equal, they
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are expected to hold more cash reserves than their state-owned counterparts.
Hypothesis 2: Due to the high adjustment costs, Chinese PLCs cannot
instantaneously adjust towards the target cash holding level, and are thus expected
to have a dynamic cash-holding partial adjustment process towards the target cash
holding level. Moreover, among all PLCs, PLCs with private controllers have the
fastest adjustment speed, as they have more difficulties in accessing external funds.
In addition to the identities of the ultimate owners, the control power distribution,
as represented by the ownership concentration (calculated as the percentage of
shares held by the largest shareholder), is argued to have significant effects on
corporate governance (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al.,
2002; Chen et al., 2007). More specifically, the role of ownership concentration is
fairly complex, as concluded by Bai et 01 (2004): increasing ownership
concentration from a low level may help address the free-rider problem. However,
the further increase in ownership concentration could lead to the 'tunnelling'
problem as emphasised by Johnson et 01 (2000), namely the 'entrenchment' effects.
Finally, as the ownership concentration approaches 100 per cent, the 'alignment'
effects start to work again to remove the 'tunnelling' problem. It is worth noting
that the literature regarding ownership structure also suggests that outside (non-
management) blockholders could play a positive role in disciplining the largest
shareholder and enhancing firm value due to mutual monitoring (see, for example,
Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). However, the
beneficial role of outside blockholders as monitors is likely to depend on the degree
of investor protection. Faccio et 01 (2001) conducted a comparison analysis of
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expropriation from the perspective of dividends using accounting data of listed
companies from selected European and Asian economies, and report that Asian
. corporations with multiple blockholders pay significantly less dividends than
similar corporations in Europe, which might indicate that in countries with weaker
investor protection blockholders are more likely to collude with the controlling
shareholder to expropriate the minority shareholders.
5.3. Data and variable construction
5.3.1. Data
To investigate the determinants and the dynamic adjustment mechanism of
corporate cash holdings of Chinese PLCs, I gathered a sample of Chinese PLCs
from the Shanghai Wind information database. The original sample for this study
consists of all A-share PLCs listed on The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2001 to 2007, subject to data
availability. As in the last chapter, the customised dataset provided by Sinofin
Financial Information Service Co., Ltd. helps identify the type of the ultimate
controller of each Chinese PLC and categorise these ultimate controllers into five
groups: the state asset management bureau at the central level (SAMBCG), the
state asset management bureaus at the local level (SAMBLG), State-owned
enterprises (SOEs) that are affiliated to the central government (SOECGs) and
those affiliated to the local governments (SOELGs), and private investors.
The initial sample has 9289 observations. The sample screening process is as
follows: (1) Exclude firms for which operating performance data is not available
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and follow the tradition of the literature to remove financial firms, due to them
using a different financial reporting system( 1606 observations dropped); (2) Drop
firms whose leverage ratio is greater than one(5 observations dropped); (3)
Eliminate firms with ST (Special Treatment) or PT (Particular Treatment)
designation '! (1721 observations dropped); (4) Remove firms that do not have
continuous operations (listing) for at least four years during the research period(899
observations dropped). As a result, the final sample is an unbalanced panel that
consists of 5058 firm-year observations, and there are 785 firms in the sample.
5.3.2. Variable construction
5.3.2.1. Measuring corporate cash holdings
Following the patterns of the literature, Iuse the ratio of cash and cash equivalents
to total assets as the proxy for corporate cash holdings (see, for example, Ozkan
and Ozkan, 2004).
5.3.2.2. Corporate financial variables
Cash flows (CFit): From the perspective of the financing hierarchy theory, in the
presence of asymmetric information resulting in costly external financing, firms
31 It is mandated by the CSRC that if a Chinese listed company reports accounting losses in two
consecutive years, its stock will be put under 'Special Treatment' status (ST). If it fails to turn its
accounting earnings back to positive in the third year, i.e. it reports losses for three consecutive
years, it will be put under 'particular treatment' (PT) status. The market has imposed various trading
and financial restrictions on ST and PT stocks. For example, unlike other normal listed companies,
the stock price movement of an ST company is restricted to be no more than five per cent in either
direction, and the company's semi-annual report must be audited. Furthermore, an ST company
cannot raise additional capital from the stock market. A listed company with PT designation can
only be traded on Fridays with a stock price limit of five percent fluctuation per day. Moreover, it
will be delisted from the market if it continues to suffer losses in the fourth year. The rationale
behind the ST and PT designations is that ST and PT companies are bad performers in the long run,
and it is necessary to restrict or delist them in order to protect the interests of investors (Jiang and
Wang, 2008).
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prefer internal finance over informationally sensitive external finance in their
financing policies (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, firms that have higher cash
flows are expected to hold larger amounts of cash as a resource of internal funds. I
use the ratio of cash flow to total assets as a proxy for the cash flow. A positive
relationship between cash holdings and cash flows is expected. By contrast, the
trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between cash holdings and cash
flow. Under the trade-off theory, firms can use their cash flows as a source of
liquidity assets to finance new investments, and thus firms with high cash flows are
expected to hold less cash.
Non-cash liquid assets (NWCit): Within the framework of the trade-off theory,
non-cash liquid assets are a substitute for holding cash. Transaction costs will arise
when converting non-cash assets into cash in imperfect markets. It is reasonable to
assume that the cost of converting non-cash liquid assets into cash is much lower as
compared with other assets. Firms with sufficient liquid assets can liquidate non-
cash liquid assets at low costs to raise funds when they find themselves being short
of cash. The proxy for non-cash liquid assets is the ratio of net working capital
minus cash to total assets. According to the trade-off theory, I expect a negative
relationship between cash holdings and non-cash liquid assets. The financing
hierarchy theory does not provide a clear prediction for the relationship between
corporate cash holdings and non-cash liquid assets.
Leverage (LEVit): The trade-off theory fails to provide a clear-cut prediction for the
relationship between cash balances and the leverage ratio. Firms can use
borrowings as a substitute for cash reserves because leverage can act as a proxy for
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the ability of firms to issue debt. Moreover, the cost of funds used to invest in
liquidity increases as the ratio of debt financing increases, which would imply a
reduction in cash holdings with increased leverage. Therefore, a negative
relationship is expected between a finn's cash holdings and its leverage. However,
because of the existence of agency costs of debt, highly leveraged firms find it
difficult and expensive to raise additional funds. These firms also sometimes find it
impossible to renegotiate existing debt agreements to prevent default and
bankruptcy. Such firms have high incentives to hold larger amounts of cash. In
addition, it is worth noting that higher debt levels can increase the likelihood of
financial distress, therefore I would expect a finn with a high leverage to increase
its cash holdings to decrease the likelihood of financial distress. Accordingly, I
would expect a positive relationship between cash holdings and leverage. Leverage
is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets.
It is argued that under the fmancing hierarchy theory, the cash holdings are
mechanically adjusted by a finn's investment and financing decisions. Indeed,
when retained earnings are insufficient to finance current investment needs, the
firm would issue new debt, thus increasing leverage and drawing down its cash
holdings. However, when retained earnings exceed investment needs, the firm
repays debt and accumulates cash, hence a negative relationship could be expected
between cash holdings and leverage.
Bank debt (BANKDEBTit): Because of the comparative advantage of banks in
monitoring firms' activities and in collecting and processing information, it is often
argued that bank financing is more effective than public debt in reducing problems
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associated with agency conflicts and informational asymmetries. Thus, the
existence of a bank relationship would enhance the ability of firms to raise external
finance through providing signals about a borrowing finn's credit worthiness.
Moreover, bank debt can serve as a substitute for holding high levels of cash
because bank debt is more easily renegotiated when firms need to. These arguments
suggest that firms with more bank debt are expected to hold less cash. I measure
bank debt as the ratio of total bank debt to total debt, and I expect a negative
relationship between cash holdings and bank debt, according to the trade-off theory.
Growth opportunities (MKTBOOKit): The trade-off theory and the financing
hierarchy theory make the same prediction over the relationship between cash
holdings and corporate growth opportunities. Asymmetric information between
inside and outside investors makes external financing more expensive. Myers and
Majluf (1984) argue that firms whose values are largely determined by growth
opportunities face a more severe asymmetric information problem, hence firms
with higher growth opportunities would hold larger amounts of cash in order to
avoid passing up valuable projects in the future.
I measure firms' growth opportunities as the ratio of book value of total assets
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of
assets. Opler et al (1999) argue that the book value of a company does not contain
any information about its future growth opportunities, and the higher market
valuation relative to the book value of the company's assets suggests that the
company has a high preponderance of future growth options. Higher market value
can demonstrate the investors' expectation that a finn will have positive net present
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value (NPV) projects in the future. Furthermore, the extant literature suggests that
firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to keep larger cash reserves
in order to not forego future growth opportunities (see, for example, Ozkan and
Ozkan, 2004; Harford et al., 2008). Therefore, I would expect a positive
relationship between cash holdings and growth opportunities.
Firm Size (SIZEit): The size of firms is measured by the natural logarithm of total
assets. The trade-off theory expects a negative relationship between cash holdings
and the size of firms. Large firms may have less information asymmetry than small
firms. Therefore, small firms face more borrowing constraints and higher costs of
external financing than large firms. In addition, the cost of external financing is
smaller for larger firms because of scale economies resulting from a substantial
fixed cost component of security issuance costs. All of these would in tum imply
that small firms should hold more cash. However, it is argued that within the
framework of the financing hierarchy theory, larger firms tend to have higher levels
of operational cash flows, hence a positive relationship between cash holdings and
firm size should be expected.
Capital expenditures (CAPEXit):The capital expenditures are measured as the ratio
of capital expenditures minus depreciation to total assets. The trade-off theory and
the fmancing hierarchy theory share many commonalities, as many variables used
in explaining the trade-off theory are also employed in the financing hierarchy
theory. The major difference between the two theories is that the trade-off theory
suggests a positive relationship between cash holdings and capital expenditures,
while the financing hierarchy theory suggests the opposite. Under the trade-off
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theory, it is highly likely that firms with high investment needs hold more cash in
order to support their investments and avoid expensive external borrowings,
whereas the financing hierarchy theory suggests that firms always follow an order
in their financing policies. Before resorting to external funds firms would first use
accumulated cash to finance their investment projects.
Dividend payments (DIVIDENDit): Dividend payments to shareholders are
measured as the ratio of dividend payments to total assets. It is often argued that
dividend-paying firms can raise funds by simply cutting their dividends, and in this
sense a negative relationship should be expected between firms' cash holdings and
dividend payouts. In contrast, as Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue, firms may hold
more cash to maintain their dividend payment policy and thus a positive
relationship may be observed. The trade-otftheory does not therefore come up with
a clear prediction regarding the relationship between cash holdings and firms'
dividend policies.
Cash flow variability (CVit): The cash flow variability is measured by the industry
sigma motivated by Opler et 01 (1999). For each firm, I compute the cash flow
standard deviation for the previous years, if available. I then take the average
across industrial dummies of the standard deviations of firm cash flow (industry
sigma). The trade-off theory suggests that firms with more cash flow uncertainty
have more incentives to build up fmancial slack and retain more cash reserves in
their daily operations to avoid situations in which they may suffer from cash
shortfalls. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between cash flow variability
and cash holdings.
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5.3.2.3. Corporate governance variables
The existing literature suggests that corporate governance should play an important
role in establishing corporate cash holding behaviour (see, for example, Dittmar et
al., 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al.,
2008). In section 5.2, I have briefly discussed different corporate governance
mechanisms and explained how these mechanisms could function in mitigating the
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, as well as those between
large shareholders and minority shareholders. However, theory does not shed much
light on the exact nature of the relationship between cash holdings and corporate
governance mechanisms. The central theme of the literature on the relationship
between corporate governance and cash holdings is that firms with good corporate
governance and firms in countries with strong investor protection usually hold less
cash (see, for example, Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and
Ozkan,2004). If these arguments also hold for Chinese PLCs, then I would be able
to make the following predictions. Firstly, Jensen (1993) argues that small boards
are more efficient than large ones and hence board size (BOARDSIZE1t)of Chinese
PLCs should be positively correlated with cash balances. However, I may also
expect negative effects of board size on cash holdings in a sense that bigger boards
may increase the managerial monitoring and enhance the financial accounting
process, as documented by Anderson et al (2004). Secondly, shares held by the
board (INSIDERSHARE1t) may help align the interests of shareholders and
managers, indicating a negative relationship between INSIDERSHARElt and cash
holdings. Thirdly, since the presence of independent directors (lNDEPENDENT1t)
helps improve corporate governance, I would like to see a negative relationship
between INDEPENDENTItand corporate cash balances in Chinese PLCs. Fourthly,
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it is argued that joint service (DUALITYit)as the CEO and board chairman may
erode the corporate system of checks and balances and compromise independence
between directors and firm managers. In this sense, a positive relationship between
DUALITYitand corporate cash holdings should exist. Fifthly, the relationship
between controlling shareholders' ownership and the alignment of controller
shareholder and minority shareholders' interests can be non-monotonic. To
investigate this relationship, I include TOPONEit (percentage of shares held by the
largest shareholder) as well as its quadratic term TOPONE2it. Sixthly, due to the
nature of non-management blockholders (TOP4_lit) in corporate governance,
either a positive or a negative relationship could be expected between TOP4_lit
and cash holdings. Finally, it should never be neglected that the ultimate controller
is always a determinative factor in corporate governance structure. Based upon the
discussion in the literature section, I expect PLCs whose ultimate controllers are
private owners to hold more cash.
Table 5.1 provides a brief explanation for the dependent variables as well as all
independent variables. Panel A of Table 5.2 presents a detailed distribution of the
sample of Chinese PLCs used in the analysis according to firms' ultimate
controllers, and the balance of the panel is stated in panel B. It is clear from the
table that the state is still in control of more than 80% of all Chinese A-share PLCs,
with SAMBLG being the largest controlling group (36.1% of all observations).
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Table 5. 1 Summary of variables
Variable Name Variable Definition Expected Si2n
CH Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to
total assets
LEV Ratio of total liabilities over total assets +1-
CF Ratio of cash flow to total assets +/-
BANKDEBT Ratio of total bank debt to total debt -
NWC Ratio of net working capital minus cash -
to total assets
CAPEX Ratio of capital expenditures minus +/-
depreciation to total assets
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets of +/-
firms
DIVIDEND Ratio of dividend payments to total +/-
assets
MKTBOOK Ratio of book value of total assets +
minus the book value of equity plus the
market value of equity to book value of
assets
CV Industry sigma +
SAMBCG Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate -
controller is the SAMBCG; otherwise 0
SAMBLG Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate -
controller is an SAMBLG; otherwise 0
SOECG Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate -
controller is an SOECG; otherwise 0
SOELG Dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate -
controller is an SOELG; otherwise 0
BOARDSIZE Size of board (number of directors) +
INSIDERSHARE Percentage of shares held by the
-
executive offices and directors
INDEPENDENT Ratio of the number of independent
directors to the number of directors -
DUALITY Dummy variable coded 1 if board +
chairman is the CEO; otherwise 0
TOPONE The percentage of shares held by the +/-
largest shareholder
TOPONE2 Quadratic term of TOPONE +/-
TOP4 1 Ratio measured by the percentage of +/-
total shares held by the other top four
shareholders over that held by the
largest shareholder.
Notes: Real variables are deflated using the China's annual CPI.
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5.3.2.4. Summary statistics
Table 5.3 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis,
and the Correlation matrix for the variables is included in Table AS.1 in the
Appendix.
Table 5.3 reveals that the mean cash holding ratio in Chinese PLCs is 15.4% and
the median value is 12.94%. These values are much higher than those reported for
UK and US firms. For example, Kim et al (1998) reported that the mean and
median values of the cash holdings for an average US firm were 8.1% and 4.7%,
respectively. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) tested a sample of publicly traded UK firms
from 1984 to 1999 and found that the mean cash holding ratio of those firms was
9.9% and the median ratio was 5.9%. As I have discussed in previous sections,
Chinese PLCs may maintain a higher level of cash holdings compared to firms in
Western countries to avoid costly external financing, as well as to ensure that they
do not have to pass up potential value increasing projects.
As reported in Table 5.3, the mean leverage ratio is 47.07% for my sample firms.
Bank loans constitute a significant portion of total assets in these firms, with a
mean ratio of bank loans to total debt of 44.9% (the median is 48.19%). Obviously
borrowings from banks is an important source of debt financing for Chinese PLCs.
Cash flows, on average, amount to around 6% of total assets for a PLC in China
during any given financial period. Chinese PLCs seldom payout dividends to their
shareholders, as the mean dividend payout ratio is less than 1% of total assets. In
addition, PLCs controlled by private investors, on average, have the best further
growth opportunities (MKTBOOK=1.2506).
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This table also reveals some aspects of the sample firms that are worth noting. It
shows that on average in Chinese PLCs the largest shareholder holds around 43%
of total outstanding shares, while the other top five shareholders in total hold less
than half of the amount of shares held by the largest shareholder. It is also worth
noting that around one third of firms' directors are independent directors, and in my
sample 8.4% of firms have the positions of CEO and chairman of the board being
simultaneously held by the same person. The average shareholdings held by the
executive officers and directors are trivial for Chinese PLCs (the mean is 0.5%).
This is because the majority of Chinese PLCs are ultimately controlled by the state,
and in these state-controlled PLCs most top executives (especially the CEOs) are
not true owners but civil cadres selected by the state through political processes
(Firth et al., 2006b). Moreover, in the state-controlled PLCs, executive ownership
is usually granted by the state as part of the compensation and incentive structures,
and normally amounts to only a minute portion of total outstanding shares.
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5.4. Empirical tests and results
In this section, I will focus on questions of whether the firm-specific and the
corporate governance characteristics influence cash holding levels of firms and of
how firms adjusttheir cash holdings towards the target level once the actual level
of cash reserves deviates from the target level. In doing so, I employ the dynamic
'partial adjustment model of corporate cash holdings motivated by Ozkan and
Ozkan (2004).
5.4.1. Dynamic partial adjustment model ,j
In this -subsection, I intend to go through a brief description of the dynamic partial
adjustment model employed to explore the dynamic adjustment mechanism of
corporate cash holdings in China.
Opler et al (1999) set up the base for the discussion on the target cash-holding level.
The premise of the literature on this discussion is that firms could have various
reasons to hold cash as long as financial markets are not perfect in the sense of
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) argue that the
optimal level of cash holdings is determined by the costs and benefits of holding
cash, as well as firms' idiosyncratic reasons32• The cash holdings level, in this sense,
must be optimal at maximising shareholders' value, which may not always be the
case in the presence of agency problems. Therefore, the actual target level of_
corporate cash reserves is co-determined by the financial as well as ..corporat~
governance characteristics.
32 Dittmar et al (2003) suggest that family-controlled firms may hold cash reserves for tax reasons.
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cHtt=XP+ft+!i.+Eit (1)
The Model (1) is the model determining the target cash level, where the CHtt is the
finn's target level of cash holdings in year t, X is a vector of firms' characteristics
including both frrm-specific and corporate governance characteristics, It is
unobserved panel-level effects and Eitis the disturbance term. I also include time
dummies to remove universal time-related shocks from the errors. Tt is a vectorof _
time dummies. P contains unknown coefficients to be estimated.
Although CHtt is the target level of cash holdings, a finn's actual level (CHit) of
cash holdings does not necessarily always stick to it. From the perspective of the
trade-off theory, the finn will start adjusting its cash holdings towards the target
level, once its actual cash holdings depart from the target cash-holding level.
However, in the presence of market imperfections, the adjustment cannot be
achieved in one go, which leads to a partial adjustment model given by:
(2)
where the target change is determined by CHtt-CHit-l' Considering the expensive
adjustment costs that may be incurred in imperfect capital markets, it is likely that
firms would only adjust a fraction y of the target change in one period. The value
of y lies between zero and one, representing firms' abilities to adjust to their target
cash-holding levels. If y equals one, firms are able to achieve the target change
immediately, which also implies that there are no adjustment costs in the markets.
By contrast, if y equals zero, firms cannot adjust their current cash levels towards
I
target levels, since adjustment costs are extremely high and not affordable.
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Combining Model (1) into Model (2) yields:
(3)
where 0=1- y, 8= YP, -8t= Yit, J1.i=YIi, and Uit= YEit. uit should have the same
properties as Eit, and J1.iandUit are assumed to be independent for each i over all t .
Model (3) is the dynamic partial adjustment model I will use to test the dynamic
adjustment mechanism of cash holdings of Chinese PLCs.
5.4.2. Regression results
To control for the endogenity problem as I have stressed in the introduction section
of this chapter, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) employ the 'First-differenced GMM' to
achieve robust estimations. However, 'First-differenced GMM' has been found to
have poor finite sample properties, particularly when the number of time periods
available is small. Blundell and Bond (1998) found that the 'First-differenced
GMM' may be subject to a downward finite sample bias, according to their
simulation results. This occurs as the autoregressive process becomes too persistent
or as the variance of the fixed effects increases relative to the variance of the
idiosyncratic shock (Bond et al., 200 I). From the empirical experience, the
corporate cash holdings change fairly slowly over time, making a quite persistent
autoregressive process. In this sense, using 'First-differenced GMM' to estimate
cash holdings in an empirical analysis may lead to biased results. To improve
estimation accuracy Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the 'System GMM,33
estimator, which has been proven to have superior finite sample properties.
Moreover, compared with the 'First-differenced GMM' that only uses moment
33 Please refer to the last chapter for a thorough discussion of these problems and a brief
introduction of GMM.
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conditions in first-differenced equations, the 'System GMM' exploits a system of
both the set of moment conditions in first-differences and the additional set of
moment conditions in levels, enabling it to be more efficient in its estimation.
Therefore, in Table 5.4, the reported results mainly rely on the estimates provided
by the 'System GMM' method.". Though OLS and fixed-effects estimators are
actually biased estimators for dynamic panel data, they are able to provide a range
that should contain good estimates of the true lagged dependent variable". To
ensure the results are not influenced by the presence of outliers, all variables except
dummy variables are winsorised at both tails of their distribution. The
winsorisation is at the both 1 and 99 percentile points of the distribution.
Table 5.4 presents the estimation results of the dynamic partial adjustment model of
cash holdings for an unbalanced panel of Chinese PLCs over the period 2001 to
2007. Columns (1) and (2) report estimation results using OLS and Fixed-effects
estimators respectively, and column (3) describes the results provided by the
'System GMM' estimator. The following discussion of the results will be based
around estimates of the 'System GMM' estimator, which is able to convey
estimates robust to the endogenity problem by using instrumental variables. It
34 Bond et al (2001) have provided a test to see whether the system GMM estimator is the
appropriate one. This test consists of comparing the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
obtained when the equation is estimated by OLS, fixed effects and first-difference GMM. As the
OLS estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is upward biased while that
obtained with a fixed effects estimator is downward biased, one would expect the first-difference
GMM coefficient to lie between the two. If however, it lies below or very close to the fixed-effects
estimate then one needs to use the system GMM estimator. Although I have found that in my study
the majority of results produced by both first-difference and system GMM estimators are similar,
the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable given by the first-difference estimator are
sometimes close to or even smaller than the corresponding fixed-effects estimates. Therefore, I
choose to rely on the system GMM estimator.
35 In OLS regression, the lagged dependent variable is positively correlated with the error, biasing
its coefficient estimate upward, while the Fixed-effects estimator is expected to bias it downward
(Roodman, 2006, p.l8).
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should be noted that the validity of instruments depends on the absence of higher-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced disturbance term and is justified by
the overidentifying (Sargan) test. The reported test statistics of serial correlation
(AR (1) and AR (2» and overidentifying (Sargan) test suggest that the set of
instruments in column (3) is verified.
Table 5. 4 Estimation results for the dynamic partial adjustment model
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Fixed System-GMM
CHit_1 0.6443··· 0.2949··· 0.3939···
(23.51) (6.37) (15.91)
CHlt_1 * SOECGit 0.0158 0.0891· 0.1970···
(0.44) (1.79) (5.21)
CHit_1 • SAMBCGit 0.1005·· 0.0767 0.1704···
(2.40) (1.30) (3.89)
CHit_1 • SOELGit 0.0827· -0.0415 0.2792···
(1.79) (-0.46) (5.99)
CHIt_1 • SAMBLGlt 0.0542 0.0384 0.2090···
(1.61) (0.77) (5.18)
BOARDSIZEit -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0012
(-0.87) (-1.60) (-1.25)
INDEPENDENTit -0.0256 -0.1667 -0.1049·
(-0.93) (-1.38) (-1.92)
INSIDERSHARElt 0.0064 0.0152 0.0622··
(0.4~ (0.77) (2.47)
DUALITYlt -0.0014 -0.0065 0.0084·
(-0.41) (-0.92) (1.69)
SIZElt 0.0015 0.0301··· 0.0036
(1.25) (4.791 (1.01)
LEVit -0.0551··· -0.2085"· -0.0819···
(-6.05) (-8.47) (-4.51)
cs, 0.2576··· 0.2079··· 0.2893···
(14.40) (9.61) (11.47)
BANKDEBTlt -0.0222··· -0.0010 0.0087
(-4.14) (-0.09J (0.88)
NWClt -0.0694··· -0.2092··· -0.1115···
(-8.34) (-11.43) (-6.71)
CAPEXit -0.2897··· -0.2191··· -0.2474···
(-15.28) (-8.51) (-9.46)
MKTBOOKlt 0.0050· 0.0087*** 0.0125···
(1.84) (2.71) (4.37)
DIVIDENDlt -0.1965 0.0963 -0.5664··
(-1.18) (0.44) (-2.15)
CVit 0.0642 0.0164 0.1764***
(1.15) (0.28) (3.03)
TOPONEit 0.0300 0.0711 0.0593
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(0.89) (1.03) ( 1.05)
TOPONE2;t -0.0377 -0.0624 -0.0071
(-1.09) (-0.91) (-0.13)
TOP4_lit -0.0004 0.0144·* 0.0264***
(-0.14) (1.98) (4.35)
SOECG1t -0.0207*·* -0.0354*** -0.0276**
(-3.04) (-3.24) (-2.57)
SAMBCG1t -0.0126· -0.0075 -0.0266***
(-1.81) (-0.60) (-2.72)
SOELGit -0.0041 -0.0259*** -0.0272***
(-0.68) (-3.02) (-3.15)
SAMBLGlt -0.0123*· -0.0171*· -0.0261*··
(-2.35) (-2.19) (-3.27)
Cons 0.0386 -0.4839*·· 0.0640
(1.28) (-3.69) (0.71)
Obs 4273 4273 4273
R2 0.6678 0.3511
AR(I) 0.0000
AR(2) 0.8610
Sargan 0.2792
Notes: (1) Dependent vanable 1S CHit; (2) Time-effects are mcluded m all columns;(3) Industnal
and regional effects are controlled in columns (I) and (3); (4)T-statistics are reported in brackets in
columns (1) and (2), while Z-statistics are reported in brackets in column (3); (5) Appropriate
instrument sets are selected and justified using Sargan and serial correlation tests for the 'System-
GMM' estimator; (6)Instruments for the 'system-GMM' estimator are CHt lagged t-2 only, and all
other independent variables lagged t-2 to t-5 that are used as instruments in the first-differenced
equations, with lagged first-differences of ail independent variables as instruments in level equations;
(7)· P-valu~IO%, • • P-value$5% and • • * P-value::::I%.
Table 5. 5 Instruments for the 'System-GMM' estimator
Instruments for the first-differenced Instruments for the level equations
equations
CHt lagged t-2 only, and all other lagged first-differences of all
independent variables lagged t-2 to t-5 independent variables
Notes: Appropnate instrument sets are selected and Justified usmg Sargan and senal correlation tests
for the 'System-GMM' estimator and the exogenous variables use themselves as instruments
Table 5.4 shows that in all columns the coefficients of the lagged cash are positive
and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and the coefficient estimate of
the lagged cash of 'System GMM', as expected, falls between values of the lagged
cash provided by the OLS and the fixed-effects models. Within the framework of
the dynamic partial adjustment model of cash holdings, this is evidence for the
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existence of target levels of cash holdings. For instance, in column (3) the
coefficient estimate is 0.3939, which means the adjustment speed is 0.6061=1-
0.3939 (y=I-8) for Chinese PLCs whose ultimate controllers are private owners.
The results could be seen as evidence that target cash levels exist for Chinese PLCs,
and it is impossible for them to instantaneously reach the target cash level. One
possible explanation for delays in the adjustment process is the existence of
transaction and other adjustment costs in the capital markets. It might be interesting
to investigate whether PLCs controlled by different ultimate controllers possess
heterogeneity in the adjustment speed. To do so, interaction terms between the
lagged cash and dummy variables representing different controlling groups are
therefore included in the model. The positive and significant coefficient estimates
of four interaction terms suggest that on average PLCs with private owners have
the swiftest adjustment speed.
The estimated coefficient of cash flows on cash holdings is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level in all columns. The positive and significant coefficient of
cash flow is in line with the financing hierarchy theory that firms with higher cash
flows prefer to hold larger amounts of cash due to their preference for internal over
external finance. Firms with high cash flows can repay debt and accumulate cash.
The estimated coefficient is 0.2893 in column (3), which means that on average,
when a firm's operational cash flow increases by 0.01, its cash holdings will
correspondingly increase by around 0.003. It is worth noting that firms tend to
retain a significantly large fraction of their operational cash flows in the form of
cash and cash equivalents within the firm. It seems that Chinese PLCs have great
incentives to generate cash reserves out of corporate cash flows.
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The trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between cash holdings and
borrowings from banks, implying that firms can use bank loans as an effective
substitute for their cash reserves. More specifically, bank debt is more effective
than public debt in dealing with problems arising out of agency problems and
asymmetric information, thus lowering the cost of external financing (see, for
example, Diamond, 1984; Berlin and Loeys, 1988). Furthermore, this finding is
also in line with the argument that an announcement of a bank's issuing or
renewing a loan to a firm can provide positive signals about the borrowing firms'
credit worthiness, and the existence of a bank relationship could enable firms to
have easier access to external funds (James, 1987), hence a negative relationship
between bank debt and corporate cash holding should be expected for Chinese
PLCs. However, according to Table 5.4, there is no strong evidence supporting the
idea that bank debt financing has effects on corporate cash holdings, as the
coefficient estimate of bank debt is insignificant at all conventional levels.
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of CAPEX (ratio of capital
expenditures minus depreciation to total assets) in all columns contradicts the
trade-off theory but supports the financing hierarchy theory, which suggests that
firms have a greater preference for internal over external finance in their financing
policies in the sense that if new investment projects come up, firms have the
tendency to finance these projects primarily with their accumulated cash and cash
equivalents. The estimated coefficient of CAPEX in column (3) is -0.2474 and this
is statistically significant at the 1% level. According to Table 5.3, the mean and
standard deviation for CAPEX are 0.0688 and 0.0637, respectively. If a PLC
increases its CAPEX by one-standard-deviation then its cash holdings (CH) will
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decrease by approximately 0.0158. Given that the mean of cash holdings is 0.1539,
a one-standard-deviation increase in CAPEX leads to a decline of around 10% in
the PLC's cash holdings.
The estimated coefficient of leverage is significant and negative at the I% level in
column (3), which is in favour of the financing hierarchy theory. According to the
financing hierarchy theory, it is argued that cash holdings are mechanically
adjusted by firms' various investment and financing decisions. That is, a firm can
increase its cash holdings by issuing new debt in order to finance current or future
projects, which would increase its leverage ratio. When the firm's retained earnings
exceed investment needs, it will repay debt and thus accumulate cash reserves.
Moreover, the significant and negative coefficient of leverage ratio suggests that
the leverage can be seen as a signal showing the ability of a firm to issue new debt,
which would in tum lead to a negative relationship between the firm's leverage and
cash holdings.
The estimated coefficient of MKTBOOK in column (3) is 0.0125, and this is
statistically significant at the I% level. The results suggest that Chinese PLCs with
more growth opportunities hold more cash, as predicted by both the trade-off and
the financing hierarchy theories discussed in section 5.2. These two theories both
suggest that when external financing is non-existent or prohibitively expensive,
firms with strong growth opportunities, as represented by the market to book ratio,
tend to hold more cash to guarantee their financing, thereby avoiding having to
forgo valuable projects.
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The estimated coefficient of CV is 0.1764, and this is statistically significant at the
1% level (z-statistic=3.03). As predicted by the trade-off theory, the results reported
in Table 5.4 suggest that firms with more cash flow uncertainty are more
incentivised to keep higher levels of cash reserves in their daily operations.
Moreover, it is often argued that it is much easier for dividend-paying firms to raise
funds by simply cutting their dividend payments to shareholders. In this sense, a
negative link between dividend payments and cash holding should be expected.
The results of Table 5.4 provide empirical evidence for this argument. In addition,
according to the trade-off theory, non-cash liquid assets are an immediate substitute
for cash. It is therefore reasonable to assume that firms with sufficient liquid assets
can easily convert their non-cash liquid assets into cash holdings at low costs when
they are short of cash reserves, hence a negative relationship between these two
would be expected. According to Table 5.4, the coefficient of non-cash liquid assets
(NWC) is -0.1115 with its z-statistic being -6.71. The standard deviation ofNWC is
0.1731 according to Table 5.3, hence a one-standard-deviation decrease in non-cash
liquid assets yields an increase of 0.0193 in cash holdings. The mean value of cash
holdings is 0.1539, so a one-standard-deviation decrease in non-cash liquid assets
yields a 12.5% increase in cash holdings.
As for corporate governance mechanisms, there are several interesting findings that
are worth noting. Firstly, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of
INSIDERSHARE contradicts my prediction that insider ownership may help align
the interests of insiders and outsiders, thereby lowering corporate cash holdings.
Agency theory does not expect such a positive relationship, and this positive
relationship might be due to the fact that privately-controlled PLCs that usually
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have higher levels of insider ownership are found to maintain larger cash balances,
while PLCs controlled by state entities have trivial insider ownership and retain
significantly less cash than the privately-controlled ones. However, I cannot
directly test for it. This would require further investigation which is beyond the
scope of the current study. Secondly, Faccio et al (2001) suggest that the role of
non-management blockholders depends on investor protection, and in countries
with weak investor protection blockholders may collude with the controlling
shareholder to expropriate minority shareholders. For Chinese PLCs, it appears that
my findings are supportive of Faccio et al's (2001) argument. Last but not least, my
findings show that the overall explanatory power of corporate governance
characteristics over cash holding decisions is not strong. Rather, the identities of
the ultimate controllers of PLCs do seem to play an important role in cash holding
decisions. Table 5.4 and Table 5.6 suggest that PLCs controlled by state entities
hold significantly less cash than their private counterparts, while there is no
consistent difference in cash holding policy among state-owners. For instance,
PLCs with SAMBCG as the ultimate controller on average hold 2.66% lower cash
holdings than private owners, when all other factors are equal. Considering that the
mean cash holdings for Chinese PLCs is about 15.4%, it is also economically
significant. Based upon the results given in column (3), both short-run and long-run
differences in cash holdings among the five controlling groups of Chinese PLCs are
depicted in Table 5.6.
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Table 5. 6 Test of equality in coefficients (Wald statistlcs")
Short-run Long-run
SAMBLG VS.SOECG 0.l4 0.01
SAMBLG VS. SAMBCG 0.22 0.19
SAMBLG VS. SOELG 1.35 0.l8
SAMBLG VS. Private 10.69*** 7.98***
SOECG VS. SAMBCG 0.03 0.26
SOECG VS.SOELG 0.02 0.01
SOECG VS. Private 6.61** 4.84**
SAMBCG VS.SOELG 0.01 0.00
SAMBCG VS. Private 7.38*** 4.83**
SOELG VS. Private 9.90*** 7.66***
Notes: * P-valu~lO%. ** P-valu~S%. and .** P-valu~l%.
Based upon the results given in Table 5.4, Table 5.6 reports the test statistics of
both short-run and long-run differences in cash holdings among five controlling
groups of Chinese PLCs. The long-run coefficients are extracted from the
corresponding short-run coefficients in the AR (1) model. In order to illustrate how
it can be realised, I use a simple AR (1) model-s- Yit=aYtt-l+~Xit +Uit, without loss
of generality. In such an AR (1) model, the lagged dependent variable on the right
hand side can expand out in the way that Yit-l =aYtt-Z+PXit-l +Uit-l, Yit-2=aytt-1
+PXit-2 +Uit-2' ...• ... , Yit-T=aytt-T-1+~Xit-T +Uit-T' As the model expands out, the
sum of coefficients in front of all xs will be ~+ a' + a2p +alp + ...• .. +eTp, and it will
reach its limit--_L, as T~ 00. Compared with the short-run coefficient p, .L is the1-a 1__
long-run coefficient. For example, the long-run coefficient for SOECG in column
36 To test a set of linear or nonlinear hypothesis--Ho: R (8) =q. after fitting a model, I use the Wald
test statistics: W={R (')-q} '(GVG')-1 {R (')-q}, which under Ho. in large samples, has a Cht-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of equations in R (')-q =0, i.e. the
number of restrictions .• is theJ »k estimated coefficient vector. V is the k xk estimated asymptotic
covariance matrix, and V=Est.Asy.Var[i). G is the derivative matrix of R(') with respect to'. R is
a function returning ajxJ vector.
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(3) in Table 5.4 can be calculated as -0.0276 -0.6185. Based on the results
1-(0.3939+0.1970)
in Table 5.6,· it is interesting to find that privately-controlled PLCs hold
significantly more cash holdings than those controlled by state owners both in the
short-run and in the long-run. Moreover, it seems that there is no significant
difference in the level of cash holdings among state controlled PLCs.
In addition, some tests have been conducted in order to examine whether the
differences in the coefficients associated with the lagged dependent variable across
firms controlled by different agents are statistically significant. The test statistics
are wald-statistics, and the test statistics for four interaction terms are 25.13, 35.86,
27.14, and 26.82, which are all statistically significant at the 1% level. However,
they are not found to be significantly different from each other. The test results
suggest that even though all PLCs controlled by the state have slower adjustment
speeds than those controlled by private owners, PLCs controlled by different state
agents are found to have similar adjustment speeds.
5.4.3. Robustness check
To check whether my results are robust to alternate measures of some key variables,
a series of robustness tests have been conducted, and corresponding results are
reported in Table A5.2 in the Appendix. In order to check whether the results given
in Table 5.4 are consistent for alternative measures of a firm's size and leverage
ratio, I calculate a firm's size as number of employees and leverage ratio as a firm's
total liability over total assets minus total liability. The results are reported in
columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table A5.2. Some additional robustness checks have
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been conducted by using different measures of dependent variables. Columns (4),
(5) and (6) of Table A5.2 report results by estimating regression models using cash
to total assets net of cash ratio as the dependent variable. Also, total assets in the
denominators of variables are calculated as assets net of cash in producing results
reported in columns (4), (5) and (6). Furthermore, to see whether my results are
robust to using cash to sales ratio as the dependent variable, corresponding
estimation results are provided in columns (7), (8) and (9) of Table A5.2. The
results of Table A5.2 suggest that my main conclusion holds when alternate
measures of dependent and independent variables are adopted.
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5.5. Conclusion
This chapter has empirically investigated the corporate cash holdings for a sample
of Chinese PLCs over the period 2001 to 2007. Both the trade-off theory and the
financing hierarchy theory are found to have some explanatory power over
corporate cash holdings of Chinese PLCs. Also, the findings of this chapter provide
several interesting features that are worth noting.
Firstly, my results indicate that there exists a target cash holding level for Chinese
PLCs, and this target level could vary across PLCs with different ultimate
controllers. It is interesting to discover that PLCs whose ultimate controllers are
private owners hold significantly more cash holdings than state owners both in the
short-run and in the long-run, while there is no significant difference in the level of
cash holdings among state controllers. This finding is consistent with two possible
explanations. On one hand, it might be evidence revealing that private owners in
China may have incentives to expropriate minority shareholders by increasing the
amounts of liquid assets under their control that can be ,used to pursue their own
benefits. On the other hand, it might be due to the possibility, as suggested by
Dittmar et al (2003), that firms in countries with less developed capital markets
may only accumulate cash as a buffer against future cash shortfalls. As discussed
above, compared with state-controlled PLCs that have easier access to external
funds, private PLCs in China are considered to be more financially constrained. In
order not to fall into the state of cash shortage that would force firms to forgo good
investment opportunities, private PLCs have a greater tendency to keep high
liquidity levels, which could also help lower their financial risks.
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Secondly, I found evidence supporting the dynamic cash-holding partial adjustment
model for Chinese PLCs. The results are consistent with the view that due to the
high adjustment costs, Chinese PLCs cannot instantaneously adjust towards the
target cash level. Moreover, it is interesting to note that among all Chinese PLCs,
PLCs with private controllers are found to have the fastest adjustment speed. The
finding regarding the heterogeneity in the adjustment speed could be seen as
evidence that PLCs with private owners in China might have more difficulties in
accessing external finance, and are thus more cautious about their cash-holding
positions. In order to avoid falling into embarrassing situations (like cash shortage)
that could potentially increase their financial risks, they have a greater tendency to
swiftly adjust their cash holdings towards the target level by all possible means.
Another possible explanation for this finding might be simply that privately-
controlled PLCs in China are more operationally efficient than their state-
controlled rivals.
Additionally, the results indicate that PLCs with higher cash flows and more cash
flow uncertainty hold more cash than other PLCs. In stark contrast, PLCs with
more non-cash liquid assets and higher leverage ratios are found to retain less cash
reserves. Moreover, dividend-paying PLCs, if necessary, can quickly build up their
cash holdings by cutting their dividend payments. My results support this argument.
Finally, my analysis also reveals that growth opportunities of Chinese PLCs exert
positive impacts on the cash holdings, while their capital expenditures do exactly
the opposite.
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CHAPTER SIX
TOP EXECUTIVE TURNOVER AND EXIT
TYPES OF CHINESE PUBLICLY LISTED
COMPANIES
6.1. Introduction
The relationship between top executive turnover and corporate performance has
been the focus of a large and ever growing body of literature, as research in this
area could provide a crucial measure of the effectiveness of different corporate
governance mechanisms with which a firm solves agency problems (Kato and
Long, 2006). Despite the vast literature focused mostly on US and UK markets, the
literature on Chinese listed firms is small but burgeoning. More importantly, China
would make an ideal case for the study of executive turnover for at least two
reasons. First, given the lack of an effective market for corporate control in China,
the internal corporate governance mechanism that determines executive turnover is
particularly important. Second, agency problems (including both the 'classic'
agency conflicts and the 'new' agency conflicts) are acute in China due to vaguely
defined property rights and weak investor protection.
China has undergone a large amount of economic reform in the past three decades.
This reform has privatised and corporatised a large number of former state-owned
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enterprises (SOEs). and many of these enterprises or their profitable operating units
have then been listed on China's two stock exchanges. Going public, on paper,
allows the publicly listed companies (PLCs) in China to attach top priority to the
goal of profit-maximisation. To assist this goal, China's Company Law enacted in
1994 (and recently amended in 2006) requires Chinese PLCs to adopt a formal
governance structure that is actually based on Western-style corporate management
and governance practices combined with Chinese characteristics (Chen et al., 2006).
The Company Law (1994) is China's first company law to provide a
comprehensive guideline for how limited companies and public limited companies
should operate within the boundary of the People's Republic of China. It covers
almost every aspect of corporate issues. such as corporate constitution. capital
requirement. shareholders' meetings. share transfer and trading. bankruptcy. merger
and acquisition, corporate accounting and financial transparency, and corporate
bond. For example, according to the Company Law of 1994, the number of
shareholders of a limited company should be between two and 50, the minimum
capital requirement is 0.3 million RMB if the limited company is a retail company,
and its board of directors should consist of three members at minimum and 13
members at maximum.
In 1999 China's first Securities Law was enacted to regulate various aspects of
securities transactions and other dealings in China. Also, the Securities Law (1999)
grants the CSRC the primary power to regulate markets. In accordance with the
principles of the Company Law (1994), the Securities Law (1999) and other
relevant laws and regulations, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies (CCGLC) in China, authorised and published by the Chinese Securities
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Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State Economic and Trade Commission
(SETC) in 2002, expands on the Company Law of 1994 by setting forth in great
detail a set of basic principles for corporate governance of Chinese PLCs, such as
basic rules for shareholders and shareholders' meetings, behaviour rules for
controlling shareholders, election procedures for directors, duties and composition
of the board of directors, and incentive and disciplinary system for management.
The CCGLC is applicable to all PLCs in China and plays an important role in
setting up the basic corporate governance system at Chinese PLCs, protecting
investors' interests and providing basic behaviour rules and moral standards for
directors, managers and other senior management members of PLCs. The CSRC
requires all Chinese PLCs to act in the spirit of the CCGLC to improve their
corporate governance practices.
According to agency theory, corporate governance mainly focuses on addressing
two types of agency problems. The first type is the 'classic' agency problem, which
refers to the conflicts arising out of the diverging interests between managers and
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b).
The other is the 'new' agency problem, which is in relation to the discrepancies of
interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta et
al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, b). In order to deal with these two types of agency
problems, existing literature on corporate governance has suggested a variety of
corporate governance mechanisms (both internal and external mechanisms") that
can be used to mitigate those agency conflicts. The internal mechanisms include
37 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a theoretical review.
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those like the executive compensation contracts, the board of directors and the
ownership structure, while the external mechanisms include those like the market
for corporate control and legal protection. Arguably, whether these corporate
governance mechanisms can work effectively and efficiently could depend on a
number of issues, such as the historical development, legal concerns, and the
institutional characteristics of the country in which a company is domiciled (Firth
et al., 2006a). Measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance
systems is always a matter of complexity as it involves all possible aspects of a
firm, and each element of the corporate governance system is difficult to quantify.
Instead of providing a very detailed picture of corporate governance systems for
their sample firms, the majority of previous studies on corporate governance have
tended to focus on a specific approach or angle through which they determine the
quality of corporate governance at these firms. One approach 38 to examine top
executive performance-turnover sensitivities, among others, is arguably an
important and informative method of measuring the quality of corporate
governance systems. This approach is the one I use in this chapter, and it is
logically based on the premise that a firm with good corporate governance should
hold top management accountable for its business operations, and oust it if a firm's
performance is unsatisfactory.
Most previous research on top executive turnover has been conducted in Western
countries whose capital markets are mature and usually have good legal protection
for investors. Existing studies on corporate governance have suggested that a
380ther approaches include those focused on things such as corporate performance, capital structure,
cash holdings and accounting disclosure, etc.
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country's political and regulatory environments can significantly influence firms'
corporate governance systems (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999,
2000b, 2002b; Volpin, 2002; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar et al., 2003). In this
sense, the results of top executive performance-turnover drawn from Western
economies, like the UK and other European countries, may not hold in China for
two reasons. On the one hand, China's immature capital markets are unable to offer
investors sound legal protection if judged by Western standards (Firth et al., 2006a).
On the other hand, Fan et al (2007) argue that in China the majority of firms' shares
are concentrated and the state is often the ultimate controller, which would
significantly affect the role of the board of directors in monitoring and disciplining
top executives.
To bridge the academic gap, recent years have seen a small but ever growing body
of literature on the top executive performance-turnover relationship in the Chinese
context. For example, Kato and Long (2006) test a sample of Chinese PLCs from
1998 to 2002. They argue that CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related
to firm performance. Chi and Wang (2009) explore a dataset of Chinese PLCs, and
find evidence that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is weaker in the
state-controlled PLCs than in non-state ones. Shen and Lin (2009) use a large
sample of PLCs in China for the period 1999 to 2002, and they show that firm
profitability and state ownership are inversely related to top management turnover
only when firm profitability falls below the target level.
Though those recent studies have greatly improved our understanding with respect
to the top executive performance-turnover relationship at Chinese firms, they
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actually have flaws of their own and results drawn by them could be rather
misleading. It is worth noting that the official classification scheme of shares fails
to identify the ultimate controller of Chinese PLCs, as the legal person shares
which are deemed to be held by state-owned commercial firms can actually be
owned by either private or state entities. Earlier studies using official classification
of shares to identify the ultimate controller are therefore expected to render invalid
and misleading conclusions. For example, Firth et al (2006a) examine the
relationship between firm performance, corporate ownership and top management
turnover in China, based on the data of the replacement of top management over a
five-year period from 1998 to 2002. Applying multinomial logistic techniques to
analyse the sample, they find that top management turnover is related to a firm's
profitability rather than its stock returns. Moreover, turnover-performance
sensitivity is found to be higher in firms where legal entities are major shareholders
than in those controlled by the state. Their findings emphasise the monitoring and
disciplining role of legal entities in enhancing the turnover-performance sensitivity
at Chinese PLCs. However, it should be noted that legal-person shares and tradable
shares can be held by a range of heterogeneous entities, ranging from wholly state-
owned enterprises to state agencies to private firms.
Some other existing studies see Chinese PLCs as only being controlled by two
groups (the state and the private sector) and neglect the fact that the state-controlled
PLCs in China are, in reality, controlled by different state entities with different
motivations and incentive structures Foe example, Based on a sample comprising
all Chinese non-financial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges from 1995 to 2001, Chi and Wang (2009) examine the relationship
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between CEO turnover and the corporate performance of Chinese listed companies.
They find a negative relationship between the level of pre-turnover profitability and
CEO turnover, particularly when firms are incurring losses rather than making
profits. In addition, no such relationship is found in state-controlled listed
companies. By examining a sample of 638 Chinese listed companies during 1999
to 2002, Kato and Long (2006) find that CEO turnover is more sensitive to
corporate performance in privately-controlled companies than in those controlled
by the state. Moreover, there is a positive link between ownership concentration
and performance-turnover sensitivity in listed companies where the largest owner is
a private investor. From the perspective of agency theory, it is imperative to
correctly identify both the principal and the agent, in order to ideally solve
principal-agent conflicts.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 provides an
overview of theoretical issues relevant to top executive turnover in China. Section
6.3 describes the dataset and the variable constructions. Section 6.4 presents the
results. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
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6.2. Background, corporate governance and top executive turnover
Previous studies have suggested a variety of factors that could potentially affect the
sensitivities of top executive turnover to firm performance, such as board structure
(see, for example, Weisbach, 1988; Fizel and Louie, 1990; Huson et al., 2001;
Laux,2008), top executives' personal characteristics (see, for example, Finkelsteina
and D'Aveni, 1994; Fan et al., 2007), top executives' shareholdings (e.g. Dahya et
al., 2002; Goyal and Park, 2002), ownership structure (see, for example, Denis et
al., 1997; Dahya et al., 1998; Chi and Wang, 2009; Shen and Lin, 2009) and legal
protection (see, for example, Volpin, 2002; Defond and Hung, 2004), etc. Given the
unique institutional characteristics of Chinese capital markets, it seems impossible
for Chinese PLCs to rely on external corporate governance mechanisms in
disciplining their top executives. The unique institutional characteristics are mainly
referred to as the status quo in China, that apart from the weak investor protection
in Chinese capital markets, the market for corporate control is actually missing and
the managerial labour market is currently immature. Therefore, in contrast to
Western economies, Chinese firms' internal corporate governance mechanisms take
a more important role in monitoring and disciplining top executives.
This section is intended to briefly discuss related corporate governance issues, as
well as provide some background information with respect to top executive
turnover at Chinese PLCs.
6.2.1. Performance and top executive turnover
From the perspective of agency theory, the separation of ownership and
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management could cause severe performance inefficiency, which has been
extensively documented by prior corporate governance studies (see, for example,
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b). In light of
this problem, aligning the interests of the managers with those of shareholders
seems to be a quick and effective solution. To this end, a variety of corporate
governance mechanisms have been devised to ensure that managers act in the best
interests of shareholders. Moreover, from the shareholders' perspective, putting
firms in the most capable hands could be equally important, as managers with
excellent capabilities are more capable of maximising firm efficiency and
profitability. However, it might be quite difficult, if not impossible, and time
consuming for shareholders to learn about the managers' ability (Gregory-Smith et
al., 2009). Therefore, when it comes to examining whether the management is loyal
to shareholders and possesses the capacity to maximise shareholders' wealth, there
are no direct quantitative measures. Nevertheless, shareholders can use accounting
based and/or market based performance as proxy measures, as the management
should be held accountable for a firm's operation performance and rewarded or
punished accordingly (Firth et al., 2006a).
There is a perception in existing corporate governance literature that good
corporate governance practices should come with inverse sensitivities of
performance and top executive turnover, which indicates that a healthy corporate
governance system should be effective at disciplining under-performing top
executives, and removing them if necessary in extreme cases. An interesting
finding in the literature is that such a negative relationship can be found across
different corporate governance regimes. Gregory-Smith et al (2009) model the
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tenure and exit of CEOs from the UK FTSE 350 companies for the period 1996 to
2005, and find the hazard rate of forced departure of CEOs increases with lower
firm performance, as measured by total shareholder return. Huson et al (2001),
using a sample of US companies during the 1971 to 1994 period, report on the
negative relationship between the likelihood of CEO turnover and firm
performance. Similar empirical results have been obtained by prior studies focused
on German and Japanese firms (see, for example, Kaplan, 1994; Abe, 1997; Leker
and Salomo, 2000). In China, recent studies also report that for Chinese
corporations, unsatisfactory corporate performance often precedes top management
turnover (see, for example, Kato and Long, 2006; Firth et al., 2006a; Chi and Wang,
2009; Shen and Lin, 2009; Liao et al., 2009). All of these empirical studies are
supportive of agency theory, which argues that it might be imperative to increase
the accountability of the management for their firms' performance, and the
necessary replacement of incumbent managers could be an effective solution to the
agency conflicts between shareholders and the management.
6.2.2. China's economic reform, and the appointment and dismissal of top
executive
China's economic reform that began in 1978, aimed at improving SOEs' corporate
performance, has deeply changed the corporate governance structure of Chinese
SOEs. Central to the economic reform is to introduce Western corporate
governance systems/ideas into China, leading to a large wave of privatisation of
former Chinese SOEs (Fan et al., 2007). It is worth noting that the privatisation in
China is actually partial privatisation, and the state is still the controlling
shareholder inmany privatised firms. In this sense, the post-1978 economic reform
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has not strongly challenged the dominant status of the state in the whole economy,
but in reality represents a great opportunity for all firms in China to learn Western
business experience and mimic corporate governance structures of their Western
counterparts. As a result of the economic reform, the modem enterprise system has
started to appear and new Western-style corporate governance structures have been
widely adopted in almost all commercial sectors.
As for the corporate governance structure, All Chinese PLCs, regardless of
differences in their ownership structures, have similar frameworks for the corporate
governance structure, which are largely shaped by the same set of laws and
regulations, such as the Company Law (1994), the Securities Law (1999) and the
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (CCGLC, 2002). (Chi and
Wang, 2009). The general framework of the corporate governance structure of
Chinese PLCs consists of the controlling shareholder, the board of directors, the
shareholders' meeting and the management. In the case of appointing new top
executives, the corporate governance structure of Chinese PLCs needs to act in the
following manner in order to complete the whole process. According to the
CCGLe (2002), in strict compliance with the terms and procedures provided for by
relevant laws and regulations, the controlling shareholder of a listed company
should take initiatives in selecting and nominating the appropriate candidates for
the top executive to the board of directors. Then, the board of directors, normally
made up of 5 to 19 members, should be responsible for formally nominating its
choices to the shareholders' meeting, which has the final say on the matter. Such a
process is also applicable to all other relevant issues, such as the reappointment,
dismissal and remuneration of the top executive. In addition, the CCGLC (2002)
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stipulates that the controlling shareholder should be strictly prohibited from
appointing or dismissing the top executive by circumventing the shareholders'
meeting or the board of directors. However, it is highly likely that the controlling
shareholder of a listed company, by wielding its dominant controlling power, can
still easily affect the resolutions on the managerial personnel made by the
shareholders' meeting or the board of directors.
6.2.3. Ownership structure and top executive turnover
A key corporate governance mechanism that could affect the likelihood of a change
in top executive rests on the ownership structure. Denis et 0/ (1997) suggest that
various attributes of a firm's ownership structure could have an important impact
on internal monitoring efforts, which would in turn affect the incidence of top
executive turnover. Compared with counterparts in Western countries, Chinese
PLCs often have a concentrated ownership and most of them have a dominant
shareholder whose shareholding could far exceed that of any other non-
management large shareholders (Hovey and Naughton, 2007). Moreover, a
majority of PLCs were profitable carve-outs of SOEs before floating on China's
two stock exchanges, and the state often retains a substantial shareholding in these
firms even after listing. Due to the large involvement of the Chinese government in
the economic reform process, more than 80% of PLCs are actually ultimately
controlled by the state. Fan et 0/ (2007) suggest that in contrast to the privately
controlled Chinese PLCs, PLCs controlled by different state entities may have both
profit and non-profit objectives. The private controllers may put pressure on
managers of PLCs to increase efficiency and maximise profits and simply judge
them from firms' accounting and/or market performance, while the state entities are
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supposed to have certain non-profit objectives and the success in meeting these
objectives could at least partially determine the overall assessment of the top
management.
Liao et al (2009) claim that the non-profit objectives are policy burdens imposed
on the state-controlled PLCs that mainly arise from three sources: retirement and
other welfare costs, redundant workers and the persistence of price distortions.
These policy burdens may hold managers of the state-controlled PLCs less
accountable for finn performance measures, since the information asymmetry
between the management and the state would make it very easy for the
management to use policy burdens as the excuse for poor corporate performance
(Liao et al., 2009). Also, such information asymmetry makes it rather difficult for
the state as the owner to differentiate operational losses from policy-induced losses,
which may obscure the true level of agency conflicts between shareholders and the
management. It is worth noting that if there are policy-imposed objectives for the
state-controlled PLCs, then a weakened relationship between finn performance and
top management turnover can be expected. Moreover, unlike private owners whose
property rights are well defined and clear-cut, the state, as the owner of Chinese
PLCs, is actually the representative of state assets, which theoretically belong to all
Chinese citizens. In this sense, the ownership of state assets is highly diffused and
in the control of government bureaucrats. Even though some government
bureaucrats might be interested in profit-maximisation, due to the diffused
ownership, the state's incentive to motivate or discipline managers should always
be questioned (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Thus, according to this perspective,
there should be weaker performance-turnover sensitivities for the state-controlled
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PLCs.
Besides the potential differences in the performance-turnover sensitivities between
the state and the private owners of Chinese PLCs, the sensitivities may also differ
across various subtypes of state ownership. By tracing up the control chain, I divide
Chinese PLCs into five groups according to the type of the ultimate controller.
They are the state asset management bureau at the central level (SAMBCG), state
asset management bureaus at the local level (SAMBLG), SOEs affiliated to the
central government (SOECG), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELG)
and private investors. Although the first four groups are all state entities, controlled
and supervised by either the central government or local governments, their diverse
motivations and incentive structures may probably make them act differently on
decisions with respect to the appointment and dismissal of the top management.
In terms of the incentive to monitor and discipline the top management, it could be
argued that PLCs controlled by SOEs (hereafter, PLCSOEs), including both
SOECGs and SOELGs, may have stronger performance-turnover sensitivities of
the top executive than those controlled by SAMBs (hereafter, PLCSAMBs),
including the SAMBCG and SAMBLGs, for the following two reasons. Firstly,
compared with PLCSAMBs, PLCSOEs have enjoyed more autonomous power in
deciding their choices of the top management. China's post-1978 economic reform
has provided managers of SOEs with the greatest freedom ever to operate firms
with profit-maximisation as the top priority. Though the extent to which SOEs are
subject to government control remains substantial, the direct involvement or
intervention from the state has been greatly minimised, which would in tum give
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managers of SOEs more freedom in making the personnel decisions of parent firms
as well as those of subordinate listed companies. Unlike PLCSAMBs, whose
controlling shareholders are not firms but state bureaus bearing no risk of the
consequence of poor performance of their supervised PLCs, PLCSOEs need to
consolidate the profit in their parent SOEs' financial reports and thus managers are
carefully selected based on their business acumen and receive close monitoring
from the controlling shareholders. In stark contrast, in reality, the Party
Organisation Department (POD) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
Chinese Communist Party Committee (CCPC) control the key personnel decisions
at the PLCSAMBs, while SAMBs, as the controlling shareholders, are merely
'order takers' after the decisions are made. Moreover, many top executives
appointed to the PLCSAMBs are not professional managers but government
bureaucrats who are selected based more on political considerations than on
business considerations". These bureaucrats are civil cadres on the state payroll
whose remuneration and rewards are not paid based on corporate performance only.
In reality, as agents of the state, they may probably use firms' resources to fulfill
social and political objectives (policy burdens), which would often decrease firms'
profit. SAMBs, on the other hand, need to use a complicated assessment package
when evaluating the performance of these bureaucrats, and such a package should
reflect the evaluation of the completion of both firms' financial and policy goals.
Secondly, SAMBs and SOEs, as owners of PLCs, also differ on how closely they
monitor the daily operation of the PLCs they control. SAMBs usually oversee
39 For example, the incumbent CEO of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC: SH600028),
Mr Jiemin Jiang, was the vice-governor of Qinghai province from 2000 to 2003.
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many listed as well as unlisted companies, while it is rare that SOEs are delegated
to control a number of companies. In this sense, SOEs could be more capable of
closely monitoring the daily operation of their controlled PLCs, which would
effectively decrease information asymmetry. In addition, PLCSOEs are often the
listed carve-outs of SOEs, and SOEs have the expertise to effectively monitor and
correctly evaluate the top executives of PLCSOEs. In contrast, Chen et al (2009)
point out that the SAMBs' officials typically lack the relevant business knowledge
and industry experience to effectively monitor managers of PLCSAMBs, which
may lead to a deeper level of information asymmetry between SAMBs and
PLCSAMBs. The increased information asymmetry can make it much easier for
mangers of PLCSAMBs to use policy burdens as an excuse to avoid the
punishment for financial losses, as it is rather difficult for SAMB officials to
differentiate between the losses caused by policy burdens and the losses caused by
managerial discretion, due to the information asymmetry (Liao et al., 2009).
Empirical studies have shown that distinctions should be made among PLCs
controlled by the SAMBCG or SOECGs (hereafter, PLCCGs) and PLCs controlled
by SAMBLGs or SOELGs (hereafter, PLCLGs) (see, for example, Chen et al.,
2009; Liao et al., 2009). Arguably, such distinctions can make PLCCGs and
PLCLGs differ in the top executive performance-turnover sensitivities and I would
expect a stronger link for PLCCGs for the following two reasons. Firstly, PLCCGs
and PLCLGs differ in the top executive performance-turnover sensitivities in the
extent of the monitoring to which they are subject. In comparison with PLCLGs,
PLCCGs are usually the largest PLCs in China or PLCs in strategic industries, and
thus are subject to much more strict monitoring from their controlling shareholders,
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a number of government ministries40 and the public. According to agency theories,
strict monitoring can effectively minimise agency problems caused by the
information asymmetry in the sense that losses incurred by managerial discretion
can be more easily spotted and the under-performing top executives might then get
removed from both inside and outside firms, Secondly, PLCCGs and PLCLGs
could also differ in their top executive performance-turnover sensitivities in the
extent of the policy burdens to which they are subject. Nowadays, Chinese PLCs
typically do not have to bear as many policy burdens as SOEs did before the
economic reform. However, policy burdens do still exist implicitly for all state-
owned PLCs, and, in reality, PLCLGs typically bear more policy burdens than
PLCCGs, particularly in hiring redundant workers and taking account of other
social concerns under pressure from local governments in that "the State considers
employment and social stability as important measures of local governments'
performance ... [As] the social security system of China is still immature and often
fails in providing sufficient unemployment aids. Severe unemployment and poor
social security provision can cause social instability and damage the whole
economy" (Liao et al., 2009, p.17). It is worth noting that the policy burdens are a
set of multiple objectives imposed by the state that can distract PLCs from
maximising firms' profit and the appointment and removal of the top management
is based on the PLCs' financial performance evaluation and the evaluation of the
completion of the state-imposed policy burdens. Hence, a weaker performance-
turnover relationship should be expected for PLCLGs bearing more policy burdens.
40 For example, the National Audit Office, the Ministry of Finance, the National Economic and
Trade Commission and the National Planning and Economic Commission, etc.
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Hypothesis 1: In contrast with private owners, the state controlling entities are
supposed to have certain non-profit objectives which would at least partially
determine the overall assessment of the top management in those state-controlled
PLCs. In this sense, compared with their privately-owned counterparts, there
should be weaker performance-turnover sensitivities and less CEO turnover for the
state-controlled PLCs.
Hypothesis 2: Among state-controlled PLCs, in terms of the incentive to monitor
and discipline the top management, PLCs controlled by SAMBs have weaker
performance-turnover sensitivities than those controlled by SOEs. In addition, in
terms of policy burdens they are subject to, PLCs controlled by state entities
affiliated to the central government are expected to have stronger performance-
turnover sensitivities than those controlled by state entities affiliated to local
governments.
6.2.4. Board structure" and top executive turnover
The board of directors is considered to be an important internal corporate
governance mechanism, particularly due to the fact that the market for corporate
control as a major source of external control is currently not in place in China. It is
argued that independent directors are likely to be more effective at monitoring the
top managers than inside directors (Huson et al., 200I). Kato and Long (2006)
argue that the most direct and effective way for the controlling shareholders to
41 The existing literature usually uses three measures to describe the board structure: board size,
board independence, and board leadership (whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board of
directors). The board leadership can also be considered to be in relation to a top executive's personal
characteristics, and hence in this study it is not discussed in this section. Instead, I include it as a
major aspect of a top executive's personal characteristics or personal power.
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exert influence over firms' daily operations is by appointing firms' top executives,
and these inside top executives are expected to work in the interests of the
controlling shareholders rather than those of the minority shareholders. Moreover,
in a finn, directors may lack the incentive to monitor the management when their
careers are tied to the controlling shareholder, or they have strong personal ties with
the incumbent top executive. Thus, an under-performing top executive may be
protected and remains in control if the board of directors is insider-dominated.
The existing literature has shown that it is easier for the controlling shareholder to
reap large private benefits if there are more inside directors sitting on the board,
while the presence of independent directors can help effectively curb insiders'
expropriation of minority shareholders wealth (Weisbach, 1988; Hennalin and
Weisbach, 2003). Fama (1980) suggests that independent directors tend to have
incentives to develop their reputations in the managerial labour market by
providing strict monitoring efforts. According to the above reasoning, the presence
of independent directors can significantly enhance the monitoring effects of the
board: the greater percentage of independent directors serving on the board, the
better oversight quality the board will provide. A number of prior studies have
documented a positive relationship between the percentage of independent
directors and the likelihood of high top executive turnover (see, for example, Fan et
al., 2007). In light of the more active monitoring role that independent directors
could play in the corporate governance system, the CSRC's 'Guidelines for
Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies'
(enacted in 2001) stipulated that independent directors in any PLC should make up
no less than one third of directors serving on the board by 30th June, 2003.
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Prior studies have also found that the size of the board of directors may affect
performance-turnover sensitivities of the top executive (see, for example, Jensen,
1993; Yermack, 1996). However, they have not reached a uniform conclusion on
this issue. Fan et al (2007) argue that it would be easier for top executives to foster
closer ties with board directors in firms with smaller boards, which could probably
render the boards' monitoring efforts less effective. For this reason, a less
significant link between corporate performance and top executive turnover might
be observed for firms with smaller boards. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996),
however, suggest that larger boards are less effective monitors of top executives
and can be more easily captured by them.
6.2.5. Top executive characteristics and turnover
In the existing literature the characteristics of a top executive are often considered
in four areas, which are top executive's age, duality, tenure and compensation. It is
argued that the age of the top executive is less likely to be related to the
performance-forced turnover (Farrell and Whidbee, 2003). Goyal and Park (2002)
suggest that this is because top executives aged around 65 are more likely to step
out of firms due to normal retirements than to performance-forced turnovers.
Previous studies have found a strong relationship between top executive tenure and
turnover (see, for example, Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Goyal and Park, 2002;
Gregory-Smith et al., 2009). However, the exact relationship between these two
issues is not clear-cut, as top executive tenure could affect the top executive
turnover either positively or negatively. Allgood and Farrell (2000) provide two
possible explanations for such a varying relation. They argue that, on the one hand,
tenure provides a top executive with time to capture the board using control of
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information and board appointments, aligning directors serving on the board and
making the board more favourably disposed towards him or her. If this is true, then
the expected top executive turnover will decrease with tenure. On the other hand,
they suggest that what a board learns about a top executive's ability over time may
have a variable impact on top executive turnover according to performance. A
board of directors may know little about a newly appointed top executive's ability,
and there is plenty of information asymmetry between the top executive and the
board. However, such information asymmetry about the appointed top executive's
ability would diminish over time, hence a poor level of performance might be
acceptable to the board in the top executive's early tenure, but the same level would
tend to be seen as under-performing later in his or her tenure. In this sense, the
performance-turnover sensitivities of the top executive may become increasingly
stronger with the tenure.
The top executive duality means that the top executive is designated as the CEO
and chairman of the board of directors at the same time. 'The Code of Best Practice'
issued by the Cadbury Committee in December 1992 recommends that the
positions of CEO and Chairman of the board should not be held by one individual,
as a board that is more independent from the management is more capable of
providing effective monitoring of the firm. Dahya et at (2002) suggest that a top
executive holding both the CEO and chairman of the board positions would have
more power to exert influence in the boardroom and entrench himself or herself at
the firm over the course of the tenure. Also, the top executives with dual roles may
face a lower risk of turnover than those holding only one position (Shen and Lin,
2009).
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From the perspective of agency theory, the top executive compensation that is
widely measured by stock ownership is argued to be an effective way to align the
interests of shareholders and those of the management (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
Moreover, Denis and Sarin (1999) argue that a top executive with larger ownership
tends to have more power to affect the board's decisions. It is likewise reasonable
to assume that large managerial ownership can limit the power of the boards to
monitor and discipline under-performing top executives. If the above reasoning
holds, a negative relationship between the top executive compensation and turnover
would be expected. In the case of Chinese PLCs, however, the level of executive
stock ownership is fairly low, and on average represents merely OJ per cent of total
outstanding shares in my sample. Thus, I would not expect a significant
relationship between the top executive compensation and turnover at Chinese PLCs.
6.3. Data and variable construction
6.3.1. Data
To investigate the performance-turnover sensitivities of top executives at Chinese
PLCs, I gathered a sample of Chinese PLCs from the Shanghai Wind information
database. The original sample for this study consists of all A-share PLCs listed on
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)
from 2001 to 2007, subject to data availability. As in the previous two empirical
chapters, the customised dataset provided by Sinofin Financial Information Service
Co., Ltd. helps identify the type of the ultimate controller of each Chinese PLC and
allows me categorise these ultimate controllers into five groups: the state asset
management bureau at the central level (SAMBCG), the state asset management
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bureaus at the local level (SAMBLG), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are
affiliated to the central government (SOECGs) and those affiliated to the local
governments (SOELGs), and private investors. In addition, reasons for the top
executive turnover are supplemented by GTAIT Co., Ltd42•
The initial sample has 9289 observations. The sample screening process is as
follows: (1) Exclude firms for which corporate performance data is not available
and follow the tradition of the literature to remove financial firms, due to them
using a different financial reporting system(l270 observations dropped); (2) Drop
firms whose leverage ratio is greater than one(2 observation dropped); (3)
Eliminate firms with ST (Special Treatment) or PT (Particular Treatment)
designation(1774 observations dropped); (4) Delete firms with stated reasons for
top executive turnover being 'Retirement', 'Change in controlling shareholders',
'Legal disputes', 'Completion of acting duties' and 'No reason given'(l71
observations dropped). As a result, the final sample is an unbalanced panel that
consists of 6072 firm-year observations, and there are 1052 firms in the sample.
6.3.2. Variable construction
6.3.2.1. Dependent variable and classification of top executive turnovers
The GTA IT Co., Ltd provides information on the reasons reported for CEO
turnover, if any: (I) Change of job, (2) Retirement, (3) Contract expiration, (4)
Change in controlling shareholders, (5) Resignation, (6) Dismissal, (7) Health, (8)
42 GTA (www.gtadata.com)isaleadingglobalproviderofChinafinancialmarketdata.China
industries and economic data.
245
Personal reasons, (9) Corporate governance reform 43, (10) Legal disputes, (11)
Completion of acting duties"; (12) No reason given. Table 6.1 summarises the
distribution of CEO turnover across different stated reasons for the sample
observations. Among all stated reasons for turnover, 'Change of job' is the most
common reason, and Table 6.1 shows there are 729 turnovers (accounting for about
39.7% of turnovers) labelled as 'Change of job', The second most commonly stated
reason is 'Resignation', which accounts for around 22% of all turnovers over the
sample period. The third most commonly stated reason is 'Contract expiration',
which accounts for approximately 18.5% of turnovers. According to Table 6.1, the
least commonly given reason for a turnover is 'Legal disputes', and only 3
turnovers fall into this category.
Since the investigation of the top executive performance-turnover sensitivity is
aimed at assessing the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism of
Chinese PLCs in cases of CEO turnover, I exclude CEO turnovers for which the
stated reasons are 'Retirement', 'Legal disputes' and 'Completion of acting duties',
as these turnovers are not directly related to the disciplinary efforts exercised by
shareholders. I also exclude CEO turnovers for which the stated reason is 'change
in controlling shareholders', due to too few observations (11 cases) falling into this
category. 'Health' and 'Personal reasons' are combined into one category, as a
43 This refers to two unique types of turnovers at Chinese PLCs. The first type involves the
separation of the chairman of the board and CEO roles, i.e., a person who previously held both
. positions of the chairman of the board and CEO resigns from the managerial position, but retains the
chairman position. The second type results from the regulations stipulated by the CSRC in 1998 that
senior managers of Chinese PLCs should not hold senior managerial positions in the parent firms.
44 This refers to the situation that someone (often the chairman of the board) acts as the CEO on a
temporary basis. For example, the chairman of the board temporarily takes over the CEO's
responsibilities after the former CEO resigns from the managerial position until the new CEO is in
place.
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health reason is a personal reason. The new 'Personal reasons' category contains all
of the observed cases from the original two categories. My final sample contains 6
categories of turnover: 'Change of job', 'Contract expiration', Resignation',
'Dismissal', 'Personal reasons' and 'Corporate governance reform', and includes
1664 cases of CEO turnovers, representing 90.7% of all turnovers over the sample
period. The Panel B of Table 6.1 summarises the distribution of CEO turnover
across different stated reasons for the final sample.
I intend to stick to the publicly stated reasons for CEO turnovers when
investigating the top executive performance-turnover sensitivity at Chinese PLCs,
and relative considerations in identifying the final sample are provided in details as
follows. When investigating the link between top executive turnover and firm
performance, prior research has suggested that it is imperative to distinguish
between forced and normal turnovers (see, for example, Weisbach, 1988; Parrino,
1997; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003). Chang and Wong (2009) argue that only the
forced turnovers can reflect the disciplinary efforts of shareholders, and
distinguishing between forced and normal turnovers can enable researchers to more
effectively assess the quality of firms' corporate governance systems. However, it
may sometimes be rather difficult to distinguish between forced and normal
turnovers based upon publicly disclosed information (see, for example, Denis and
Denis, 1995; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003). To deal with this problem, Shen and Lin
(2009) apply the behaviour theory of organisational search to clarify the
relationship between top management turnover and firm profitability". However,
45 According to the behaviour theory, when firm performance meets the target level, firms are
247
their attempt to classify turnover types can lead to erroneous conclusions, as
distinguishing between forced and normal turnovers based on finn performance
could potentially fix the estimation results, especially when the finn performance is
also used as a key independent variable in the analysis. Moreover, there is little
information available that can help researchers to clearly determine whether a
turnover is forced or normal. Dividing CEO turnovers into forced and normal
turnovers based on publicly disclosed information is just asking too much of the
existing data. For example, 'Resignation' is one of the most commonly stated
reasons for CEO turnovers in the sample and can either be seen as a normal
turnover or a forced turnover. It is a normal turnover if the departing CEO
voluntarily resigns and then takes up a new job somewhere else, while it is a forced
one if the CEO departure is performance-related. Hence, in the case of
'Resignation', whether the turnover is normal or forced really depends on the
destination of the departing CEO. However, it is difficult to obtain information with
respect to the destination of the departing CEO. It is also worth noting that lumping
CEO turnovers roughly into two groups would probably obscure the true story
behind them. At the same time, there are good reasons to suspect that the likelihood
of CEO turnover tends to vary depending on multiple types of risk to which the
CEO is exposed, and exploiting the publicly stated reasons for CEO turnover might
potentially represent a good opportunity to draw a complete image for CEO
turnovers at Chinese PLCs. For example, an increase in the CEO's age might
unlikely to dismiss their incumbent CEOs, and CEO turnovers should not be considered as forced
under satisfactory performance. In contrast, when firm performance falls below the target level,
firms may seek forced CEO turnovers which represent an important organisational change that can
lead to enhanced prospect of returning performance to the target level.
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increase the likelihood of CEO turnover in cases for which the stated reasons are
'Personal reasons', 'Contract expiration' and 'Retirement'. However, it might not
be closely associated with CEO turnovers in cases for which the stated reasons are
'Dismissal' and 'Corporate governance reform' .
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6.3.2.2. Characteristics of top executive
The objective of this chapter is to investigate top executive turnover at Chinese
PLCs and identify the determinants of turnover. The CEO is considered to be the
top executive of a PLC in this study. Note that the existing literature typically
defines a CEO as the top executive of a firm. The existing literature suggests that
top executives' personal characteristics will probably affect the likelihood of
turnover, so I introduce a set of control variables to analyse such possible effects. In
the follow analysis, I control for CEOs' age (AGE), duality (DUALITY), tenure
(TENURE) and compensation (COMPENSATION).
6.3.2.3. Firm performance
I use three measures of firm performance: return on assets (ROA), return on equity
(ROE) and return on sales (ROS). All three variables are lagged one period" and
adjusted for industry medians, where industry sectors are in accordance with the
industry classification codes stipulated by the CSRC in 2001. The measures of firm
performance are adjusted for the industry median: this process involves subtracting
the industry median from all measures to give an adjusted value, _and it wo~ld
minimise possible influences of some unobservable effects. The multinomial
logistic estimator cannot deal with these unobservable effects as well as GMM
estimator adopted in two previous empirical chapters. This is why I take this
adjustment in the third empirical chapter.
Market based measures of firm performance are not used here due to market
46 This is due to the possible lag between a CEO's performance evaluation and actual decisions on
turnOVer...---.. .
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manipulations and high volatility in the Chinese stock market (Fan et al., 2007).
More importantly, the market based measures of finn performance are less
effective at reflecting actual finn performance for Chinese PLCs, as not all
outstanding shares are tradable on the two Chinese exchanges (Chang and Wong,
2009).
6.3.2.4. Ownership and ownership-related control variables
In line with the two previous empirical chapters, all sample observations are
classified into five groups according to the identity of the ultimate controller of
each Chinese PLC. They are the state asset management bureau at the central level
(SAMBCG), the state asset management bureaus at the local level (SAMBLG),
state-owned enterprises that are affiliated to the central government (SOECGs) and
those affiliated to the local governments (SOELGs), and private investors
(PRIVATE). Only four dummy variables are used in the analysis to avoid the
problem of dummy trap, and the private investor variable is the reference group.
In addition, prior studies also suggest that the ownership concentration tends to
have effects on top executive turnover. One prominent feature of the Chinese stock
market is the highly concentrated ownership structure. La Porta et al (1999) argue
that the highly concentrated ownership structure is the consequence of weak
protection for investors. Ownership structure could have an important impact on
firms' internal monitoring efforts. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), a
highly concentrated ownership structure can provide the controlling shareholder
with more incentives to monitor managerial performance, which would result in
stronger perfonnance-tumover sensitivities. To control for the ownership
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concentration, the variable TOPONE, measured by the percentage of shares held by
the largest shareholder, is used as the proxy of the ownership concentration.
Moreover, the quadratic term TOPONE (TOPONE2) is also included to capture any
curvilinear effects the ownership concentration may have on the likelihood of top
executive turnover at Chinese PLCs. In addition, Denis et al (1997) suggest that
non-management blockholdings can reduce the degree of managerial entrenchment,
and thus lead to an increased rate of management turnover. Bloch and Hege (2001)
show that the presence of such blockholders could be an effective way of
enhancing internal monitoring and limiting private benefits. Hence, the variable
TOP4_1, which is a ratio measured by the percentage of total shares held by the
other top four shareholders over that held by the largest shareholder, is used to
reflect the power of non-management blockholdings in disciplining the top
management, and a positive relationship between TOP4_1 and turnover would be
expected.
6.3.2.5. Other control variables
As for the impact of the board of directors on top executive turnover, I use two
variables to control for this. The first one is board size (BOARDSIZE), measured
by the total number of directors serving on the board, and the second is the
percentage of independent directors of the board (INDEPENDENT). Moreover, I
control for two other important firm characteristics in the following analysis, which
are capital structure (LEV) and firm size (SIZE). A firm's capital structure is
measured by its leverage ratio, and a higher leverage ratio means more borrowings
from outside the firm. Jensen (1986) emphasises the important role debt creation
could play in disciplining and motivating the management. Firms with increased
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debts will attract more external monitoring from debt-issuers. In this sense, firms
with higher leverage ratios may experience more top executive turnovers. Firm size
(SIZE) is also an important firm characteristic that should be taken into account
when investigating the top executive turnover. Dalton and Kesner (1983) suggest
that it could be much easier for managers to get themselves entrenched in larger
firms. Berry et al (2000) suggest that entrenched managers in larger firms are less
likely to be deemed incompetent. Hence, firm size (SIZE), measured as a natural
logarithm of total assets of firms, is controlled in the analysis, and a negative link
between firm size (SIZE) and top executive turnover may exist for Chinese PLCs.
Table 6.2 provides a brief explanation for the dependent variables as well as all
independent variables. Panel A of Table 6.3 presents a detailed distribution of the
sample of Chinese PLCs used in the analysis according to firms' ultimate
controllers, and the balance of the panel is stated in panel B. It is clear from the
table that the state is still in control of the majority of all Chinese A-share PLCs,
with four different state entities controlling around 80% of Chinese PLCs in total.
255
Table 6.2 Summary of variables
Variable Name Variable Definition Expected Sign
CT Dummy variable denotes CEO
turnover
PERF ROA, ROE and ROS, all lagged one
-
period and adjusted by industry
medians
AGE CEO's age +
TENURE CEO's tenure +/-
COMPENSATION The percentage of shares held by a
-
CEO
LEV Ratio of total liabilities over total +
assets
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets of
-
firms
SAMBCG Dummy variable coded 1 if the
-
ultimate controller is the SAMBCG;
otherwise 0
SAMBLG Dummy variable coded 1 if the
-
ultimate controller is an SAMBLG;
otherwise 0
SOECG Dummy variable coded I if the -
ultimate controller is an SOECG;
otherwise 0
SOELG Dummy variable coded 1 if the -
ultimate controller is an SOELG;
otherwise 0
BOARDSIZE Size of board (number of directors) +/-
INDEPENDENT Ratio of the number of independent
+directors to the number of directors
DUALITY Dummy variable coded 1 if board
chairman is the CEO; otherwise 0 -
TOPONE The percentage of shares held by the +/-
largest shareholder
TOPONE2 Quadratic term of TOPONE +/-
TOP4 1 Ratio measured by the percentage of +
total shares held by the other top four
shareholders over that held by the
largest shareholder.
Notes: Real vanables are deflated using the China's annual CPI.
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6.3.2.6. Summary statistics
Table 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics of total finn-year observations during
the period 2001 to 2007, and the Correlation matrix for the variables is included in
TableA6.1 in the Appendix.
Only accounting-based performance variables are adopted in this study because
they are more reliable performance indicators in the Chinese stock market. The
means of the industry median-adjusted finn performance variables are -0.0091
(ROAI), -0.0334 (ROEI) and -0.0601 (ROSI). Among all PLCs, on average, those
controlled by SAMBCG have the best corporate performance, with the mean of
ROAI, ROEI and ROSI being -0.0007,-0.0237 and -0.0049, respectively. PLCs
controlled by SOECG, as a whole, is the second best group in terms of corporate
performance. The average age of the CEOs of Chinese PLCs is 47 years, with a
range from 28 years to 67 years. On average, a CEO's tenure is approximately 3.5
years. It seems that the CEO tenure is quite low in China as compared to other
countries (e.g. the UK and the US), and it may be due to the short history of the
Chinese stock market. The statistics also indicate that the executive incentive
scheme is not popular in China, as the mean shareholding by CEOs at Chinese
PLCs is merely 0.08%.
On average, there are around 10 directors serving on the board, and one third of
them are independent directors, which is strictly in line with the 'Guideline for
introducing Independent Directors to The Board of Directors of Listed
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Companies .47 stipulated by the CSRC in 2001. The CEO is disclosed to also hold
the position of board chairman in 8.48% of sample PLCs. The mean shareholding
by the largest shareholders is approximately 41%, indicating that one thing PLCs in
China have in common is a highly concentrated ownership structure.
47 The Guideline requires that independent directors should make up at least one third of directors
sitting on the board in any listed company by 30th June, 2003.
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6.3.3. Methodology
6.3.3.1. Binary Choice and Binomial Logistic Model
In many situations we need to model an economic outcome that is not a continuous
measure of some activity, but discrete choices among a series of alternatives, for
example, modelling labour force participation, purchasing a new car or the decision
of whether or not to go to a college. There are a number of different types of model
that can be used to model and analyse such discrete choices, and many of them are
known as qualitative response models. Moreover, what the qualitative response
models have in common is that their dependent variables are indicators of discrete
choices.
Many qualitative response models are those for which the dependent variable takes
values that are only coded for some qualitative outcomes, such as a 'yes or no'
decision. Now, consider the most basic model of which the dependent variable only
takes binary (0/1) choices, for example, to model the labour force participation we
conduct a survey for a number of respondents in a given period and then equate
their decisions, i.e. 'works or seeks work' and 'does not', with 1 and 0, respectively.
In such a case, the OIl coding representing decisions of qualitative choices is
merely for the purpose of convenience. It is believed that a set of factors such as
age, education, marital status and number of children can have some effects on a
respondent's decision of whether or not to work, so:
Prob(Y = llx)=F(x, P)
Prob(Y = Olx)=l-F(x, P)
The vector contains all factors that are believed to affect respondents' decisions,
and the set of parameters P reflects the impact of changes in x on the probability.
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We first model the above equations with the linear regression, that is:
F(x, p) = x'B
Since E [ylx] = F(x, P), the regression model is therefore constructed as follows:
y= E [ylx] +(y- E [ylx]) = x'B +e
The linear regression model above, however, has many shortcomings. To name but
two, e is heteroscedastic in a way that depends on p. Because x' ~ +e must equal 0
or 1, e equals -x'~ or 1- x'B, with probabilities I-F and F, respectively. Hence the
variance of s, Var[elx]=x'B (1- x'B) obviously depends on p. Another major flaw is
that we cannot contain the predicated probabilities of the model within the 0-1
interval.
In principle, our requirement is to find a model that will produce predictions
consistent with the general framework of probability models as given by Greene
(2008): Probe event j occurs) = ProbeY = j) =F[relevant effects, parameters].
Moreover, the predicted probabilities should be constrained to the 0-1 interval.
Hence, for a given regressor vector, two conditions would be expected:
lim Probff = llx) = 1
x'f3-++oo
lim Prob(Y = llx) = 0
x'(3--oo
In principle any proper and continuous probability distribution defined over the real
line to have the property that meets the above two conditions will suffice. The
logistic distribution, partly because of its mathematical convenience, has been
widely used in practice. The logistic distribution:
(a)
has been used in many applications, which gives rise to the binomial logistic model.
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6.3.3.2. Multinomial Logistic Model
It would be interesting to consider the situation where we have more than two
outcomes. Consider the outcomes 0, 1, 2, 3, , m recorded in y, and the vector
X consisting of all explanatory variables. The model for such outcomes is:
p'.x
e J
Prob(Y = j) (1' x r j=O, 1...... , m.
Lf:1=oe k
(b)
This model is a multinomial logistic model, and the binomial logistic model I have
discussed before can be seen as a special case of this multinomial logistic model if
J= 1. In a multinomial logistic model, even though the outcomes are coded as 0, 1, 2,
3 , m, these numerical values are arbitrary because it does not necessarily mean
that, for example, the outcome coded m is better than the outcome coded m-I, the
outcome coded 3 is better than the outcome coded 2, and the outcome coded 2 is
better than the outcome coded 1. Such an unordered property of Y distinguishes the
use of the above multinomial logistic model from regression models that are
appropriate for continuous dependent variables and from ordered logistic models
that are appropriate for ordered categorical data.
Without loss of generality, consider an example that has three outcomes or choices:
outcome coded l(buy an American car), outcome coded 2 (buy a European Car)
and outcome coded 3 (buy a Japanese car). In the multinomial logistic model a set
of coefficients, Pj' j= 1,2, and 3, corresponding to each outcome will be estimated:
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I
eP3X
Prob(Y = 3)= p' X p' pi X
e 1 +e 2X+e 3
However, the above model is not uniquely identified in the sense that there is more
than one solution to the estimated coefficients Pi that leads to the same
probabilities for three outcomes. A convenient normalisation that helps solve the
problem is to arbitrarily set one of Pi j= I, 2, and 3, to 0. For example, if setting
Pl =0, the equations become:
1
Prob(Y = 1)= p' X pi
l+e 2 +e 3X
I
eP2X
Prob(Y = 2)= pi X pi
l+e 2 +e 3X
I
eP3X
Prob(Y = 3)= pi X pi X
l+e 2 +e 3
Then the remaining coefficients P2 and P3 will measure the change relative to the
Y=1 group. This is because only m parameter vectors are needed in order to
determine m+1 probabilities. By the same token, for a model that has m+1
outcomes, i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3, ..... , m, if I set Po = 0, the probabilities for each outcome
will be:
p'x
Prob(Y = jIX)= e J pi x : j=O, 1...... , m.
1+l:~1 e k
(c)
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6.4. Empirical tests and results
6.4.1. Regression models
In the following analyses, I intend to use multinomial logistic regression models to
examine the top executive performance-turnover sensitivities at Chinese PLCs, as
well as the determinants of turnover. Based on the existing literature on top
executive turnover and my understanding of the unique features in the Chinese
stock market, I include in regression models a number of factors that could
potentially affect the likelihood of top executive turnover at Chinese PLCs. The
basic model is as follows:
(1)
where CTtt denotes CEO turnover of ith PLC in the year t, PERFtt-1 is firm
performance (ROA, ROE and ROS), lagged one period and adjusted by industry
medians, X is a vector of control variables incorporated in regression models, Tt
is a vector of time dummies and Bit is the disturbance term. Cl, 8, and , are
unknown coefficients to be estimated.
6.4.2. Empirical results
There are a total of 6072 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2007 after the sample
screening process. To investigate the top executive performance-turnover
sensitivities in Chinese PLCs, three firm performance measures (ROAI, ROEI and
ROSI) are adopted, and a set of control variables are included in the multinomial
logistic regression models. Moreover, four dummy variables, (SOECG, SOELG,
SAMBCG and SAMBLG), representing the identity of the ultimate controller, are
also used to facilitate the comparison of potential behavioural differences on CEO
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turnover decisions between the private controller and state controlling entities. To
ensure the results are not influenced by the presence of outliers, all variables except
dummy variables are winsorised at both tails of their distribution. The
winsorisation is at the both 1 and 99 percentile points of the distribution.
Table 6.5 reports the estimation results of the multinomial logistic regression
models of the performance-turnover sensitivities for Chinese PLCs over the sample
period. In all models, the multinomial logistic regression can enable researchers to
make all comparisons among seven alternatives ('Change of job', 'Contract
expiration', 'Resignation', 'Dismissal', 'Personal reasons' and 'Corporate
governance reform', and the control sample, i.e. no turnover). In the framework of
multinomial logistics, an important assumption that should be satisfied is that
outcome alternatives for the model should have the property of independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Before moving on to the discussion of the estimation
results, I need to test whether such a stringent assumption holds for all three
multinomial logistic regression models in my study. The IIA assumption, stated
simply, requires that the inclusion or exclusion of outcome alternatives does not
have effects on the relative risks associated with regressors in the remaining
alternatives. The Hausman test 48 is implemented here to test whether the HA
assumption is violated in the multinomial logistic regression models. Table 6.6
shows the results of the Hausman test of HA for multinomial logistic regression
models (1), (2) and (3), reported in Table 6.5, and the test statistics suggest that the
48 The Hausman test statistic is distributed as Qd2 and is computed as: H=( 'c· P.>' (Vc - V.)-l( Pc
. P.>, where Pc is the coefficient vector from the consistent estimator, P. is the coefficient vector
from the efficient estimator, Vc is the covariance matrix of the consistent estimator and V. is the
covariance matrix of the efficient estimator.
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multinomial logistic regression models In my study do not violate the HA
assumption.
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Table 6.6 Hausman test of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(HA)
Test group(alternative) (1) (2) (3)
1.Change of job 0.65 1.02 0.42
2. Resignation 0.63 1.26 0.59
3. Personal reasons 0.95 0.64 0.82
4. Dismissal 0.25 0.22 0.60
5. Contract expiration 1.21 0.58 2.22
6. Corporate governance reform 1.03 0.23 1.85
Notes: * P-valu~l 0%, ** P-valu~5%, and *.* P-valu~l %.
It is difficult to interpret coefficient estimates from multinomial logistic models, as
the change in the probability includes coefficient estimates from all alternatives. It
is likely that a positive coefficient may not actually imply an increased probability
of a particular alternative. Hence, in addition to reporting the multinomial logistic
coefficients and the levels of significance, the marginal effects of a change in the
independent variables, which is evaluated at the sample mean, are also reported in
panel B of Table 6.5. For any dummy variable, the marginal effects show by how
much the probability of CEO turnover will change with a change in status, while
for any continuous independent variable, they show how much the probability of
CEO turnover will change with a one unit change in the value of that variable. With
the marginal effects, it could therefore be much easier to determine the relative
importance of each independent variable in predicting the likelihood of CEO
turnover.
In Table 6.5, ROAI, ROEI and ROSI lagged one period are used as firm
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performance in models (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Table 6.5 shows that whatever
firm performance measure is used, similar results are found across models.
Interestingly, despite many aspects that the six different alternatives are found to
have in common, the estimates indicate that differences do exist across them. It can
be argued that identifying those similarities and differences among different
turnover types would lead to a better understanding of CEO turnovers in the
Chinese PLCs. According to Model (2), a one-standard-deviation increase in ROE
yields a decline in the likelihood of CEO turnover by approximately 1.12%, if the
turnover type is 'Contract expiration'. Based on the results of Model (3)
('Resignation'), a 0.1 increase in ROS is associated with a 0.23% decrease in the
probability of the CEO being replaced. An increase of one standard deviation
(0.3105) would decrease the likelihood of CEO turnover by almost 1% in Model (3)
and the stated reason is 'Contract expiration'. Although the coefficients are
statistically significant, it is not economically important. Given that the sample is
mainly driven by state-owned PLCs, it is no surprise to find that in a PLC, a CEO's
performance is something but not everything in determining whether he/she should
leave or not.
In accordance with the existing literature, there is a negative relationship between
CEO turnover and firm performance for Chinese PLCs. Table 6.5 shows quite
clearly that poor firm performance (ROA, ROE and ROS) is significantly related to
CEO turnover, and this applies to all turnover types except the 'Corporate
governance reform'. The 'Corporate governance reform' refers to two unique types
of turnovers at Chinese PLCs as a result of corporate governance reform promoted
by the CSRC in 1998, and it is unlikely to be caused by poor firm performance. It
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is worth noting that the results might suggest that the face-saving devices for
departing CEOs are widely used in Chinese PLCs. It is possible that 'Change of
job', 'Resignation', 'Personal reasons' and 'Contract expiration' can all be used as
face-saving devices, since the relationship between firm performance and CEO
turnover is found to be significantly negative for these turnover types. As seen in
Table 6.1, during the sample period, only 57 out of a total of 1835 CEO turnovers
are clearly reported as 'Dismissal'. Defond and Park (1999) argue that firms rarely
use poor firm performance as publicly disclosed explanations for CEO turnovers.
Gregory-Smith et al (2009) suggest that in many cases of CEO turnovers, it could
be suspected that face-saving explanations are used in order to save the ousted
CEOs' future careers and reputations. For example, 'Health problems' is one of the
most frequently used face-saving devices for departing CEOs who would otherwise
be punished or dismissed due to unsatisfactory firm performance. To avoid such
awkward situations, they may choose to resign from their managerial positions,
citing health problems as a generally acceptable reason for their leaving.
Table 6.5 shows that firm size is negatively related to the occurrence of the
replacement of CEOs, but it does not apply to 'Corporate governance reform',
'Personal reasons' and 'Contract expiration'. This negative relationship indicates
that larger firms are more likely to retain the services of incumbent CEOs, which is
consistent with Berry et aI's (2000) argument that it is less likely for executives in
larger firms to be considered as unsatisfactory. Firth et al (2006a) provide an
alternative explanation for this negative relationship by arguing that CEO positions
in those larger firms always require more skilled persons and it could be very
difficult to find capable successors to replace the incumbents. Thus, it could be
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much easier for CEOs to get themselves entrenched in larger firms.
An interesting finding manifested in the results is that the capital structure
(leverage ratio) of Chinese PLCs may increase the likelihood of turnover. The
positive and significant relationship between a PLC's leverage ratio and turnover
supports Jensen's (1986) argument that external borrowings can play an important
role in disciplining and motivating the management. In this sense, firms with more
debts tend to have more frequent CEO turnovers. Such a positive connection can be
more clearly observed for turnover types 'Change of job', 'Resignation' and
'Personal reasons'. For instance, the marginal effects reported in Panel B of Table
6.5 show that if a PLC's leverage ratio increases by 0.1, it will have decreased
probability of CEO turnover by 0.67 per cent.
In this study a CEO's tenure is measured by the number of years the CEO has held
the position. Under the entrenchment hypothesis 49 supported by many previous
studies, it could be expected that CEOs with longer tenures are less likely to be
ousted. My findings would lend support to such a hypothesis, as the estimated
coefficients of TENUREtt are negative and statistically significant at least at the 1%
level in all three models, whatever the turnover type is. Prior studies suggest that
CEOs with longer tenure tend to be more powerful and face lower risk of turnover
than CEOs with shorter tenures (see, for example, Salancik and Meindl, 1984;
Allgood and Farrell, 2000; Goyal and Park, 2002; Shen and Cannella, 2002).
Gregory-Smith et al (2009) argue that longer tenure provides a CEO with more
49 Longer tenure can provide CEOs with opportunities to establish a power base over time, which
would probably lower the risk of them being removed.
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time to capture the board of directors, and thus makes the board act in his or her
favour. Results shown in Table 6.5 are consistent with the existing literature.
Moreover, it appears that CEOs with longer tenure in China could act as an
obstacle to the CSRC's recommendation of improving corporate governance in
Chinese PLCs by separating the chairman of the board and CEO roles, as a
negative link between the CEO tenure and turnover is found for the turnover group
'Corporate governance reform'. The marginal effects of TENURE.. are significant.
According to Model (1), one more year (e.g. from 3.5 to 4.5) in TENURE.. results
in a 2.1 per cent decrease in CEO turnover if the stated reason for turnover is
'Change of job' .
It is worth noting that the relationship between turnover and CEO age is found to
be positive and significant. Table 6.5 shows that such a positive relationship mainly
applies to two turnover types, 'Personal reasons' and 'Contract expiration',
indicating that the age of a CEO is a factor but not an important driving force in
CEO turnovers in Chinese PLCs. For example, for those turnovers for which the
stated reason is 'Personal reasons', the results show that an increase in CEO age of
one year will increase the probability by 0.1% (Model (1». My findings suggest
that health problems could significantly shorten a CEO's tenure in China, under the
logic that older people are more likely to have health problems. In other words,
older CEDs are more likely to resign from their managerial positions due to health
problems. Also, it might be concluded that Chinese PLCs may prefer not to renew
job contracts with older CEOs. In contrast, younger CEOs would stand a better
chance of being offered new employment contracts/contract renewals in the
managerial labour market in China.
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Jensen (1993) and Fama and Jensen (1983a) point out that concentrating decision
management and decision control in one individual would probably result in the
failure of internal control systems, as it can significantly weaken the board's
effectiveness in monitoring the top management. Not surprisingly, those CEOs in
Chinese PLCs who also hold the position of the chairman of the board face
significantly less risk of turnover, as estimated coefficients of DUAU1Y it are
found to be negative and significant in all models. Such a negative relationship is
more pronounced for the 'Change of job' and the 'Corporate governance reform'.
For example, if the turnover reason is 'Change of job', according to Model (1) such
a dual role of CEO would result in a 6 per cent decrease in the likelihood of
turnover. This finding is in line with the existing literature on top executive
turnover, which suggests that top executives holding both the CEO and chairman of
the board positions would have more power to shelter themselves from normal
monitoring and disciplining efforts of shareholders, thus facing a lower risk of
turnover (see, for example, Dahya et al., 2002). Moreover, the results also call for
a much stricter implementation of the CSRC's recommendation of separating the
dual role of the chairman and the CEO. For example, the CSRC could make this
recommendation a compulsory policy for all PLCs in China.
Previous studies suggest that the top executive compensation scheme can
effectively reduce agency problems by helping align the interests of the top
executive with those of shareholders. An increase in CEO compensation would
therefore probably decrease the likelihood of CEO turnover. However, my findings
do not provide evidence for such a relationship at Chinese PLCs. One possible
explanation could be that the compensation scheme is currently not popular in
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China, and it might be expected that compensation for top executives may show
little effect on CEO turnover in the Chinese PLCs.
According to the existing literature, there are conflicting views towards the effects
of the size of the board on CEO turnover. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue
that it could be much easier for entrenched top executives to capture larger boards.
However, Fan et al (2007) also point out the possibility that if boards are smaller,
then CEOs are more likely to form closer relationships with other board directors,
thus making the boards act in their favour. In such cases, under-performing CEOs
may face significantly lower risk of replacement (Helmich, 1980). The results
reported in Table 6.5 provide supporting evidence for Jensen (1993) and Yermack
. (1996), and the estimated coefficients of
BOARDSIZEtt are found to be significantly negative, particularly for turnover
types 'Contract expiration' and 'Corporate governance reform' .
Another major issue of board structure is the level of independence of the board,
measured by the ratio of independent directors sitting on the board. The existing
literature stresses the role that independent directors can play in enhancing the
monitoring efforts of the board. The independent directors are believed to have
both expertise and incentives to spot and oust under-performing CEOs. According
.to the above reasoning, I would expect a positive and significant link between
INDEPENDENTtt and the likelihood of CEO turnover in my study. Table 6.5
shows that the estimated coefficients of INDEPENDENTit are positive and
statistically significant, which indicates that independent directors in China do
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enhance PLCs' internal governance mechanisms by more effectively monitoring
their CEOs' behaviour. However, it should also be noted that such a positive role of
independent directors in Chinese PLCs might be limited, and independent directors
are more active in disciplining CEOs in cases of 'Dismissal' and 'Contract
expiration' .
As to the influence that ownership structure may exert on CEO turnovers, the
results in Table 6.S document that the ownership concentration of Chinese PLCs
has little effect on the likelihood of CEO turnover. Yet, as expected, the identity of
the ultimate controller is found to have certain effects on the turnover. The results
reported in Table 6.5 reveal several interesting points. Firstly, Chinese PLCs are
found to have similar sensitivities of CEO turnover to performance, regardless of
the identity of their ultimate controllers. In order to test whether different ultimate
controllers have different sensitivities of CEO turnover to performance, four
interaction terms of firm performance with the dummies for four state controlling
entities are included in all regression models. However, no systematic results in this
respect are detected, and the interactions are found to be statistically insignificant
in all three models. Secondly, overall, state-controlled PLCs tend to have fewer
CEO turnovers than privately controlled PLCs. After splitting CEO turnovers into
six groups according to their publicly disclosed reasons, I find that compared with
their private counterparts, all state controlling entities are more likely to retain
services of their incumbent CEOs, particularly if the turnover types are 'Personal
reasons' and 'Contract expiration'. For example, in Model (1), the marginal effects
of 'Personal reasons' for SOELG, SOECG, SAMBLG and SAMBCG are -0.005, -
0.006, -0.009 and -0.009, which indicates that in PLCs the probability of CEO
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turnover will decrease by 0.5%, 0.6%, 0.9% and 0.9%, respectively, if these state
agents are the ultimate controllers.
The results reported in Table 6.5 regarding the relationship between ownership and
CEO turnover can have several implications. On one hand, the results provide
evidence to support my prior reasoning that the non-profit objectives and policy
burdens imposed on the state-controlled PLCs may inhibit PLCs from dismissing
their CEOs. It is worth noting that CEOs serving in those state-controlled PLCs
may use the policy burdens as an excuse to avoid possible replacements. On the
other hand, it appears that state-controlled PLCs are less likely to replace their
CEOs due to non-performance related reasons (for example, age, health conditions).
Moreover, only PLCs controlled by SAMBLGs are found to have fewer CEO
turnovers than their private competitors in 'Change of job' and 'Resignation'. This
may imply that compared with PLCs supervised by all other state entities, PLCs
controlled by SAMBLGs tend to have more policy burdens, and are therefore more
likely to keep the services of their current CEOs as long as they can successfully
fulfil the given non-profit objectives. Thirdly, for turnovers for which the stated
reasons are 'Dismissal' and 'Corporate governance reform', there is no difference
in the probability of CEO turnover among PLCs controlled by different ultimate
controllers. Since the results imply no significant difference in the CEO
performance-turnover link among Chinese PLCs, I would expect to see no
reduction in the probability of CEO turnover for all state-controlled PLCs in the
sub-sample 'Dismissal', which is most likely to be performance-related. Similar
fmdings for the sub-sample 'Corporate governance reform', however, are more
likely to rest on the special nature of this type of turnover.
285
Furthermore, it is argued that ownership by non-management blockholders is
important in mitigating agency problems by reducing management entrenchment
and supporting a more active board (see, for example, Pagano and Roell, 1998;
Bloch and Hege, 2001). My finding is consistent with the above argument, and the
estimated coefficients of TOP4_lit are found to be positive and statistically
significant in Table 6.5. The positive and significant link between the non-
management blockholders and CEO turnover exists mainly for CEO turnover types
'Personal reasons' and 'Contract expiration" indicating a positive but limited role
of the non-management blockholders in disciplining CEOs. Given the relatively
small portion of equity ownership by the non-management blockholders, the
limited influence level they do have on the likelihood of CEO turnover is
considered modest.
6.4.3. Robustness check
To check whether my results are robust to alternate measures of some key variables,
a series of robustness tests have been conducted and corresponding results are
reported in Tables A6.2 and A6.3 in the Appendix. Since in China the average CEO
compensation level is a bit low and in my sample only 1642 out of total 6072 cases
have positive CEO compensation levels, I therefore re-run the regression using a
dummy variable equal to one if the level of CEO ownership is positive, and zero
otherwise. The estimation results are reported in Table A6.2. Interesting results
arise as the dummy variable is found to be statistically significant at conventional
levels, suggesting that top executive compensation does help align the interests of
the top executives and those of shareholders in Chinese PLCs, which would in turn
decrease the likelihood of CEO turnover.
286
In addition, to test if the estimation results are consistent for alternative measures of
a firm's size and leverage ratio, some robustness tests are conducted and results are
reported in Table A6.3. In Table A6.3, a firm's size is calculated by number of
employees and the leverage ratio is measured by a firm's total liability over total
assets minus total liability. The estimation results provided by Table A6.3 do not
contradict my main results reported in Table 6.5.
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6.5. Conclusion
This chapter investigates the CEO performance-turnover sensitivity of Chinese
PLCs, and also identifies the determinants of the turnover. As predicted, a negative
link between corporate performance and the likelihood of CEO turnover is found.
Such a negative relationship indicates that an improvement in firm performance
will decrease the probability of a CEO being replaced. Moreover, PLCs whose
ultimate controllers are private investors tend to have more CEO turnovers.
Arguably, privatisation can improve corporate governance quality and have a
positive impact on firm performance by holding CEOs more accountable for their
performance. However, my findings suggest that in China, the state-controlled
PLCs may have adopted similar performance-evaluation standards for their CEOs
as their private rivals, and no systematic difference in the CEO performance-
turnover sensitivity is found among PLCs. Also, it is likely that PLCs may use
some face-saving reasons when their incumbent CEOs are dismissed. By splitting
the sample according to the stated reasons for CEO turnover, the results indicate
that state-controlled PLCs are more likely to retain their incumbent CEOs only if
turnovers are not performance-related. In this sense, it might be concluded that
China's corporate governance is beginning to come of age.
Also, this chapter evaluates the effectiveness of a variety of corporate governance
mechanisms in disciplining CEOs of Chinese PLCs. It could be argued that due to
China's relatively immature capital markets and weak legal protection for investors,
conventional governance mechanisms may not have the same impact on CEO
turnover as they do in Western economies. My fmdings show that the majority of
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governance mechanisms are found to have the same effects as predicted by prior
studies conducted in the West, except the CEO compensation scheme. For example,
firms' capital structure (leverage ratio) is found to positively affect the likelihood of
turnover, the presence of independent directors can help discipline under-
performing CEOs, and CEOs also holding the position of the chairman of the board
are less likely to be replaced, etc. However, it is worth noting that the extent of
influence that these governance mechanisms may have on the CEO turnover in
Chinese PLCs is modest.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
7.1. Overview
This thesis seeks to make valuable contributions to the corporate governance
literature by conducting in-depth empirical analyses of three important issues
regarding corporate governance in the context of China. Each issue is thoroughly
discussed in its own empirical chapter. The first empirical chapter analyses the
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance of Chinese
PLCs. Given the unique characteristics of Chinese markets, the heterogeneity of
state entities is taken into consideration in the analysis. As a result, this chapter sets
up a new research framework for corporate governance in the Chinese context, and
the empirical results contrast with most previous studies by showing that state
ownership does not necessarily drag down corporate performance.
The second empirical chapter provides analysis of corporate cash holdings in China.
In doing so, it starts by examining the determinants of corporate cash holding
behaviour of PLCs. It then moves on to provide evidence for the target level of
cash holdings in China, and to document the dynamic partial adjustment behaviour
of PLCs towards the target cash holding levels. Furthermore, this chapter also tests
and reconciles competing theories proposed by the extant literature on corporate
290
cash holdings.
The third and final empirical chapter investigates the top executive turnover of
Chinese PLCs. It aims to address the shortcomings in the literature, and, at the
same time, particular attention is paid to the role of the ultimate controller in
disciplining under-performing CEOs. Unlike most previous studies that have
roughly divided all turnovers into two categories, forced and normal turnovers, I
split the sample according to the stated reasons for CEO turnovers and utilise
multinomial logistic regression techniques to provide a detailed examination of the
top executive turnover in China. The empirical analysis of this chapter reveals
several interesting findings that can truly improve our knowledge of corporate
governance in this respect.
7.2. Summary of main findings
The three empirical chapters included in this thesis have provided interesting and
insightful findings to further enhance our understanding of the current corporate
governance practices in China. This section is intended as a summary of the main
findings.
The first empirical chapter focuses on the investigation of issues of ownership
structure and corporate performance in the Chinese context. The majority of
previous studies in this area have suffered from two types of miscIassification as
they either use share type as a proxy for owner type or treat all types of state
ownership as one group. They fail to properly identify and distinguish among the
different types of owners (ultimate controllers) of PLCs, which renders analyses
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largely invalid in previous research in this respect. Section 4.4 demonstrates how
such shortcomings will lead to erroneous conclusions. Considering the
heterogeneity of state agents in terms of their non-uniform incentive structures and
motivations, my study differs considerably from the prior research by
distinguishing different owners. The state-controlled PLCs are classified into four
major types based on their owners' political and economic interests and incentives.
Thus, all PLCs in the sample are divided into five types: SOELGs, SOECGs,
SAMBLGs, the SAMBCG and private investors. Following this classification, with
special attention paid to the types of ultimate controllers in PLCs, the empirical
analysis reveals several interesting and insightful findings that could potentially
inform future research. To offer robust and reliable estimation results, three
different indicators of corporate performance - ROA, ROE, and ROS - are used.
Firstly, state ownership as a whole is found to be inferior to private ownership, but
this does not necessarily mean that state ownership always reduces shareholders'
wealth. As is clearly shown by the empirical findings, PLCs whose ultimate
controllers are the SAMBCG and SOECGs can perform equally as well as their
private counterparts. Secondly, a number of factors that are theoretically proposed
by agency theory are incorporated in the analysis, and despite the unique
characteristics of the Chinese markets, many of them are found to have similar
effects as in developed economies. Last but not least, an 'M-shaped' relationship
between ownership concentration and corporate performance was confirmed by
applying the spline regression technique- to the sample. Such a non-monotonic
relationship suggests that there could be two optimal levels of ownership
concentration.
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The second empirical chapter provides an in-depth examination of corporate cash
holdings in China. The type of ownership is included as a main element in the
analysis. Empirical research reveals the determinants of corporate cash holdings in
PLCs, and the majority of factors are found to have similar effects as found in
Western markets. The analysis also supports the amalgamation of the well-known
trade-off theory and the financing hierarchy theory/pecking order theory. Amongst
all findings, it is worth noting that PLCs controlled by state owners have
significantly less cash holdings than those controlled by private investors both in
the short-run and in the long-run. Meanwhile, regardless of types of state
ownership, all state owners are found to have similar cash holding levels. Such
interesting findings can be attributed to the unique institutional background in
China. On one hand, it might be evidence revealing that private owners in China
may have more incentives to hold liquid assets in order to not forego possible
profitable projects in the future. Dittmar et al (2003) suggest that firms in countries
with less developed capital markets may only accumulate cash as a buffer against
future cash shortfalls. A long-criticised legacy of the planned economy and even
nowadays is the 'soft budget' constraint, which means that the state-controlled
firms in China enjoy endless financial backing and easy negotiation of finance with
the financial provider (the government). In this sense, PLCs owned by private
investors could be more financially constrained, and are thus more incentivised to
retain higher cash holding levels. On the other hand, private owners hold more cash
assets simply because they are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders by
increasing the amounts of liquid assets under their control that can be used to
further their own interests. Arguably, liquid assets are easy targets of rent-seeking
management and controlling shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that agency
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conflicts might become more severe when firms have large free cash flows.
The empirical analysis of this chapter also supports the idea that there are target
cash holding levels for PLCs. The results are consistent with the view that market
frictions may cause delays for Chinese PLCs in adjusting towards target cash
holdings levels. Utilising the partial dynamic adjustment model, the empirical
results demonstrate that amongst all Chinese PLCs, PLCs with private owners are
found to have the fastest adjustment speeds. I put forward two possible
explanations for such findings. The first explanation might be that private owners
are more cautious about their cash-holding positions. As discussed above,
privately-controlled PLCs may have more difficulties in accessing external finance.
In order to avoid finding themselves slipping into cash shortages that could
potentially increase their financial risks, they have a greater tendency to swiftly
adjust their cash holdings towards the target level by all possible means. Another
explanation would simply be that private owners can run their businesses more
efficiently than state competitors, and thus have much quicker adjustment speeds.
The third and final empirical chapter studies the top executive (CEO) turnover of
Chinese PLCs by focusing on the impact of types of ultimate owners and the exit
types of departing CEOs. This chapter is intended to mainly address two issues.
First, it explicitly models the executive turnover-performance relationship at
Chinese PLCs. In order to examine whether the relationship may vary for different
types of state ownership, the potential impact of the heterogeneity of state agents
on CEO turnovers is also thoroughly explored in this study. Second, the dataset
used in this study identifies a number of turnover reasons for departing CEOs.
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Applying multinomial logistic regression techniques to the sample, empirical
results generate several insightful findings. First, consistent with the existing
literature, a negative turnover-performance relationship for Chinese PLCs is
confirmed. Hence, CEOs will be ousted if their performance is deemed
unsatisfactory. Second, despite the different incentives and motivations that
different owners may possess, empirical analysis indicates that all owners tend to
have similar turnover-performance sensitivities. It is worth noting that state owners
are more reluctant to remove their CEOs as long as firms' corporate performance
meets the required level. Third, analysing the sample and taking the stated reasons
for CEO turnovers into account, results suggest that PLCs tend to use some 'face-
saving' reasons to disguise the true reasons for turnovers. One possible explanation
for the application of 'face-saving' reasons is to avoid potentially damaging the
leaving CEOs' future careers. Finally, this chapter conducts an examination of a
variety of factors that may affect CEO turnover, and most of them are found to
have similar impacts as in developed economies.
7.3. Policy implications
In addition to contributing to the literature on corporate governance in the Chinese
context, my study has some implications for public policy. China's gradual
economic reform strategy has allowed the government to accumulate experience
based upon lessons learnt from the recent past reforms or regional experiments. My
study, hopefully, can provide some useful guides for policy makers, and have some
policy implications for strategies of future economic reform.
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The economic reform in China has reached the point where many easy and less
controversial reform issues have already been solved, while issues that still remain
are more difficult and ideologically controversial to deal with. Clarke (2003) argues
that the Chinese government has to seriously consider issues of whether it is still
necessary for the state to continue to maintain a full ownership interest in firms in
several sectors. At the 16th National People's Congress (NPC) in 2002, in order to
deepen the economic reform and inject new impetus into the economy, the Chinese
government proposed to further reduce the state ownership in the whole economy.
Therefore, several questions has arisen in this respect, such as what type of state
ownership will be relinquished in the upcoming phase of the economic reform, and
how and to what extent the government should retreat from the whole economy.
Moreover, as China's reform in the economic sector deepens, many problems have
emerged. The most difficult and challenging issue in the development of China's
stock market arises from poor corporate governance practices. Ownership structure
per se does not decide everything. It might be more important for the CSRC, the
major regulatory body of the stock market, to improve corporate governance
systems of PLCs and provide better protection for outside investors.
The results of my study provide some directions and hints on the path of further
divestment of the state ownership as well as the development of China's stock
market. First, my study suggests that it is not necessary for state ownership to be
inferior to private ownership. Under proper management and strict monitoring,
PLCs controlled by some state entities can perform as well as their private rivals.
Second, if the government decides to further decrease its shares in the whole
economy by relinquishing control of some state-owned PLCs, it should start with
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those controlled by SAMBLGs and SOELGs. My findings show that among the
four types of state controlling entities, the SAMGLG and the SOELG are the worst
performers in terms of corporate performance and corporate governance. PLCs
under their control have displayed rather poor operating performance and have
failed to live up to investors' expectations. Third, as the economic reform deepens,
it should be imperative for the Chinese government to create a fairer arena for all
market players. Although PLCs controlled by different types of investors are
subject to the same regulations and laws, those controlled by the state are found to
have greatly benefited from some invisible or underlying rules that probably stem
from China's former centrally-planned economic system. One of these rules is in
connection with the so-called 'soft budget' constraint. My study has found that the
state-controlled PLCs could enjoy endless financial backing from the government
and easy negotiation of finance with their financial providers, which are mainly
state-owned banks. In contrast, PLCs owned by private investors would be subject
to more financial constraints, hence it is necessary and urgent for the Chinese
government to eliminate all the invisible or underlying rules so as to construct a
healthier and better functioning stock market. Last but not least, as the economic
reforms deepen, the time has come for the government to get rid of state
interference and relieve policy burdens on state-owned PLCs. The results of my
study suggest that state-owned PLCs are more likely to retain their incumbent top
management whose evaluation package contains non-profit maximisation criteria.
Arguably, policy burdens imposed on state-owned PLCs may hold their top
management less accountable for firm performance measures, and it would be
much easier for top management to use policy burdens as the excuse for their
unsatisfactory performance.
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7.4. Limitations and further research
The findings of this thesis can help shape the direction of future research In
corporate governance. The findings of the three empirical chapters demonstrate the
need to address issues in relation to the heterogeneity amongst state ownership
types in Chinese corporate governance research. Neglecting state owners' different
political and economic interests would probably obscure the true story. As noted
already, many previous studies have flaws in this respect as they fail to identify and
distinguish different types of ownership. The first empirical chapter has remedied
such flaws and demonstrated how the correct identification of ultimate owners
would lead to a different story. However, this chapter did not fully address all
aspects, and there is still room for further research. As suggested by the literature,
the divergence between cash flow and control rights can largely help to explain the
incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders (see, for
example, Claessens et al., 2002). Incorporating factors that capture such divergence
in the examination of ownership structure and corporate governance would
probably provide us with a better understanding. However, due to the limitations of
the data, this has to be left for further research.
The second empirical chapter has provided a clear picture of corporate governance
in one particular aspect: corporate cash holdings. However, the issue of cash
holdings is only part of the story of firms' capital structure. If appropriate data
could be collected, further investigation could focus on issues related to PLCs'
capital structure. Similarly, the third empirical chapter is also limited by the data
available and could be improved with further investigations. As acknowledged
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before, it is difficult but highly beneficial to obtain the data on the destinations of
the leaving top executives, which can enable researchers to clearly determine
whether top executives are removed or not. Research with such data would
probably produce a sharper image of the turnover-performance relationship in
China and bring more fruitful insights as a result. Furthermore, in China the
government is both the regulator and a player in the capital markets. Arguably, a
top executive with a good guanxi with the government can help hislher company to
secure favourable regulatory conditions and access to external funds, such as bank
loans, hence our knowledge of the top executive turnover could be greatly
improved with data on top executives' political connections to the government.
However, constrained by the dataset available, I have to confine the research to the
current scope and leave such expansions for further research.
The present research has contributed greatly to the improvement of our
understanding regarding corporate governance in China, although it has only
partially redressed the inadequacies in the literature. There is still large scope for
future research in this area. It would be useful to conduct research with respect to
many other issues, such as corporate capital structure, the pay-performance
relationship of top executives, the role of institutional investors and the role of
guanxi. Moreover, my study is also subject to limitations arising from the vague
image of real policy burdens imposed on state-owned PLCs. I doubt if obtaining
information regarding retirement and other welfare costs, redundant workers and
the persistence of price distortions can help draw a complete picture of the total
policy burdens. Nevertheless, a better knowledge of these issues would greatly
enhance our understanding of the relative importance of corporate governance
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mechanisms in China, and could eventually lead to the emergence of a clear picture
of corporate governance research.
In addition, due to the short history of the Chinese stock market, my sample is an
unbalanced panel with a relatively short period. Inclusion of new PLCs and
exclusion of delisted PLCs might have some influence on my results. Furthermore,
due to there being relatively fewer privately-controlled PLCs in my data, it seems
more difficult to obtain a complete picture of the private-controlled PLCs than
those state-owned ones. Extra caution should therefore be taken when applying the
findings of my study to real practice.
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